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ABSTRACT
The influence o f eight commodity groups on international economic integration in
five Central American Countries are analyzed. The commodity groups are rice, beans,
com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef. The countries are Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. A game theory framework is used to find a Nash
equilibrium solution to a set of trade negotiation scenarios. The payoffs of the Political
Preference Function (PPF) are used for the trade liberalization scenarios under analysis.
These PPF payoffs are estimated using the MISS model.
The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) is used as the main criterion for trade
liberalization. Status quo (SQ) or no reduction in protection, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%
reductions in protection or free trade (FT), are the scenarios under analysis. Four games
are modeled. In game one all PPF weights equal one, which means that all commodities
groups have the same importance in the government’s view. In game two, all PPF weights
are different from one, i.e., the government assigns different degrees of importance to some
sectors relative to other sectors and to itself. Game three and four include the PPF weights
o f game one and two but with a reduction of five percent in the exchange rate.
The results show that any individual country will agree to free trade when the rest
of countries, as a bloc, reduces protection by 50%. This indicates that Central American
countries will be likely to agree on a partial trade liberalization rather than to a more
involved form of economic integration. Commodity groups do not affect trade liberalization
adversely. The study suggests that the use o f game theory is an appropriate approach to
analyze economic integration in Central America.
xiii
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In June 1990, the Central American presidents signed an accord calling for the
creation of a stronger regional common market in an effort to end the poverty that has
contributed to regional instability. In 1992, the presidents ofthe Central American Countries
met to restart the process of economic integration one more time. This was a second
attempt to deepen economic integration of the area, hi the new scheme of economic
integration the objective is to promote the socioeconomic development of the region
through an increase in exports and the participation of the countries in international markets
as a bloc. With this objective in mind, the agreement of 1992 included a more open trade
relationship with the rest of the world and the re-elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers
in intra-regional trade. This time the agreement did not look forward to achieve the creation
o f the Central American Republic. The main objective was to alleviate the external debt
burden through the creation of a greater export supply o f commodities produced in the
region, the modernization of the productive infrastructure, and the increase of income and
employment
The agreement of 1992 indicates that each country will have to completely eliminate
tariff and non-tariff measures applied to trading partners in Central America. This implies
a reduction of 3% for Guatemala, 5% for El Salvador, 10% for Honduras, 8% for
Nicaragua, and 2% for Costa Rica. It is reasonable to expect that the countries with the
higher level of duty levied will suffer the most dramatic reductions in government revenue.
Will this agreement really improve the welfare of all countries or only that of a few? A clear
answer to this question is the determinant for the success o f the implementation of the

1
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2
agreement Therefore, a formal analysis is needed to measure the change in welfare from
such changes in trade policy. Little work has been done to analyze the effects of these
changes. It seems important to assess trade liberalization in Central America from different
perspectives and using various empirical approach. More research on this topic is
recommended because, for example, commodity groups may be very influential in shaping
domestic policies towards a trade liberalization agreement Among few studies on this issue,
De Franco (1996) found that a total elimination of the intra-regional trade barriers and the
adoption of a common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world, i.e., the formation
of a customs union, is harmful for the welfare of Honduras and Nicaragua. However, the
influence of commodity groups on the domestic policy-making process is not captured in
the study o f De Franco but it could be crucial for countries as how and when to enter the
trade liberalization agreement
Overview of Central America
Geographical Overview of Central America
Central America consists of seven small nations: Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. They are strung along the narrow isthmus
that links North America (Mexico) with South America (Colombia), with the Caribbean Sea
to the north and east and the Pacific Ocean to the west and south. This strategic location has
helped shape the region's history, culture, and economy. Central America has an area of
some 522,000 sq km (202,000 sq mi), and its population in 1992 was estimated at about 31
million. Its geography varies from towering volcanoes to some of the world's densest

jungles. The volcanoes are the most spectacular feature, forming a nearly 1,300-km-long
(800-mi) chain from the Mexican border into central Costa Rica and reaching heights of
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over 3,650 m (about 12,000 ft). Many o f these peaks are still active, contributing to both
the richness o f the soil and the dangers o f life in the area. Central America is also prone to
earthquakes. There is a major break in the chain of volcanoes and mountains in southern
Nicaragua, and the chain ends in central Panama. This has made these two areas particularly
attractive for trade routes between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and as possible canal
sites.
Economic Overview of Central American Countries
The economic development of Central American countries has been slower than in
other American Countries. By present standards, Central American countries are poor and
in developing stages. Table 1 presents data on key macroeconomic indicators. The total
economy of the countries is very small when compared with, for example, Louisiana
Table 1.1. Key Economic Indicators of Five Central American Countries ( 1997)
Item

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Pop, mill

11.2

6.0

6.3

4.6

3.5

GDP, USS
billion

17.8

11.4

4.7

2.0

9.5

Infiation,%

9.2

4.6

20.2

9.2

13.3

GDP
growth, %

5.0

5.0

5.3

5.8

3.6

Agriculture*

23.6

13.2

22.6

33.8

15.1

Industry*

20.2

26.7

30.2

21.7

23.2

Services*

56.4

60.1

47.1

44.6

61.7

Exports**

3187

2049

2007

936

4328

Imports**

4193

3256

2216

1482

4571

Debt**

3914

3182

3998

5887

3548

Debt/GDP

22.0

27.8

85.1

291.7

37.2

Source: World Bank, 1999. *-As > percentage ofGDP, ***mcludes good and services, USS millions
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which had a GSP of about $120 billion and a population of 4.4 millions in 1996 (Mindscape
US Atlas, 1996). All the countries in Table 1 present a negative balance of payments and
a high level of debt This is one o f the main reasons why accelerated improvement of the
productive sector is needed.
Table 1 shows the structure of the economies of the countries under the agreement.
Although the largest sectors are industry and services, it is clear that agriculture plays an
important role in the economies of these countries. Therefore, the impacts of the agreement
on economic integration will affect the agricultural sector of each country.
Historical Overview of Economic Integration
In earlier decades, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica
tried to deepen the economic integration of the area. This task proved to be difficult There
were many obstacles in the way of integration and this caused many delays and nearly
caused the disintegration of the Common Market created in the sixties. The objective ofthe
economic integration of that time reflected the fact that the terms of trade of the agricultural
commodities produced in the area were worsening. Therefore, a fast way to industrialization
was envisaged in the agreement of the Central American Common Market (CACM). There
were four main elements of this economic integration agreement First, free intra-regional
trade among the country members of the CACM. Secondly, a unified duty was levied on
imports from countries not member. Third, the CACM included the creation of the Central
American Peso, a common currency for the country-members. Finally, the creation of
institutions, such as the General Secretary of the Treaty of Economic Integration, the
Central American Monetary Council and the Central American Bank of Economic
Integration, were included in the agreement (De Franco, 1996).
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The Central American Common Market (CACM) formed in 1960 spurred some
industrial growth. Economic development produced better communications and more
education. The growing middle class began to demand more democratic and efficient
governments. At the same time, the new export crops took the best land away from the rural
poor, leading many to move to the cities. As pressures for change mounted, large
landowners combined with conservative military leaders to use increasing force to defend
their power. Elections were controlled, and the path to peaceful change seemed closed. This
prompted many to support radical-left violence as means of social and political changes. In
Nicaragua the long dictatorship of the Somoza family fell before the Sandinista guerrilla
campaign in 1979. Violence also spread to El Salvador and increased in Guatemala. The
CACM, already weakened by a 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras, virtually
disintegrated as the fighting spread. Tourism and investments declined sharply and debts
rose. High interest rates and low crop prices contributed to near economic collapse, and
U.S. efforts to restore stability via military and economic aid met with little success.
Conflict and economic decline continued despite efforts of the Contadora group
(Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) to find a solution acceptable to both
U.S.-supported forces and others aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 1987, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua signed a peace plan that helped bring
about elections in Nicaragua in February 1990, which the Sandinistas lost, and the
disbanding ofthe U.S.-supported rebel forces (the contras) there. Negotiations between the
central government and rebel forces in El Salvador were concluded in a cease-fire in January
1992.
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International Economic Integration
Robson (1984) defines economic integration “to denote a state o f affairs or a process
involving the combination of separate economies into larger economic regions.” In addition,
economic integration is concerned with efficiency in the use of resources. Robson (1984)
distinguishes three levels of economic integration: 1) national; 2) international; 3)
worldwide. In addition, at each level there may be sectoral integration. For example, there
can be integration in the agriculture sector or in industry. In this study, the second level of
integration is the relevant one.
International economic integration may take different forms and it depends on the
intended degree of economic integration (Robson, 1984). Depending on the degree of
integration, there are free trade areas, custom unions, common markets and economic
unions. A free trade area involves the free movement of product in the area, i.e, it involves
elimination of trade barriers between the members of the free trade. In addition, each
member retains it own tariff with respect o f the rest of the world. By contrast, a custom
union agreement involves not only the free movement of products in the area, but also a
common external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world. A common market is a deeper
form of integration. A common market contains the elements of a custom union and
additionally allows for free labor and capital flow in the area. Thus, in a common market,
factor and product markets are integrated. Presently, the deepest form o f international
integration is represented by an economic union. An economic union contains all the
elements of a common market and a high degree of unification of monetary, fiscal and other
policies, hi this case, depending on the degree of integration, a wide spectrum of forms of
integration can be seen. The degree of integration will depend mostly on the degree of
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harmonization policies among the members. In general, most agreements on international
integration are focused on the suppression o f discrimination among members, the
maintenance of discrimination against the rest o f the world and, the lasting character of the
agreements which limits the use of certain instruments of economic policy.
According to Robson (1984), there are important motives for the existence of
economic integration, such as gains in welfare for the group as a whole. The gains that may
be derived from the integration can be expressed in terms of increased production according
to comparative advantage, increased output arising from economies of scale, improvement
in the terms of trade with the rest of the world, changes in efficiency due to increased
competition among members, and integration-induced changes affecting the quantity and
quality of factor inputs.
On the other hand, economic integration is not a panacea for economic problems.
In real life, for example, a custom union (CU) agreement often has both trade-creating and
trade-diverting effect The success of the agreement is based on the net trade-creating
effect, i.e., by how much the trade-creating effect is greater than the trade-diverting effect
If trade creation is greater than trade diversion, then countries can expect to gain from the
agreement The reverse is true if trade diversion is greater than trade creation. Thus, the CU
agreement may well be beneficial or detrimental for the group involved.
International Economic Integration in Practice
Starting from the second half of the present century one can find many examples of
economic integration across the world. Some of them have been successful and others have
stagnated or completely disintegrated. Most of the agreements are made by countries that
are located close to each other or that share similar cultural, educational and political views.
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The most successful example of an agreement of economic integration is perhaps the
European Union (EU). The EU started as a common market in the late fifties and initially
included Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg as
members. In later years, the common market became what is now known as the European
Union (EU). Presently, there are IS country-members. As described earlier, since the EU
is an economic union, it involves free trade among members, the determination o f a common
external tariff (CET), factor and capital mobility and the creation of a common currency for
all die members of the union besides fiscal and monetary policies. Although many problems
have been present which have caused delays along the way to the realization of the
objectives of economic integration, this union can be said to be a success from both
theoretical and empirical points of view.
Other less successful examples are found around the globe in all continents. For
example, Robson (1984) found that six groups of economic integration have been set up in
Africa in the present century. The Custom and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC)
was setup by the francophone People’s Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and the
Central African Republic. These countries were also linked by a monetary union. The
Economic Community of East Africa (CEAO) was formed in 1974 by Ivory Coast, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. The CEAO is a second francophone grouping
and is also grouped in a monetary union with Benin and Togo. Liberia and Sierra Leone
established the Mano River Union (MRU) in 1973, the latter involving a custom union and
other forms of cooperation. In 1980, Guinea joined the union. The Economic Community
o f West African States (ECOWAS) was setup in 1975 by fifteen countries in Lagos. This
union included both francophone and anglophone countries and countries already linked in
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the CEAO and MRU. In 1969, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and the Republic of South
Africa signed a custom union agreement on foundations dating back to 1910. In 1976,
Zaire, Burundi and Ruanda formed the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).
Finally, the East African Community formed by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania broke up in
1978 although there was evident effectiveness during its existence.
In Latin America, there are also various examples o f economic integration besides
the 1960 common market o f Central America. The Treaty of Montevideo (1980) set up the
Latin America Integration Association (LAIA). This treaty included all Latin American
Countries with the exception of Guyana, Surinam and French Guiana. The LAIA is the
successor of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The Cartagena
agreement of 1969 established the Andean Group which included Chile, Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. The Caribbean Common Market was established
in 1973 by Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and others.
In Asia, besides the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), formed by
Singapore, Malaysia, the Phillippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, there are no other schemes
of international integration. There are, however, arrangements for sectoral integration
between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in the group known as Regional Cooperation for
Development (RCD).
Problem Definition
At this moment, there is little information available to each Central American
country’s decision-makers to foresee the effects of an economic integration agreement at
the national, regional and international levels, and specifically in the agricultural sector. This
study will analyze the consequences of the customs union agreement on the welfare of
several important agricultural commodities ofthe participating countries.
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Problem Jnstification
Since little information is available, Central American decision-makers have no clear
idea of the effects the economic integration system may bring to each country. In addition,
little research has been done on the long term effects o f the customs union agreement on the
five central American countries, which can be a serious obstacle for the successful
development o f the 1992 accords. For example, De Franco(1996) argues that in the short
and middle term Guatemala and Costa Rica will gain and Honduras and Nicaragua will lose
form the agreement. This outcome may persuade policy-makers of the latter countries to
be skeptical about the agreement However, the long term effects (S-10 years) are not
discussed anywhere. In addition, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used by De Franco
(1996) to estimate the effects of the custom union in the Computable General Equilibrium
Model (CGE)only included capitalists (owner) and workers without a sectoral analysis of
the impacts o f the agreement In general, international trade theory suggests that trade
liberalization brings positive changes in welfare for all parties (Krugman, 1994). This is the
reason why countries are willing to negotiate and liberalize trade. If there is not a feasible
gain from die agreement then it is reasonable to expect that the status quo situation will
prevail. Likewise, for the agreement to be acceptable, it is important to show how long it
will take for the benefits to show up for all countries. Finally, this study is important for the
agricultural sector of all countries within and outside the agreement in terms of trade
creation and diversion effects. So, this analysis is important for the US because it is the main
trading partner of the Central American countries.
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Objectives
Main Objective
The main goal of this research is to provide an analysis of the possible effects of the
economic integration efforts on the agricultural sub-sector o f the five Central American
Countries and their repercussions on the successful implementation of the integration
agreement o f 1992.
Specific Objectives
1.-

To identify and evaluate recent relevant national and international trends in
economic integration and the outcomes of such trends.

2.-

To hypothesize aplausible economic model useful in explaining the long term effects
of economic integration at country and sectoral levels.

3.-

To empirically estimate and test the hypothesized economic model, and

4.-

To draw conclusions from the model and provide recommendations to policy- and
decision-makers which can be used in further development o f the economic
integration of the Central American region at the sectoral level.
Procedures

Objective One
The first objective o f this research will be accomplished by a review of the relevant
literature in order to develop a thorough background on the relevant areas of the present
research. Therefore, empirical evidence of international economic integration will be
assessed. Moreover, the conceptual and empirical approach to evaluate economic
integration agreements will be reviewed. This literature review should generate relevant
information to understand recent trends in economic integration around the world and give
some hints as to what direction this present research should take.
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Objective Two
To achieve objective two of this research, based on the information obtained in
accomplishing objective one, an economic model will be conceptualized. This model will
relate the implementation of economic integration in Central American countries through
various economic policies (trade, fiscal, monetary) and the effects of such integration on the
agriculture sector. Since the objective of economic integration i? the improvement of the
welfare standard of the populations of the members of the integration scheme, the benefits
or losses derived from the scheme of integration changes in welfare will be estimated. Thus,
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total welfare changes will be estimated
to assess the impact o f the agreement on the welfare of each country. As in a cost-benefit
analysis, it is believed that if benefits outweighs costs, then the chances of successful
integration are increased and the agreement is more likely to last On the other hand, if
country members believe that the agreement is detrimental to welfare, the agreement is likely
-to fail.
It is worthwhile to recognize that the effects o f the integration agreements are to
be spread over the whole economy. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this study, agriculture
is a very important economic sector in Central American countries. So, the focus of this
research is to investigate the effects of economic integration on the agricultural sector. Thus,
the conceptual model will be developed in a partial equilibrium framework because any
change in welfare in this sector is a representative situation o f the whole economy.
Therefore, the use o f a partial equilibrium framework to analyze the effects of economic
integration on the agriculture sector will contribute toward this assessment of the impact of
this economic agreement on the whole economy.
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Objective Three
This objective will be achieved through the empirical modeling o f the relationships
established in objective two. Until recently, Central American countries continued defining
the timetable and the extent o f a new economic integration agreement. Therefore, several
integration scenarios are likely to be present in the table of negotiations. Most of these
scenarios have to deal with the coordination o f national policies. This coordination is a
crucial condition in order for each country to start benefitting from the reduction of trade
barriers and increased size markets. At the same time, integration efforts convey costs in
terms of sovereignty, welfare trade-offs and trade diversion as a whole and from the
perspective of specific domestic sectors. Therefore, some scenarios may bring positive or
negative benefits for all or some of the members. Thus, it is important to assess what
scenarios are the most relevant to achieve the stated goal of standard of living improvement
of the populations of Central American countries.
Since it was stated that the theoretical framework will involve the use of a partial
equilibrium model, the use a Political Payoff or Preference Function (PPF) is proposed as
one o f the most appropriate techniques in this kind of analysis. The approach of the PPF
used in this research is based on the one used by Kennedy (1995), previously developed by
Gardner, Rauser and Freebaim and also similar to the approach developed by Stigler and
Peltzman, Magee, and Hillman. Thus, the PPF used in this research is a weighted, additive
function of money metric welfare measures for various societal groups. The PPF is the
objective function that policy-makers seek to maximize through the selection o f specific
policy actions.
The discussion above indicates that societal groups enter as arguments in the PPF
and economic integration affects their welfare. Therefore, producers, consumers, lobbyists,
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and politicians will seek to influence the decisions of the government as to how to enter the
economic integration agreement Through this influence, each group seeks to minimize
adverse effects or to maximize gains when entering the agreement Thus, the
appropriateness of the PPF to analyze economic integration in Central America derives from
the extent that the political influence of various societal groups can be modeled. In addition,
the numerical estimate of each group’s influence will probably indicate what integration
scheme is the most likely to be considered as the best scheme for each country, given the
solution of the PPF maximization problem.
Objective Four
The final objective of this study will be achieved through a generalization of findings
resulting from empirical estimation of the partial equilibrium model proposed in objective
three. Results will be interpreted in the context of information needs of the policy makers,
consumers, and producers of Central American and foreign countries affected by the
agreement of economic integration in Central America.
Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter one will present the introduction, problem statement, justification,
objectives, and procedures for the research. Chapter two will present an exhaustive
literature review on the trends of economic integration in the Central American region,
empirical studies using various techniques and methods to analyze international economic
integration. Trade issues will also be reviewed. Chapter three will present a review of the
relevant literature on partial equilibrium analysis and the derivation of the theoretical model
to estimate the effects of the scheme of economic integration chosen by the Central
American countries on welfare inside and outside the economic bloc. Chapter four deals
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with the estimation o f elasticities of supply and demand which are required for the empirical
estimation of the conceptual model of Chapter three. Chapter five includes data collection,
assessment of the quality of the data and the empirical results o f the model conceptualized
in chapter three. Chapter six will summarize the results and present the implications,
conclusions, and recommendations for policy-makers inside and outside Central America.
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CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW
An exhaustive exercise is developed in this chapter. Therefore, the chapter is
divided into four sections. First, reviews of Central American agriculture and the main
policies that affect performance of agriculture are included. Second, relevant literature to
the Central American Common Market and its system of economic integration is examined.
Third, relevant literature to the issues of economic integration is reviewed in the light of
the developing countries context. Fourth, since the new philosophy of economic integration
in Central America is based on the idea of export promoting policies, empirical evidence
on Export Promotion (EP) Policies is reviewed. Finally, empirical applications analyzing
economic integration based on a game theoretical approach using a Political Preference
Function (PPF) are reviewed.
Central American Agriculture and Policies
Central American Agriculture
Climatic conditions are favorable to grow a wide variety of tropical crops in Central
America (Table 2.1). However, rice, beans, com, sorghum, cotton, coffee, sugar cane,
bananas, African palm, cattle, and shrimp are the main agricultural activities in Central
American countries. Central American Agriculture has historically had a dual nature. On
one hand, the domestic consumption sector has been neglected. Therefore, little attention
has been devoted to its technological development and productivity in this sector is very
low. The domestic consumption group is composed of beans, sorghum, com and rice. On
the other hand, the group of crops devoted to the export sector has received most o f the
efforts devoted to the development of agriculture in Central America. The agricultural
export sector consists o f cotton, bananas, coffee, sugar cane, and beef.

16
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Table 2.1.

Production o f Main Agricultural Products in Central American Countries, 1998.
El Salvador

Costa Rica

Item

Area*

Area

Output6

Output

Honduras

Guatemala
Area

Output

Area

Output

Nicaragua
Area

Output

Total
Area

Output

Rice

64.7

276.9

8.8

52.4

13.3

40.7

10.9

13.8

57.9

215.9

156

599.7

Beans

38

13.4

63.1

55.4

124.6

84.4

78.9

72.7

145.7

97.8

450

323.7

Com

17

32

250

582

589

1021

447

471

229

451

1532

2557

Sorghum

0

0

101.9

170.8

42.3

51.6

82.3

90.2

21.8

40.6

248

353.2

Cotton

0

0

0

0

0.4

0.6

1.4

1.4

1.8

2.7

3.6

4.7

Coffee

106

148.9

163.9

119.6

273

223.1

199.7

155.1

89.1

64.7

832

.711.4

Sugar C.

49

3682

81

5546

182

19845

45

4113

46

3261

403

36447

Banana

51.3

2443

0

0

17.0

710

22.4

862

1.8

88

92.5

4103

A. Palm

26.5

444

0

0

19

289

33.4

522

2

53

80.9

1308

Cattle

1527*

82“

1038

35

1769

54

5400

138

1688

48

11422

357

N/A
8.6
N/A
40.3
4.0
17.4
N/A
7.9
N/A
2.4
Shrimp
N/A
N/A
Source: ECLAC, 1999. For all countries: (a) area in 1000 Ha; (b) output in 000 MT; (c) cattle in 1000 heads; (d) beef in 1000 MT,
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Table 2.2.

Self-sufficiency Ratios of Main Agricultural Products in Central American Countries, 1997
El Salvador

Costa Rica

Item

Guatemala

Honduras

Average

Nicaragua

Rice

82.2

56.3

50.89

33.84

62.38

57.12

Beans

38.63

93.5

100.52

106.50

116.46

91.12

Com

3.23

55.61

82.88

75.54

99.72

63.39

Sorghum

0

97.38

101.91

56.54

111.23

73.41

76.86

95.46

103.96

178.11

114.23

116.78
Beef
Source: ECLAC, 1999.

El Salvador

Costa Rica

Item

Guatemala

Nicaragua

Honduras

Total

volume

Value

volume

0

0.9

1274

2.3

2800

21

10.2

186.5

44.6

1922

476.3

177.0

513.3

175.7

74.3

19.5

3251.3

988.3

212.7

585

139.8

430

55.1

171

637.3

1913

437

N/A

1792

4000

19036

34551

33367

61253

volume*

Value6 volume

Value

volume

Value

volume

Cotton

0

0

1.4

1526

0

0

0

Sugar

106.1

39.2

243.9

66.5

1364.5

315.8

Banana

2013.5

616.1

0

0

650.2

Coffee

129

405

100.7

322

Beef

12100

22700

2

2

Value

Value

31595
337033
128800 5167
86665
7516
27494
9513
61289 4510
32785
Shrimp 4889
Source: ECLAC, 1999. For all countries: (a) Cotton, Sugar, Bananas, and Coffee in 1000 TM; Beef and Shrimp in TM; (b) Sugar, Bananas,
and Coffee in million of US $; Cotton, Beef, and Shrimp in 1000 US $.
00

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2.4.

Imports o f Main Agricultural Products o f Central American Countries, 1997
Costa Rica

Item

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras
Value

Total

Nicaragua
volume

volume

Value

34382

265.3

108032

1.8

803

28.8

18082

25364

16.3

2836

1278

215891

10561

0.9

629

76.6

12408

65.2

14621

965.2

207134

volume*

Value6

volume

Value

volume

Value

volume

Rice

65.2

25565

34.3

11332

26.6

8692

58.0

28061

81.2

Beans

19.6

11499

6.2

5312

0.1

31

1.1

437

Com

568.5

93749

325.9

55670

251.2

38272

116.1

Sorghum

0

36

5.1

1038

0.1

144

70.5

44341
62624
173.2
51972 154.8
309.2
33576 262.8
Wheat
Source: ECLAC, 1999. For all countries: (a) volume in 1000TM; (b) value in 1000 US$

Value

SO

20
To get a better idea about food self-sufficiency in Central America, self-sufficiency
ratios are included in Table 2.2. It is clear that in all agricultural products for domestic
consumption, such as rice, beans, sorghum, and com, domestic consumption has to rely on
imports. This situation implies that countries have to earn foreign exchange to satisfy needs
o f main food staples. Thus, other crops devoted to exports are helpful in coping with this
situation.
Agricultural exports are very important for the Central American countries. As was
shown in Table 1.1 in Chapter one, agricultural exports made up 52.52% of Central
American total exports in 1997. This important contribution to exchange earnings came
from exports of coffee, cotton, sugar, bananas, and beef. Historically, these crops have
represented the main source of foreign exchange (Table 2.3). However, in recent years,
exports of shrimp have been increasing steadily and lately shrimp exports have made up
a good share of agricultural exports.
Central American Agricultural Policies
There are many obstacles to production and trade in Central American countries.
Various measures, such as licenses, permits, import and exports taxes are widely applied
in all countries. On the contrary, it seems that little policy efforts in food production are
directed to promote production of agricultural commodities in Central America when
compared to other countries outside the region. Table 2.5 shows export restrictions
effective in Central America in 1999. Permits and licenses are required to export in all
countries with the exception of Honduras. In addition, the degree of restrictiveness varies
across countries. Nicaragua is the most restrictive country among those imposing
restrictions. Export quotas are only imposed in El Salvador on exports of textiles to the
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US. This is probably related to the activity of the export processing zones (EPZ) or
"maquilas" present in the country.
As in the case of exports, there are restrictions to imports in Central America.
According to Table 2.6, with the exception of Costa Rica and Honduras, permits and
licenses are widely used in Central America. Nicaragua is the extreme case of import
control since licenses are required for all imports. However, there were no quantitative
restrictions such as quotas in Central American countries in 1999.
As in many other developing countries, export taxes are present in Central
American countries. Coffee, bananas, sugar, and beef are affected by this type of tax (Table
2.7). Exports are more heavily taxed in Costa Rica when compared to the rest of Central
American countries. On the contrary, there were no export taxes in effect in El Salvador
or Nicaragua in 1999. In Guatemala, export taxes are applied to all commodities. In
Honduras, only the export of bananas is taxed.
The application of an import tax or tariff is another kind of restriction to trade
commonly used in Central America, hi general, there has been a tendency to tax imports
of final goods more heavily than imports of capital goods and raw materials. This is
consistent with data reported in Table 2.8. Accordingly, all countries impose taxes with a
maximum level between 15-18% and minimum level of 0%. This is in agreement with the
new economic integration negotiations developed during the nineties.
On the other hand, some producer support policies are implemented in Central
American countries. However, in developing countries it is more common to find taxes
than measures o f support In the case of Central America, the most common measure of
support to agriculture is the implementation of subsidy programs for exportable
commodities, taxes and import duties exemptions for agricultural inputs (fertilizers,
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Table 2.5.

Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999, Export Restrictions.

Item \ Country

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Licenses/Permits

Permits are
required for
products of vegetal,
sea, and mineral
origin, wildlife
species, drugs,
flowers, textiles,
weapons and
explosives.

Licenses for
endangered species,
coffee, sugar, and
other products
under international
agreements.
Permits for diesel,
liquified gas,
cement, animal
feed, sea products,
meat, medicines
and biological
agrochemicals

No permits
required. Licenses
to export to Central
America, except
Costa Rica when
payment is made in
US currency.
Licenses are
required to export
to the rest of die
world.

Not required

Permit for: metal
for recycling,
capital goods,
shrimp, lumber, fur,
taxidermic pieces,
leather, various
forestry products,
coffee, live
animals, vehicles,
processed wood
except cedar and
mahogany,
personal property,
scientific and
commercial
exhibits.
Precious metal can
be exported only
with authorization
o f the Central Bank

Quotas

None

Textiles for the US
market

None

None

None

Source: SIECA, 1999.
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Table 2.6.

Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999, Import Restrictions.

Item \ Country

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Licenses/Permits

Only for petroleum
products

License to import
endangered species.
Permit for gasoline,
kerosene, turbo
fuel, diesel,
petroleum,
liquefied gas,
textiles, fiber bags,
sugar, molasses.

Licenses not
required. Permits
for natural and
synthetic rubber,
fertilizers, basic
staples, oilseed,
wheat fluor,
herbicides,
insecticides, animal
feed and
veterinarian
products.

None

Licenses are
required for all
imports.

None

None

None

None

None
Quotas
Source: SIECA, 1999.
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Table 2.7.

Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Export Taxes

Item \ Country

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

None

1.0% o f the price
FOB

None

None

Coffee

a)l .5% o f the exported value in
US $ at all prices
b)An additional 1% of the price
FOB if the price of a 46 Kg sac
is above US $92.00.

Bananas

1.0% of the FOB price, $0.18
and 1.5 colones for each
exported box

None

None

$0.18 per 40
Lb. box.

None

Sugar

1.0% if FOB price is below
US$18.00,5% when price is
between US$18.00 and
US$23.00,13% if price is
between US$28.00 and
US$33.00, and 18% if price is
above US$35.00

None

None

None

None

Other

Beef: 1.0% of the FOB price
Cattle: Pure breed: 1.0%,
Mixed breeds: 6.0%

None

1.0% of FOB
price except
import regime
and Export
Processing Zones
(Maquilas)

None

None

Source: SIECA, 1999.
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Table 2.8.

Trade Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Import Taxes

Item \ Country

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Various

18% of value of
final goods
1.0% o f the value
o f raw materials
and capital goods

15.0% o f the value
o f final goods.
Between 5% and
10% for
intermediate goods.
0% for raw material
and capital goods.

17% for final goods
7.0% o f value of
intermediate goods.
0.0% for raw
material and capital
goods.

18.0% of the value
of final goods.
Between 5% and
10.0% of the value
of intermediate
goods.
1.0% o f the value
o f capital goods
and o f all kinds o f
raw material
(medicines,
fertilizers,
insecticides, and
agricultural
fungicides )

between 0.0% and
15.0%. In general
higher rates are
applied to sugar,
sucrose, rice, beans,
white com, and
chicken.

Source: SIECA, 1999.
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Table 2.9.

Support Policies in Effect in Central America in 1999: Subsidies

Item \ Country

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Various

Tax Credit
Certificate (CAT)
for non-traditional
agricultural
products exported
to the rest of the
world. 8%
minimum and 20%
maximum of the
FOB value. A 15%
tax is applied to the
total amount of the
CAT.

A subsidy is given
to diesel for public
transportation and
gas for domestic
use.

A marginal subsidy
is given to public
transportation

A subsidy is given
to public
transportation.
Electricity is
subsidized when
private monthly
consumption is less
the 300 kWh.

1.5% of the FOB
value o f export is
given to exporters
in concept of
compensation for
payments on import
taxes.

Source: SIECA, 1999.
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pesticides, capital goods). Table 2.9 shows that some export subsidies are given to
agricultural commodiy exporters in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. No measures o f direct
support were reported in the rest o f the countries.
Central American Common Market (CACM)
The CACM was first established in 1960. A number o f problems of various nature
caused its virtual disintegration in the eighties, hi 1992, an effort to revive the CACM was
in vogue and a series of steps were taken to do so. In this section, a review of the nature of
the agreement of 1960, the objectives, achievements and problems are discussed. Then, a
review o f the direction of economic integration in the nineties is presented and compared
to that of the sixties and seventies.
CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
Economic integration in Central America apparently started a long time ago.
According to Quiros-Guardia (1973), after World War II there was a favorable international
market situation for many Central American export products, such as coffee, bananas and
other agricultural products. This situation led to a network o f bilateral agreements among
Central American countries in the 1950s. The changing situation in the international
economic environment and the European Common Market in that period became the
inspiration for Central American countries to sign the " CentralAmerican Treaty on Tariff

Equalization” o f 1959 and the General “ Treaty o f Central American Economic
Integration" o f1960 (SIECA, 1999). Forabetterunderstandingofthesetreaties, their main
objectives are presented here.
Walter et al (1967) mentioned five main objectives of the Central American
Economic Integration Treaty of 1960. First, the most important objective was to establish
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a regional free trade area. Secondly, an equalization o f external tariffs was envisaged.
Third, the harmonization of measures to promote industrialization was another objective
included in the agreement Free mobility o f capital and labor was the fourth objective.
Finally, the last objective was the encouragement of industries to produce and supply for
the regional market So, the main objective o f the CACM was to create a customs union for
the goods being produced in Central America.
For the purpose o f achieving the objectives mentioned above several organizational
structures were created (McClelland, 1972). The economic council, made up of the five
ministers o f economy, was among the highest authority in the system. The executive
council, made of the five vice-ministers of economy, was responsible for the direct
execution of the agreements. The Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), made up of international
officers highly trained and competent (Business International Corporation, 1969), was
responsible for the technical matters of the integration process. The Central American Bank
for Economic Integration (CABEI) was the financial institution through which important
projects for the economic integration of the area were to be financed. The monetary council
formed by the presidents of the central banks of the countries had the tasks of the
stabilization of the exchange rate and, in the long run, the creation of the Central American
currency unit
It is important to mention that the scheme of integration of the sixties not only
pursued economic but also political integration of the region. Therefore, several structures
o f political objectives were established. The Central American Court of Justice was created
as a supreme court at the regional level. The Education Council, the Central American
Legislative Council and the Central American Defense Council were established to
promote political integration in the region (Business International Corporation, 1969).
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Along with the objectives and organizational structures o f economic and political
integration, the “rules o f the game” of integration were created and established. For this
purpose several protocols were signed and brought into effect In 1958, the "Multilateral

Treaty o f Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration ” was signed in
Honduras. This treaty was supplemented with a treaty on integration industries (Walter,
1967). The former was the first document defining the integration process. The latter
defined what industries would be given a status of regional development importance and
would enjoy free access to the markets o f all countries, hi 1959, the “Central American

Agreement on Equalization o fImport Duties” was signed. This agreement defined a fiveyear schedule to equalize external tariffs.
The “General Treaty o f Central American Integration”, signed in 1960 in
Nicaragua, is probably the most important document related to the economic integration
in the area. This treaty formally established the creation of a customs union over a five-year
period. At the same time, the protocol of the agreement on the equalization of import duties
and the agreement establishing the Central American Bank o f Economic Integration
(CABEI) were ratified (Walter, 1967). According to this general treaty the CABEI was
envisaged as an institution with a high degree of independence although its capital was
created with funds from each country member and with funds provided by the U.S. In
addition to these agreements, many other protocols were signed in the same period to
regulate the activities of the CACM (SIECA, 1999).
Organization Structure of the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
Implementation o f the CACM in the way it was planned required an adequate
structure to be successful. The structure of the CACM in the sixties is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Heads of Stale

Economic Council

Monetary Council

CABEI

SIECA

Figure 2.1.

Organization of the Central American Common Market of the Sixties

Since one of the main objective of the economic union was to achieve political union, the
formation o f the CACM brought about the formation of the Court o f Justice and the
Legislative Council or Central American Parliament. The structure of the integration
scheme in Central America was greatly dependent on the economic, education, monetary,
and the defense council which were of great relevance in the implementation of the CACM
agreements. All matters related to economic development were under the responsibility of
the economic council and the direct execution under the responsibility of the executive
council.
The CABEI and the Central American Research Institute of Industrial Technology
(ICATTI from the name in Spanish), given status of institutions, were very important in the
development o f the CACM. Various projects directed to strengthen integration in the area
were to be primarily financed by the CABEI. The CABEI was the main source for large
projects such as the international Pan-American highway and other large projects in the area
for public and private industries. Finally, the ICATTI was the main industrial research
institution of the CACM. The ICATTI was instrumental in developing feasibility studies in
several industrial sectors o f the Central American economies. The SIECA, the Permanent
Secretariat of Central American Integration, strongly relied upon the advice of the ICATTI
in deciding on what was convenient or undesirable for the CACM economy.
Performance of Central American Countries under the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
In general, there is a common consensus that the implementation of the CACM
brought many positive changes to the economies of the Central American countries
(Wardlaw, 1966;Walter, 1967; Business International Corporation, 1969; McClelland,
1972; Alonso, 1994). Moreover, in many cases the CACM experience has been presented
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as an example of success of integration in less developed countries (Robson, 1984).
However, for some analysts, the fast changes during the period 1960-80 are not only a
result o f the implementation o f the CACM but also o f the favorable international terms of
trade for agricultural products (Alonso, 1994). Since it is somewhat difficult to measure the
impact of the CACM on the development of the region, analysts have different opinions on
this point.
However, under the CACM, countries began to grow at a fast rate. For example,
between 1960 and 1970, the real GDP of Central American countries grew at 6% on
average. This rate was above the S.6 % average growth rate for all Latin American
countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). This situation favored
intra-regional and international trade in the area. For example, between 1960 and 1965
exports increased in the area by 316% to a total of $ 132 million and total exports in the area
reached $772 million (Table 2.1) (Wardlaw, 1966; Institute of Latin American Studies,
1988). Thus, as a result of the elimination of internal tariffs, intra-regional trade grew in the
first three years from 3.5% to 27% of total trade. In addition, by 1968, manufactured
commodities were two-thirds of intra-regional exports (Washington Institute for Values in
Public Policy, 1983).
The impressive picture of the sixties contrasted with that of the seventies. During
the first half of the seventies, real economic growth in the region declined to 5.2% whereas
the total growth rate in Latin America averaged 6.5%. However, the worst was yet to come,
hi the second half of the decade real GDP in Honduras grew at a rate of 6.6% but in
Nicaragua it declined by 1.8% in 1978, causing the region's growth to decline to 1% on
average (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983).
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In addition, die fast population growth rate observed in the area during the years
1960-80 caused per capita economic performance remain below the average for all Latin
American Countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). For example,
measured in 1980 US$, per capita income in 1960 averaged $692 in Central America
against an average o f $842 for Latin America as a whole. By 1970 per capita income of the
CACM ($991) was still below the average for Latin America ($1106). Thus, during the
period 1960-80 the average population growth rate for CACM was 2.8% while the average
economic growth rate was 5.12%. Per capita income growth rate was 1.8% during the same
period which was below the average for Latin America as a whole.
Although the implementation o f the CACM expanded trade in the region, the
balance of trade of the CACM countries worsened relative to the rest of the world during
the same period (Table 2.10). From 1960 to 1980, the value of imports of the CACM
increased 18% while exports increased 11.9% per year on average. This is one of the main
reasons for the negative trade balance of the CACM relative to the rest of the world during
Table 2.10

Trade Balance of CACM Countries in Selected Years (US$ Million).
Imports

Years

Total

Regional

Trade Balance

Exports
Total

Regional

Total

Regional

1960

468

33

444

30

-24

-3

1965

806

121

772

132

-34

+11

1970

1133

310

1113

299

-20

-11

1975

2704

520

2352

519

-352

-I

1980

5657

1160

4775

1160

-882

0

Source; Institute o fLatin American Studies, 1988.

the analyzed period. At the regional level, both imports and exports grew 18.24% per year
on average during the same period. So, it seems that the trade balance worsening was
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mainly caused by the slow growth in exports to rest o f the world relative to the growth in
imports.
Another perspective of CACM performance can be obtained from the industrial and
agricultural sectors. It appears that industries related to consumer goods (foodstuff, shoes,
textiles, etc) and others with historical tradition were the most dynamic industries during
the first decade ofthe CACM (Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988). In addition, some
intermediate goods industries expanded in those years (paper, tires, petrochemicals and
metal-mechanic). This pattern of development, known as Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI), caused industrial production share in the GDP to increase from
12.3% in I960 to 17% in 1970 (Institute ofLatin American Studies, 1988) and then decline
to 14% between 1970 and 1980 (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983).
Agriculture has been the main source of foreign exchange earnings for Central
American countries. Bananas, coffee, cotton, beef and sugar have been historically the
primary export products accounting for about 80% o f foreign exchange earnings. By
contrast, intra-regional exports have consisted mainly o f manufactured commodities
(Alonso, 1994). As o f 1980, agriculture continued to be the most important source of
exchange rate revenue of the economy despite the integration process. However,
agricultural share in the GDP decreased from 29% in 1960 to 25% in 1970 and to about
23% in 1980 (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). In addition, food
self-sufficiency notably decreased in the seventies and enormous shortages in the food
supplies became increasingly apparent. Also, there still exists backwardness in storage
, infra-structure and food preservation (Institute ofLatin American Studies, 1988).
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Factors Affecting Performance o f the CACM in the 1960-1980 Period
As was mentioned before, the Central American experience with the CACM has
been presented as an example o f successful economic integration among LDC. However,
despite the initial great success, the CACM had practically disintegrated by the beginning
o f the eighties. Analysts mention many factors that worked for the initial success and later
failure o f the CACM from 1960 to 1980.
A.-

Input Substitution Industrialization (ISI) Scheme as the Philosophy of Growth
Ballance et al (1982) defined Input Substitution Industrialization as a long term

process. Initially, a country following this scheme should discourage consumer goods
imports through imposition o f tariffs to protect and enhance conditions for domestic
production. Secondly, expansion of production of supplies and intermediate goods is
achieved. Finally, production of capital goods is expanded. The immediate objective of this
process is to initially encourage consumer goods industries followed by an expansion of
industries supplying inputs to reduce dependence on external sources of inputs. Thus,
import substitution should create an industrial sector able to rely on domestic sources of
inputs and capital goods. Once the industrial sector has developed enough to become
competitive relative to international suppliers of manufactures, tariffs were to be reduced
to create a competitive environment as an incentive to further industrial growth.
There is an accepted concept that ISI has not been implemented as initially
suggested in most LDC including those of the CACM and therefore many problems have
arisen (Ballance et al, 1982). For example, once tariffs were imposed, their levels were
never reduced and this became a permanent feature of industrial policy. In addition, the
structure o f the economy has been affected by two types of bias. The “home market” bias
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caused resources to be reallocated out o f agriculture and mining into the import-competing
industries due to discrimination against exporters. The “consumer good” bias caused a shift
of resources out ofless favored manufacturers to import-competing industries. Thus, as can
be expected under the ISI scheme, agriculture was the main loser in most o f countries that
followed this model o f industrial development. In addition, this protectionism often led to
very high profits, inefficient use o f resources and has been crucial in discouraging the
establishment of industries providing inputs. The reason for the discouragement in
establishing industries providing inputs is that final goods producers did not want to have
any competition for the benefits of protection they enjoyed and they knew that producers
of intermediate products could eventually also be protected and become competitors for
those benefits.
hi brief, it has been stated that the good industrial performance o f the CACM in the
sixties was a consequence of the first stage of the ISI scheme and the poor performance in
the seventies was a consequence of the end of this stage (Institute o f Latin American
Studies, 1988) and the incorrect implementation ofthe ISI scheme. Because ofthe incorrect
implementation o f the ISI scheme, protection remained at high levels for consumer goods
industries. In addition, only a small number of intermediate industries was established
between 1960 and 1980. This situation led to a growing dependence on external sources of
oil and raw materials. Since prices o f oil and raw materials increased greatly in the first half
of the seventies, the share of manufactures in the GDP during the seventies decreased
considerably.
B.-

Dual Economy
The economies o f the Central American countries historically have consisted of a

subsistence domestic sector and a strong exporting sector (Alonso, 1994; Institute o f Latin
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American Studies, 1988). The export sector is mainly characterized by large size properties,
high concentration ratios and the control of export o f agricultural products (coffee, bananas,
sugar cane and cotton). The subsistence sector consists o f small farms with low
productivity, low income and high levels o f unemployment The subsistence sector
produces mainly beans, rice, com and sorghum. In addition to this division of the
agriculture sector, there is a lack of productive infrastructure (irrigation sources, means of
transportation and communications, shortage of financial credit, etc.). Few efforts have
been directed to remedy this situation and the export sector has been the main beneficiary.
The declining growth in agriculture during the seventies was caused by a decline in the
world price of the export products. This situation led to large shortages of food and
exchange earnings to purchase food abroad. In addition to the worsening terms of trade,
trade balance got almost out of control by the end of the seventies.
C.-

Industrial Integration Process
In the fifties, Central American countries lagged in industrial development relative

to leading Latin American countries. Therefore, to accelerate industrial development in
Central America, the “System o fIntegration Industries ’’ agreement was signed in 1958.
The program was intended to promote and coordinate development through the creation of
free internal trade for designated products of chosen companies (Walter et al, 1967). The
idea was that chosen companies would receive exclusive “common market rights” for a
period up to ten years. Other companies selling the same product would be forced to trade
in the CACM with the same tariffs applied to imports from outside of CACM. However,
these barriers were to be gradually decreased in a period of ten years. As can be inferred,
the purpose was to facilitate the establishment o f important industries that otherwise could

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
have not survived under the ongoing market conditions. One o f the major concerns of the
program was to prevent concentration o f industries and therefore a second integration
industry could not be granted to any CACM country until every member nation has been
awarded one.
hi practice, problems with this system of industries became apparent soon after its
creation and therefore it did not have the expected results. First, a provision of the general
treaty signed in 1960 granting immediate internal free trade in all products supplied within
the CACM practically nullified the system (Walter et al, 1967). Secondly, there was
opposition form external sources of financing, particularly the AID, which saw in this
program a monopolistic nature discouraging the free trade and enterprise that were the very
nature of the economic integration treaty of 1960 (Cochrane, 1964). Thirdly, economic
theory suggests that it is more economically feasible to create large industrial centers than
a distribution of industries over a large geographical area (Krugman, 1994).
D.-

Fiscal Policy for Industrial Development
Fiscal incentives as a means to attract foreign investment for rapid industrial

development became a two-edge sword for countries using them. For example, CACM
countries that have used a wide variety of incentives to attract investors have found that in
the long run the effect of such policies has not been as positive as expected (McClelland,
1972). This happens because competing countries are likely to offer better incentives
relative to these countries in order to secure investment Once the offer is made, other
countries competing for investment will offer a better deal to investors than the initial offer
they received. This process may continue until a point at which a country could be made
worse offwith the establishment of industries than without them. This may happen because
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o f losses in government revenue due to offered tax breaks, subsidies, monopoly rights, and
so forth. So, in the end, competing countries would be better off by agreeing on the level
o f fiscal incentives to be given to investors instead of competing against each other. This
seemed to be a strong incentive to unify fiscal policies within the CACM.
It seemed that Central American countries seriously intended to implement uniform
fiscal policies to attract investment. Article 19 of the general treaty stated the intention to
reach an agreement which would substitute the existing programs of each country on fiscal
incentives for industries. In July 1962, an agreement to unify fiscal incentives was signed
by all CACM countries. The harmonization of laws of the respective member countries to
provide the greatest possible incentives and the correction ofthe disparities that contributed
to imbalances in regional development were two important objectives of this agreement.
In addition, the agreement was very detailed in specifying various types of incentives to be
granted to industries according to their importance in CACM countries’ industrial
development. Finally, the agreement was to be completely enforced by 1970.
However, practical implementation of this agreement proved to be an impossible
task leading to negative repercussions for the economies o f CACM countries. For example,
in 1969, when Honduras withdrew from the CACM, this agreement had not been ratified
by several member countries and it was never enforced. In the meantime, each country had
resumed implementing a wide variety of fiscal incentives to attract investors. On the other
hand, it has been argued that investors looked at other factors, such as location of natural
resources , labor, weather, local financial institutions and so forth, in addition to fiscal
incentives, to make a decision on what and where to invest in Central America (Business
International Corporation, 1969). Therefore, as each country resumed offering its own fiscal
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incentives to attract capital, results showed a wasteful use o f these policy instruments,
resulting in welfare losses for CACM members (McClelland, 1972).
E.-

Political-military Problems
Political and military instability in the Central American region has been another

negative factor for economic development Political instability in the region began to be
more notorious after it received independence from Spain in 1821. Local political forces
were not educated enough to run the countries in a stable way and therefore political
turmoil was often the way to solve economic and social problems. Turmoil scared away
many potential national and foreign investors, hi addition, foreign powers tried to “re
conquer’' the region several times. This compelled countries to exert great efforts into
building armies and defending themselves from foreign re-colonization attempts.
In the last few decades, the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, civil
unrest during the seventies in Guatemala and El Salvador, the Sandinista revolution of
Nicaragua in 1979 which led to a change of government in Nicaragua, the re-militarization
ofthe area; the continuous US intervention in the area (Institute o f Latin American Studies,
1988), and beliefs of interventions from other Central American Countries (Schmitter,
1972) may be mentioned as some o f the negative political and military conditions
surrounding achieving the goals of the CACM agreements. Thus, these conditions created
an endogenous problem that negatively impacted economic development in the area. For
example, it is assumed that the failure o f the CACM agreement is due partly to political
instability, which led to disinvestment and dis-industrialization in the area (Institute of
Latin American Studies, 1988). For example, in the sixties, gross domestic investment
(GDI) grew faster than the average for Latin America 7.3%. However, in the seventies, GDI
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growth rate slowed down and in some countries there was no growth at all. This can be
explained by capital flight, reduced access to international capital markets, lower saving
rates and chronic trade and budget deficits. All these conditions were effects of the political
instability in the region (Alonso, 1994).
F.-

Social-economic Problems
Social-economic conditions in Central American countries may be seen as a cause

and at the same time as an effect of failed attempts to develop the region. On the one hand,
poor economic conditions have led to inability to adequately satisfy social needs. Generally
speaking, social conditions, such as nutrition, health, employment, education, and housing,
have been historically less satisfactory in Central America than in other Latin American
countries (Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1983). On the other hand, the
very existence of such conditions have made it impossible to develop the region rapidly.
Thus, attempts to implement various programs in the region have failed because the region
lacked the necessary physical infrastructures, skilled and educated labor, and other
important pre-conditions for an fortunate end to such efforts.
G.-

Terms o f Trade
Worsening terms of trade for agricultural products over time have led to worsening

trade balances and, in turn, deficits in balances of payments. This has had the consequence
o f causing lags in industrial development in the CACM (Alonso et al, 1994). The centerperiphery development upon which Latin America has built its international economic
relations is blamed for the many problems the region faces today and the CACM is not an
exception (Institute o f Latin American Studies, 1988). It is argued that this scheme of
relationships led to unequal exchange due to worsening terms of trade. The CACM exports
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consist mainly o f agricultural products for which terms of trade have declined considerably
and productivity growth has not kept the pace to offset the decline in terms of trade of
agricultural commodities in the last few decades. This situation has led to an increase in the
negative trade balance for this area (Table 2.10). In addition, the small sizes of national
markets worked against the possibility o f selling greater shares o f agricultural product
domestically at higher than international prices.
H.-

Budget Deficit
Budget deficits have been a chronic problem long before Central American

countries entered the common market. The situation did not improve under the CACM
(Alonso, 1994). The competition among countries in using fiscal incentives to promote
domestic investment domestically may well have reduced government revenues even more
and, in turn, led to increases in budget deficits (McClelland, 1972; Institute of Latin
American Studies, 1988). hi addition, low or negative savings, defined as current revenues
minus current expenditures, may cause a decline in capital expenditures and become an
obstacle for the overall development of the region. This situation was one more problem
faced by the CACM, which, without adequate infrastructure had little chance of succeeding.
I..-

Natural Disasters
Central American countries probably have suffered the fury o f nature more than any

other part o f the world. The geographical location ofthe region makes it a target for a wide
variety o f natural disasters that have negative impacts on social and economic development
Hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and tsunamis are among the most
common disasters in the area. To name a few cases, in the sixties Guatemala City was
completely destroyed by an earthquake. In 1968 one volcanic eruption almost completely
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destroyed Ledn, one of the most important cities o f Nicaragua. In the seventies, an
earthquake destroyed Managua, the capital o f Nicaragua, killing 15,000 people. In 1976,
Hurricane Fifi completely devastated Honduras. Floods are present in all countries almost
every year during the rainy season. In 1998, Hurricane “Mitch” devastated Honduras and
caused many human and material losses in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala. So, mother nature has also slowed down economic growth in Central American
countries by sending to this region many unfortunate catastrophes (Institute of Latin
American Studies, 1988). This catastrophes have provoked human and material losses by
order o f many billions of dollars for the region during the period o f study.
CACM in the 1980-1990 Period
As Alonso et al (1994) put it, the economic performance of Central American
countries during the eighties was disastrous. Moreover, the CACM had almost
disintegrated by 1981. Armed conflict broke out in several countries of the region and
economic problems inherited from the seventies increased. Alonso et al (1994) argued that
the decade can be divided in three periods. The period form 1981 to 1983 was a period of
recession and all Central American countries experienced negative growth rates. This was
caused mainly by a world-wide recession and a further deterioration of export prices of
agricultural commodities. The second period, extending from 1984 to 1986 witnessed a
modest recovery was present in all countries with the exception of Nicaragua. The last
period was from 1986 to 1989. During this period, economic growth slowed due to poor
performance of exports. So, the eighties was one of the saddest period in the history of
Central American countries (Lizano, 1989).
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A General Evaluation of the CACM in the 1960-1990 Period
Since the CACM appeared to have vanished in the decade of the eighties in
comparison to what was initially planned, it is desirable to evaluate the positive and
negative consequences of regional integration and what future perspective the market had
at the end of the eighties. In evaluating the general performance of the CACM in its first
era of existence it is important to compare the achievements with the initial objectives of
the CACM agreements, hi addition, an assessment o f what conditions made the CACM to
enter such an acute crisis is in order to avoid these mistakes in the present second era of the
CACM. The evaluation o f the CACM is developed in three subsections. The first
subsection gives a brief introduction of the historical nature of the CACM, what was gone
and what remained at the end of the eighties. The second subsection consists of what could
be thought as positive consequences of the CACM during that period. The third section
evaluate the obstacles to the CACM. Finally, final thoughts on the integration scheme
during these 30 years are given in the last subsection.
Historical Background for the CACM (1960-19901
To understand the particular nature of the CACM as an economic integration
scheme, a brief historical prelude can be of considerable help. During the fifties, it became
increasingly apparent that there was an urgent need to raise living standards of the
populations of Central American countries. Governments as well as national and
international institutions undertook the task o f assessing the best way to do so. This task
was not easy. Economically and socially speaking, Central American countries were already
long behind more developed countries. Without a developed productive sector, many
necessary products were imported from abroad. Therefore, there was a need for foreign
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exchange. To obtain foreign exchange, countries had to heavily rely on international trade
and terms o f trade were not always favorable. This situation brought about the need to
decide whether to export more to gain more foreign exchange or to produce normally
imported products domestically. However, the possibility o f developing and establishing
a strong agricultural and industrial domestic sector to fulfill domestic needs was
impossible, given the small size of each country taken alone. On the other hand, given
resources endowment of each country, no country sought to follow an export-led economic
growth scheme. This situation was probably one of the strongest reasons why the CACM
as an economic integration scheme was planned initially using the ISI model discussed
earlier.
The CACM had general and specific objectives. Lizano (1989) stated that there
were two main objectives of economic integration: increasing the size of the Central
American market by removing barriers to regional trade, and enabling the region to
participate more fully in the world economy. These two objectives appear to have been
fulfilled in the first 10 years of existence of the CACM. However, its performance during
the following two decades showed that the process o f trade liberalization was reversible,
as countries re-established protectionist barriers in the 70 and 80s. In spite of this situation,
there is a consensus that the success of the CACM in promoting intra-regional trade was
overwhelming. The value o f intra-regional trade reached one billion dollars in 1980 and
represented 20% of the CACM total external trade up from 6.5% in 1960 (Lizano, 1989).
However, several adverse conditions made the CACM intra-regional trade fall to 9.0% of
total trade in 1987. Increases in trade barriers were present among these conditions.
The second main objective is difficult to evaluate because the structure of trade of
the CACM with the rest of the world did not change much from 1960 to 1990 (Alonso,
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1994). Coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat continued to be the main export
commodities o f the CACM. Imports continued to be represented by manufacture, fuels and
consumer goods. Lizano (1989) mentioned that the Central American area could be
characterized by its openness to international trade during the fifties before the CACM
agreements were reached. However, had the agreements not been signed, countries
probably would have increased the level of protection anyway. So, in Lizano’s opinion, the
CACM served as an alternative to prohibitive levels of protection by Central American
countries. From this point of view, the CACM may be said to have fostered a better
participation of Central American countries in the world economy.
Several specific objectives were pursued under the CACM. In the economic sector,
an economic union was envisaged. In the political arena, a Central American republic was
foreseen. With a Central American republic in mind, the defense council was established.
The equalization o f education standards was pursued and the education council created. To
save foreign exchange, which would be devoted to more urgent needs, the Central
American Clearing House was created. Moreover, the monetary union was also one long
run specific objective. However, none of these specific objectives was completely fulfilled.
Since each country has other economic and political problems to solve, too little attention
was given to the compromises within the CACM agreements, hi addition, Central
American countries have historically lacked a true commitment to unity and this was a big
obstacle to achieve the specific objectives mentioned above.
Positive Effects ofthe CACM (1960-199(ft
Lizano (1989) mentioned several positive consequences of the CACM besides the
considerable increase in regional trade. First, although the CACM had almost disintegrated
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by 1981, some institutions remained. The permanent secretariat ofthe treaties (SIECA), the
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Central American Institute
ofPublic Administration (ICAP), the Central American Institute for Research and Industrial
Technology (ICAITI), and the Central American Clearing House (CACH) have proven
flexible and resilient in adapting to changing circumstances. These institutions were a
signal that the CACM was not completely dead and they continued to operate under the
uncertain environment of the eighties when the future of the CACM seemed to be ominous.
Second, the CACM fostered growth in the manufacturing sector, which has had important
effects, such as the acceleration of the urbanization process and the formation of an
industrial proletariat. Third, countries have learned from the experience within the CACM
to deal with conflicts and disputes related to trade in a more educated and efficient manner.
Fourth, member countries learned to save foreign exchange by using the Clearing House.
Obstacles to Successful Regional Integration in the 1960-1990 Period
There are various factors that badly affected the implementation of the CACM
during this period (Lizano, 1989). First, costs and benefits were not adequately distributed
among countries. Thus, although technical analyses show that the whole area benefitted
from integration, Honduras and Nicaragua complained that they could have been harmed
by the agreement The possible negative effects are related to the consumption of regionally
produced goods at prices higher than international prices and geographical concentration
o f industrial output in countries that enjoyed a greater degree of industrial development.
This was mainly caused by two factors. First there was a lack of agreement on fiscal
incentives to new industrial companies. The agreement signed in 1962 was never enforced.
Secondly, the System oflntegration Industries agreement signed in 1960, was never
fully implemented and caused disparities in industrial development among countries. In

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

addition, there was a lack o f coordination o f national economic policies. In Lizano’s
opinion (1989), countries were not able to properly perceive that the participation in the
CACM implied in part modifications in their own national economic policies. Moreover,
countries never coordinated agricultural policies and this represented a major failure o f the
CACM. This generated some contradictions. For example, Honduras showed comparative
advantage in the production of certain agricultural products. However, while this country
had to import industrial goods from other Central American countries, it was not allowed
to export its agricultural products to these countries.
Monetary policies also were not coordinated and this generated several problems.
For example, too little attention was given to the effects of each country's monetary
policies on regional trade flows and the regional payments agreement Thus, if a country
expanded the money supply, the volume o f imports would increase and exports decrease
generating a deficit in its regional trade.
So, regional integration faced many dilemmas that could not be solved effectively
and, therefore, this integration attempt essentially failed after the first 10 years of its
implementation. This failure could be related to mistrust among countries and lack of
complete commitment to regional integration. This could mean that although all the
economic instruments to secure success were drawn, countries were always politically
reluctant to enter a situation that they probably thought could be too compromising to
national sovereignty. For example, there was a lack of will to rationally distribute the
benefits and costs of integration because this implied changes in national policies. This is
probably why the location ofkey industrial companies, the agreement on fiscal incentives,
and the coordination of national economic policies were never agreed upon.
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The CACM from 1990-Present Period
To analyze the CACM during the present decade, this section is divided into three
sub-sections. First, a review o f the background for the agreement during the nineties is
developed and the agreement for the reinstallment of the CACM is analyzed in the context
of past decades of experiences. Secondly, the new organizational structure is analyzed.
Finally, the performance of the CACM in the present decade is evaluated.
Background for the Integration of the Nineties
Although the eighties witnessed the near disintegration of the CACM, several steps
taken in the region brought hope of a renewed effort to revive the CACM. In 1987 and
1988, several peace accords were signed by fighting groups in which fighting parties agreed
that armed struggle was no longer a viable alternative to solve the region’s problems
(Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988). With a clear possibility of entering a peaceful
period, governments agreed to discuss the acute economic crisis of the region. Thus, in
1987, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development
concluded that the region should start to diversify and expand exports to generate foreign
exchange and employment (Alonso et al, 1994).
The nineties brought many positive changes to the region. First, armed conflicts
were officially ended in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. This opened the possibility
of a faster economic recovery. Second, Central American governments agreed to reestablish
the CACM to foster economic development. Thus, in 1991, the Tegucigalpa protocol was
signed. This protocol reformed the Organization of Central American States (ODECA,
from the name in Spanish), created in 1962, into the Central American System of
Integration (SICA, from the name in Spanish) as the new organization responsible for
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overall development o f the area (SIECA (a), 1999). Another important document, the
Guatemala protocol, which substantially reformed the 1960 “General Treaty o f Central

American Integration”, was signed in 1993. The Guatemala protocol became the new
general treaty for economic integration in the region (SIECA(b), 1999).
It is worthwhile to discuss the Guatemala protocol because it defines the general
new rules of the economic integration. This protocol consists of sixty three articles
contained in six titles. Title I conceptualizes the process of economic integration as a means
to maximize development options for the contracting countries and their insertion in the
world economy. According to this protocol, economic integration is a gradual,
complementary and flexible process to enhance the convergence of intention and policies.
Title II defines the objectives and principles of economic integration. The main
objective of economic integration is the achievement of equitable, sustainable social, and
economic development of the Central American countries. This objective is to be reached
by means of a process to transform and modernize the social, technological and productive
structure which should bring an increase in competitiveness. This process should help in
reaching the efficient and dynamic reinsertion o f Central American countries in the
international economy.
Title

in of the Guatemala protocol refers to the proposed achievements of the

process o f economic integration in this new period. Chapter I defines the steps to accelerate
the transformation o f the present free trade zone of Central America into the Central
American customs union, hi addition, this chapter identifies the need for a uniform external
trade relation with the rest of the world. Finally, the free mobility of production factors and
monetary policy is addressed. Chapter II addresses the improvement and harmonization
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o f policies across countries. Chapter m states that all sectors o f the economy should be
developed in a integrated fashion.Titles IV, V, and VI are the last but not least important
titles o f the protocol. Title IV describes the institutional organization of the economic
integration subsystem which is discussed in more detail in the following subsection. Title
V consists o f the final disposition o f the protocol and title VI describes transitory
dispositions of the protocol.
There are not many differences between the treaty o f 1960 and the Guatemala
protocol. In general, both documents show the intention for a deep integration o f the region.
Both documents are very general and mostly they state the global objectives of integration.
Both documents are very specific in describing the institutional structure of the integration
scheme. By contrast, one major difference of the Guatemala protocol is that it eliminated
the “System o f Integration Industries” signed in 1958, the treaty of fiscal incentives of
1962, and the special protocol for grain products (protocol o f El Lim6n). Another major
difference is that the Guatemala protocol included Panama and the possibility o f Belize to
join the CACM.
Structure o f the CACM in the Nineties
The organizational structure o f Central American integration in the nineties is
somewhat larger than that o f the sixties. This new structure probably represents the new
context o f integration. Article 12 o f the Tegucigalpa protocol describes the organs of
Central American Integration within the Integration System of Central America (SICA)
which is shown in Figure 2.2. The highest level of decision within the system consists of
the presidential meetings, vice-presidential meetings, the Central American Parliament, the
Central American Supreme Court o f Justice, and the Consultive Committee. The latter, as
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Figure 2.2.

Central American Integration System (SICA) General Organization Structure According to the Tegucigalpa
Protocol, 1991.
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its name implies, is only a consultation organ whose members are representatives of the
private sector o f the region.
A deep degree o f integration seems to be sought this time through the Tegucigalpa
protocol. The Tegucigalpa protocol breaks down the integration system into the economic,
political, social, and cultural integration subsystem (Figure 2.2). The ministers council is
responsible for the implementation o f the strategies developed in each subsystem. At the
same time, the ministers council relies heavily on the council of foreign relations ministers
to implement such policies. The foreign relations ministers council is responsible for the
coordination of the sectoral ministers council, hi addition, the foreign relations ministers
council through the executive committee is responsible for the correct and timely
implementation of all agreements, guidelines and policies that are designed by all the
subsystems. Finally, the General Secretary of the SICA is the administrative agency of the
system. One of the objectives of the SICA is to foster development in all sectors of society
in an integrated way.
For purposes of the present research, a detailed description of the economic
subsystem is in order. As was mentioned earlier, the Guatemala protocol, signed in 1993,
is the juridical framework for economic integration in the region. According to this
protocol, the subsystem of economic integration consists o f organs, techno-administrative
organs, and institutions. This organizational structure is included in Figure 2.3. The
Economic Integration Ministers Council is responsible for the coordination, harmonization,
convergence or unification o f economic policies across countries. The sectoral ministers
council o f economic integration is composed o f die ministers by sector. Mostly these
meetings will be held by the ministers o f Agriculture, Finance, Economy, Trade, Industry,
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Tourism, and the Monetary Council, the latter composed by the presidents o f the Central
Banks o f each country. The inter-sectoral council meetings are to be held when there is a
common issue to be addressed by two or more ministries. The CABEI, ICAP, and ICAITI
are institutions of the economic subsystem. Given the importance of agriculture and
monetary issues to the region, both the Central American Agriculture Council and the
Monetary Council have their own specific secretaries. These are the Secretary of the
Agriculture Council (SCA) and the Secretary of the Central American Monetary Council
(SCMCA). Finally, the Permanent Secretariat o f Central American Economic Integration
(SIECA) is the techno-administrative organ of the economic subsystem. In addition, the
SIECA coordinates the operations of both the SCA and the SCMCA.
Performance of Central American Countries in the Nineties
After 40 years, the process of integration in Central American remains between a
free trade zone and a customs union (SIECA(c), 1999). There is free trade for almost all
goods originated in the region but some tariffs and non-tariff barriers still remain. On the
other hand, there are some elements of a customs union. Thus, the countries have already
agreed on the Common External Tariff (CET) and the Common Custom Normative.
However, these measures are not applied equally in all countries. As of the present,
countries have a wide percent range in the application of duties. For example, countries
agreed in 1993 to apply a duty rate to imports from outside the region between 5% and
15%. hi addition, duties are still levied on imported goods produced in the region and other
non-tariff barriers, such as licenses, permission, and others still exist in the region (De
Franco, 1996; SIECA (e), 1999).
There are several achievements ofthe integration efforts in the recent past First, all
countries, with die exception o f Panama, ratified the Tegucigalpa Protocol in 1996. In
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addition, the Guatemala Protocol was also ratified by all countries. As an immediate
consequence o f the changes in the last few years, the GDP has been growing at an
optimistic rate (Table 2.11). However, there are still big oscillations in the rate of growth
of Central American countries. This fact reveals the sensibility and fragility of these
economies when faced with adverse conditions.
Table 2.11.

GDP Growth Rate o f Central American Countries, (%)

Year

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

1991

3.7

3.6

3.3

-4.8

2.3

1992

4.8

7.5

5.6

0.4

7.7

1993

3.9

7.4

6.2

-0.4

6.3

1994

4.0

6.0

-1.4

3.3

4.5

1995

4.9

6.3

4.3

4.3

2.4

1996

3.0

2.2

3.7

4.5

-0.6

1997

4.1

4.0

4.9

5.0

3.2

Source: SECA (e), 1999.

On the other hand, the changes in the last few years have had a considerable positive
impact on trade. For example, the volume of intra-regional trade increased from US$650
million in 1990 to US$2200 million in 1998 (SIECA (d), 1999). hi addition, Table 2.12
shows trends in intra-regional and extra-regional trade for several years of the present
decade. Intra-regional trade, measured as the share o f Central American exports to the
region, has steadily represented about 21% of total exports. However, Central America
represents about 16% o f the total trade volume.
The trade balance situation seems to a chronic problem in Central America. During
the period from 1992 to 1997, in both intra-regional and total, Central America has shown
a negative trade balance. This is explained by the fact that during this period both intra-
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regional and total imports and exports have increased at a rate o f about 12%. Imports from
outside the region have increased at a rate close to 11%. Thus, in nominal terms both
imports and exports have almost doubled from 1992 to 1997. However, the trade balance
deficit has remained stable representing almost 30% o f total trade volume (imports plus
exports).
The stable composition of export products over time is another interesting feature
of Central American trade. As in the sixties, today’s exports are predominantly represented
by bananas, coffee, meat products, and sugar (SIECA (e), 1999). Thus, in 1996, coffee
represented 20.67% of the total value of exports, bananas represented 12.70%, and sugar
represented 4.23%. In addition, in 1996, the main markets for Central American exports
products were the United States (38%), European Union (25%), CACM (21%) and the G-3
group (3%), composed of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Table 2.12.

Central American Intra-regional, extra-regional, and Total Nominal Trade

Central
America

Rest of the
World

Trade Balance

Imports

Exports

Yen

Total

Central
America

Rest ofthe
World

Total

Central
America

Rest ofthe
World

Total

1992

997.25

3654.36

4652

1067JO

7485.41

8552.61

-69.95

-3831.05

-3901

1993

1108.20

38422)3

4951.13

1133.14

8606.80

9739.94

-24.94

-4763.87

-4788.81

1994

1233.63

4320.25

5553.88

1275.88

8808.82

10084.7

-4225

-448827

•4530.82

1995

1456.06

5360.59

6816.65

1490.82

10625.54

12116.36

-34.76

-5264.95

-5299.71

1996

1662.83

5890.37

7553.2

1665.33

10736.73

12402.06

-25

-4846.36

-4848.86

1997

1833.71

6716.48

8550.19

1959.70

12790.83

t4750.53

-125.99

-607425

-6200

Sourer. SIECA (e). 1999.

As in the case of exports, there have not been many changes in the structure of
Central American imports. Capital goods, intermediate goods, and primary raw materials
remain the main bulk of imports. Thus, in 1996 oil and oil products (10.34%), work
vehicles (3.60%), pharmaceutical products (2.37%), hard wheat (1.42%), and yellow com
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(1.25%) were among the 10 most important imported products in the region. The United
States (45.5%), the G-3 group (13%), the CACM (12.7%), the European Union (9.9%), and
Japan (4.2%) were the main sources o f Central American imports in 1996 (SIECA (e),
1999). Thus, this pattern of trade shows that both the United States, the CACM countries,
the G-3 countries, and the European Union are the most important trading partners for
Central America.
General Evaluation of Central American Countries Integration in the Nineties
As the analysis in the preceding sections shows, conditions for integration during
the nineties are more troubling than those of the sixties. This becomes clear when several
facts are taken into account First, countries have already experienced a scheme of
integration that in terms o f a rising living standards of the population is less than
satisfactory. The final outcome of the scheme of the sixties was the poor economic
performance of each country. This is probably a result of an inadequate design of the
integration scheme (Lizano, 1989). This is shown by the fact that it was impossible to
enforce several agreements because they did not satisfy all country members. Secondly, the
increase in population, the budget deficit, trade deficit, unfavorable terms of trade, political
changes, and social and infra-structural backwardness caused the poor economic
performance ofthe 1960-1990 period. Therefore, the conditions for the implementation of
a new integration scheme call for greater efforts than those of the sixties. Third, because
of the unfavorable outcome o f the integration attempt of the sixties, policy makers are
looking for a more adequate scheme than that of the sixties to secure success this second
time.
This time the objective o f the integration scheme is more pragmatic. In short and
medium terms, the goal is to alleviate the pressure on the external sector through the
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increaseofexport supply, modernization oftheproductive sector, the creation of morejobs,
and the increase in income. This situation seems to be somewhat paradoxical relative to the
objectives o f the Tegucigalpa and Guatemala Protocol. Thus, the organization structure of
the integration scheme ofthe nineties covers far more sectors than that o f the sixties but the
essence of the integration scheme is the same. Countries are still looking for economic,
social, cultural, and political union.
It seems that countries know what they should do to secure the success of the
integration ofthe nineties but how to do it is still an open question. At the present countries
seem to understand that integration means giving up a part o f their sovereignty. This means
harmonization o f national policies under a regional scheme. However, it seems that national
leaders do not completely trust the leaders of other countries. For example, there are several
border delimitation problems between Honduras and Nicaragua, and Costa Rica and
Nicaragua (La Prensa, 1999) and this has caused political frictions between them. This can
mean that although the process may be successful, it will take longer than under an
atmosphere of greater confidence. On the other hand, if leaders of the countries spend much
time looking for trust, the process can be greatly eroded and under risk of failure.
The strategy o f this new integration is based on export promotion policies (De
Franco, 1996). Countries want to abandon the Import Substitution strategy (ISI) of the
sixties and embrace an outward oriented strategy or Export Promotion strategy (EP) offered
as a better choice for development than the former. Resource allocation efficiency,
elimination o f direct unproductive profit and rent seeking activities (DUP), efficient
allocation o f investment, and dynamic effects on saving and innovations have been
mentioned as advantages of the latter over ISI strategy (Bagwhati, 1990).
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As policymakers embraced the ISI strategy in the sixties, Central American policy
makers moved in the nineties toward outward oriented strategies in the search for economic
growth. This time the idea is to foster economic growth through a growth in exports.
However, several studies reveal that although there is a high correlation between exports
and economic growth, it has been difficult to establish the direction of causality (Bhagwati,
1990). In addition, there are still some open question about how to promote exports (Nam,
1990). Thus, export subsidies without reduction o f tariffs and tariff reductions with
adjustments in the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio o f the price of non-traded goods
to the price o f importable goods, have been proposed as two viable routes to promote
export expansion.
So, although some economic recovery is under way in Central America, several
questions still remain open to further analysis in this new wave o f integration. As was
shown in the preceding subsections, Central American countries still need to find the best
strategy to foster economic development in the area in a balanced manner. In addition, how
to implement export promotion programs is a problem that countries are facing now.
Finally, harmonization of objectives instead ofharmonization ofpolicies could be a smooth
way to achieve the objectives of economic integration this time (De Franco, 1996).
Empirical Studies on Economic Integration
This section includes an exhaustive exercise. This section is divided into two
subsections. The first subsection includes a review of empirical studies analyzing
economic integration around the world. The second subsection includes studies analyzing
economic integration in Central America. The objective here is to identify the main
objectives o f these empirical studies. This will help to identify what are the main points of
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evaluation when economic integration is under scrutiny. It is important to look at previous
studies to understand the variety of empirical models (general and partial equilibrium) used,
the focus of the analysis (one crop, one sector, or the whole economy), and the time frame
of analysis. Thus, some studies are descriptive and validate trade theory while other are pro
active and make an ex-ante analysis o f the effects of economic integration.
Economic Integration Around the World
Brada et al (1988) analyzed the dynamic effects of economic integration of six
economic integration schemes. The European Economic Community (ECC), the European
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), the Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA), the
CACM, the East African Common Market (EACM), and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) were the schemes analyzed. The analysis was based on the idea that
economic integration should bring about faster factor productivity and higher investment
levels than without integration. Thus, one equation was estimated relating the ratio of
investment over real GDP to the growth of real GDP, real foreign capital inflow, a dummy
to account for membership in an economic integration scheme. A second equation was
estimated relating the growth rate of real GDP to the growth rate capital, labor, and the
dummy to account for membership in an economic integration scheme. The estimation
covered 19S1 to 1977. The results showed that economic integration has had a positive
impact on the growth rate of GDP due to higher investment and higher rate of growth in
factor productivity. Based on the examination of the six integration schemes, the results
showed that while there, in fact, exist dynamic effects due to economic integration, the
impact o f the effects on economic growth is small. Therefore, it was concluded that
dynamic effects can not explain the rapid growth o f west European countries in the sixties.
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In addition, dynamic economic effects of integration are not enough evidence to encourage
countries to join existing ones or create new economic schemes.
Testas (1997) analyzed the effects o f economic integration in the case o f African
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) from the perspective o f Algeria. The study used the supplydemand approach proposed by Verdoon, Janssen, and Clague. Import price, export supply,
and substitution are the three main elasticities to estimate the model, hi addition, tariff rates
applied in 1989 were obtained for 96 groups o f commodities. The analysis was done under
two scenarios. First, a complete elimination of tariffs (unilateral trade liberalization).
Secondly, a customs union with Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Lybia, i.e., the actual
agreement of AMU, was analyzed. The results showed that the impact of nondiscriminatory trade liberalization will cause no trade diversion and only trade expansion
both with respect to the world and the rest of AMU countries. The customs union situation
generates trade diversion but also creates it. So, net trade is created. This should imply that
there are trade gains from entering the agreement. The problem here is that the welfare
impact o f the two scenarios cannot be assessed.
Roland et al. (1997) reviewed the socioeconomic implications of NAFTA on
Mexico, the US and Canada. The main objective o f the study was to analyze the impact on
trade and welfare o f the complete elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) to
trade. Initially, an analysis of the economy of each country is developed to assess the size
and the level o f technological development across countries. For this purpose, data for
1988 were used to build a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model in which the economies
o f the analyzed countries were divided into 26 productive sectors.
The analysis revealed that the US represents the greatest economy and Mexico the
sm allest However, Canada is more dependent on international trade than the US or
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Mexico. In addition, the analysis showed that bilateral US-Canada trade links are of
considerable size. Thus, the US is the main trading partner of Canada in for both imports
and exports, hi addition, the analysis shows that tariff protection levels are low in North
American countries by world standards.
Then, the authors made use o f a general equilibrium model approach to assess the
effects of the removal o f the trade barriers on the economy of each country. Initially, six
flows ofexports and six of imports are analyzed: US-Canada, US-Mexico, Mexico-Canada,
Table 2.13. Simulations of the CGE model for North America.

___

Experiment

Prices

Protection

Markets

RTS

1

Homogeneous

Tariffs only

—

Constant

2

PPP

Tariffs only

—

Constant

3

Homogeneous

All protection

—

Constant

4

PPP

All protection

—

Constant

5

Homogeneous

—

Cournot

Increasing

6

PPP

—

Cournot

Increasing

7

Homogeneous

—

Contestable

Increasing

8

PPP

--

Contestable

Increasing

US-Rest o f World (ROW), Canada-ROW and Mexico ROW. The model uses a non-nested
CES specification for demand and non-nested CET for supply. The model is used to run
eight experiments summarized in table 2.13. The results indicate that the US gains the least
because it is the largest and the least trade dependent country. Canada gains as much as
three times in terms o f the GDP and Mexico is in between. However, economic integration
will make Mexico experience up to 5 times the amount of structural adjustment as the US.
Canadian adjustments are somewhere in between. This situation raises the question about
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feasibility o f the adjustment in Mexico. The article shows that a CGE model is a good tool
to analyze the impacts of economic integration of a region. It is important to observe the
assumption made in order to estimate the model. CES demand functions and CET supply
functions are assumed. On the other hand, markets are assumed to price competitively or
in a Cournot fashion with zero profits because free entry is assumed. In addition, the model
is tested under the assumptions o f both constant and increasing returns to scale. The model
is estimated under increasing returns because trade liberalization may lead to the realization
of potential increasing returns to scale. This is true in the case o f Mexico and Canada. At
the same time, the model tested the elimination of tariffs alone and then the elimination of
all protection. The implication is that in an international trade framework, not only the
elimination o f tariffs should be addressed but also the elimination of all forms o f trade
barriers. The sectoral analysis showed that the structure of trade changes for each country
because economic integration creates trade diversion and makes each sector expand with
the exception o f agriculture in Mexico. This issue was important because agriculture is a
large sector in Mexico and economic integration can make agricultural producers worse off.
Finally, the results showed that all countries gain from economic integration but specific
forecasts are given cautiously because of data limitations and the need for more extensive
research in the field.
Sorbazo (1997) addressed the impact of NAFTA on the economy of Mexico. For
this purpose, an applied general equilibrium model (AGE) is estimated. The main objective
was to measure the impact o f the removal of all kinds o f protection in the process of
integration. The model included 27 production sectors. Domestically and internationally
mobile capital and domestically mobile labor were assumed as the two factors of
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production. Although trade flows between Mexico and North America (NA) and Mexico
and the rest o f the world (ROW) are assumed, only the Mexican economy is explicitly
modeled. A Cobb-Douglas specification was assumed in production and consumption. To
model the economy, competitive, regulated and imperfectly competitive industries are
assumed to exist Then, constant returns to scale (CRTS) are assumed in the competitive
industries and increasing returns to scale are assumed in the case o f the imperfectly
competitive industry. To calibrate the model Armington elasticities of substitution, exports
demand elasticities and scale of size are either estimated or assumed (taken from other
sources).
The results showed that with the exception of agriculture, all other sectors expand
their production, particularly in construction, non-electrical machinery, iron and steel,
mining transport equipment, and electrical machinery. In addition, if GDP were to increase,

then a large reallocation of labor would take place. This reallocation of labor would
produce very high adjustment costs. The results also show that exports to NA increase in
nearly every sector, and in particular, in wearing apparel, rubber, leather, tobacco, and
textiles. On the other hand, services experience a contraction in exports to NA. Exports to
ROW increase modestly and in some sectors exports decrease. Economic integration leads
to a very large increase in imports from NA and, in particular, in the agriculture, food, and
beverages sector. Imports from ROW also increase but the increase is smaller than imports
from NA. Finally, the author warned about the reliability o f the outcome since some
elasticities were assumed or taken from other sources and there is no empirical evidence
about the correctness in doing so.
The analysis o f the impact ofNAFTA on Mexico was made under very simplifying
assumptions. For example, the use of Cobb-Douglas function in production and
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consumption. Also, the exchange rate was assumed to be fixed. These assumptions restrict
the analysis to an easy but unrealistic framework to analyze the economy o f Mexico.
However, even under this simplistic framework, a good assessment o f the impact of
NAFTA on Mexico can be made. The results showed that the outcome o f the economic
integration of Mexico within NAFTA poses some question of feasibility. First, agriculture,
an important sector for the Mexican economy, contracts in size under NAFTA. Secondly,
the adjustment process to new economic conditions may result in a net loss in the short run
although it is not clear if the long run outcome is a net positive gain from integration. Third,
the results show that under the realization of the economies of scale capital will become
scarce and it is not certain how the Mexican economy might deal with that situation.
Cox (1997) analyzed the impact o f a trade agreement on the Canadian economy
under three scenarios. The first scenario includes a bilateral trade agreement between the
US and Canada which is known as the CAFTA. The second scenario is the NAFTA. The
third scenario includes the CAFTA and a US-Mexico trade agreement. The last scenario
is called the hub and two spokes (HASP) agreement. First, CAFTA is analyzed and then
used as a benchmark to analyze the other scenarios, the NAFTA and HASP scenarios. A
general equilibrium model (CGE) is used to develop the analysis. The model assumes that
the commodities produced in each region are perceived as close substitutes. Canada is
viewed as an “almost” open small economy that faces perfectly elastic import supply
functions from the foreign regions but in export markets faces a set of downward-sloping
export demand functions, hi addition, labor and capital are assumed to be the two primary
factors of production. Capital is assumed to be mobile domestically and internationally but
labor only domestically. Industries were divided into competitive constant returns to scale
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and noncompetitive increasing returns to scale. The pricing decision was made taking the
average ofvalues generated from die two hypotheses. The first is based on the notion o f the
perceived demand curve and the second is based on the collusive model of pricing by
Eastman-Stykolt. The production technology is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas
specification and the demand side is characterized by a two-stage utility maximization
process. First, the individual utility function is a CES specification and on the aggregate a
Cobb-Douglas formulation is assumed. The model is calibrated based on the elasticities of
substitution, inverse elasticities of scale and import demand elasticities.
The results show that CAFTA has a significant impact on the economy of Canada.
Real GDP increases by 4.5 % and trade volume by 25%. On the other hand, using CAFTA
as a benchmark, the implementation ofNAFTA or HASP scenarios resulted in insignificant
changes for the Canadian economy. Under NAFTA, there is a significant 57 % increase in
trade volume between Mexico and Canada but the initial share of Mexico in Canadian trade
is just one percent This means that in absolute terms the increase in trade volume is small.
The results showed that once CAFTA is implemented, NAFTA will have a very
small impact on the Canadian economy. However, the paper does not give any information
of the stage of the implementation of CAFTA at the moment NAFTA went into effect. On
the contrary the paper assumed a complete implementation of CAFTA and then the
implementation ofNAFTA. But this situation does not reflect reality. The truth is that
CAFTA had not been completely implemented when NAFTA went into effect So, the
results o f this paper are somewhat misleading. Also, it is not clear what happens to CAFTA
once NAFTA is implemented. So, die results reflect an unrealistic situation and therefore
the results are not reliable.
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Levy et al. (1997) analyzed the effects ofNAFTA on Mexican agriculture and,
specifically, on the maize producer. The main objective is to analyze the distributional
effects of liberalizing maize in Mexico, the policies that may be implemented to alleviate
them and the incentive problems that can arise by the presence of such policies.
International trade theory suggests that the NAFTA agreement should result in efficiency
gains and net welfare gains for the US, Canada and Mexico. However, when such policies
are implemented, there is not a clear answer on how the losers should be compensated. This
is a major problem in Mexico where state institutions are not transparent in their job and
therefore are not reliable in implementing programs. For this purpose, the authors
implemented a general equilibrium model (CGE). The model divided the economy into
rural and urban sectors. The urban sector produces only a tradeable industrial good and a
non-tradable services good. Both goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology with
fixed intermediate inputs for urban labor and sector-specific capital. Maize, other basic
grains, fruits and vegetables, other agricultural goods and livestock are produced by land
and rural labor. In addition, the model distinguished six types of households, four in rural
areas and 2 in urban areas according to ownership of assets. The results show that a gradual
liberalization with a longer adjustment period is more adequate than a shorter one. The
results also showed that a gradual liberalization accompanied by investment in an irrigation
program would result in a better situation than using other type o f programs.
The authors showed a very real side ofNAFTA: the losers. Previous studies on
NAFTA have shown that agriculture in Mexico contracts as a result ofNAFTA. Therefore,
rural labor should be reallocated in the industrial and service sectors. However, this
reallocation is not costless in financial and cultural terms. First, maize producers lose
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because their land loses value (if rain-fed) and they do not have any support from the
government to survive. Secondly, migration of rural population to urban areas implies a
need o f change in skills and behavior because there are big differences between rural and
urban life. This adjustment is painful and requires financial support from the government.
Finally, in order to deal with this problem, the government should start a quick
implementation o f the program directed to make agricultural producers more competitive
and productive. This requires infra-structural changes and educational programs. Also, a
greater access to credit and extension programs must be made available.
Economic Integration In Central America
Wilford (1970) analyzed the CACM and its effects on trade creation and trade
diversion. The model proposed by Balasa (1966) was used for this purpose. Thus, income
elasticities of import demand were estimated for the pre-integration period and for the post
integration period. If income elasticities of intra-regional import demand under integration
were greater than those prior to integration, then “gross trade creation” occurred. In
addition, an increase in income elasticity of total import demand (extra- and intra-regional)
would indicate the presence o f “net trade creation”. On the other hand, a fall in extraregional income elasticity of import demand indicates “gross trade diversion”. Moreover,
a fall in total income elasticity import demand will indicate “net trade diversion”. The
results indicated that overall net trade creation occurred in the first seven years after
integration. However, when analyzed by sectors some trade diversion was identified. Thus,
there was trade diversion for fuel and lubricants and for fats and edible oils.
Flower et al (1994) estimated welfare effects o f economic integration in Central
America for the period from 1970 to 1984. A model proposed by Cline et al (1978) was
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used. For this purpose, propensities to import, estimated as the ratio o f the value of imports
to total domestic consumption, were obtained. Estimates o f net trade creation and trade
diversion were obtained using the above estimated propensities. Finally, the output effect
was estimated as the sum of net trade creation and net trade diversion. It is suggested that
positive net trade creation is an indication o f welfare gain. Moreover, it is suggested that
a positive output effect would imply a substantial degree ofnon-traditional welfare benefits.
The results show that during the period from 1970 to 1982 both trade diversion and trade
creation were present but declining in value. Thus, there were positive net trade creation
and net output effects. After 1982, this situation changed drastically and negative output
effect indicated that countries were losing in terms of welfare. However, the authors
pointed out because o f methodological problems, the reliability of the results was limited.
De Franco (1996) analyzed the effects of economic integration o f the nineties using
a General Equilibrium Model (CGE) based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
calibrated for 1992. In contrast with various studies using this approach, the SAM matrix
for Central America was not disaggregated into economic sectors but included all countries
separately. The SAM included activities, goods, capitalists, workers, government, capital
account, and exports. Different scenarios were analyzed. Results were obtained for the
effects of a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union (CU). The results showed that the
formation o f a customs union (CU) will benefit Guatemala and Costa Rica and could be
harmful for Honduras and Nicaragua. An improvement in the level of real exchange rate
to avoid overvaluation o f the currencies of Central American countries is given among the
recommendations. This is required to improve competitiveness of commodities produced
in the area.
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Caceres (1994) analyzed the costs and benefits of integration in Central America.
Initially, a quantitative estimation of the possible benefits o f integration was developed.
Secondly, obstacles to reap the benefits o f economic integration were measured. As a first
task, possible sources of benefits were identified and quantified. Thus, domestic savings,
trade creation, increased economic growth, stabilization of economic growth, increased
intra-industry trade, and the increase of the market size were identified as possible benefits
to be attained through integration. The quantitative assessment of saving revealed that since
intra-regional trade is mainly made up of final goods which require the imports of
intermediate goods, the possibilities o f increasing savings were small. To measure trade
creation, the approach proposed by Balasa (1967) was used. The results showed that in the
period 1962-1969 integration did not lead to a significant change in resource allocation.
This indicates that little trade was created. A further analysis to measure the possibilities
o f increased economic growth showed that distance between countries could be a
determinant factor to propel economic growth in country members through a greater flow
o f trade. Based on previous studies and the estimation of the Grubel-Lloyd index for
Central American countries, the results show that there is a good opportunity to benefit
from intra-industry trade, hi addition, according to Gray (1988), intra-industry trade is
greatest among countries with similar income levels. So, intra-industry trade could be very
beneficial for Central America given this fact Finally, it is clear that broadening the market
creates room to reap the benefits of increasing returns to scale in production and
competition.
Transport costs and low levels of human capital have been mentioned as important
obstacles to a successful economic integration. At this moment, the costs of transport and
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insurance for commodities in the region are really high in Honduras and Nicaragua relative
to the rest of the Central American countries. According to Caceres(1994), levels ofhuman
capital have a considerable impact on the export performance of a given country. Therefore,
a model was estimated to determine the importance of the level ofhuman capital in the
export sector performance o f the CACM. The results showed that the role of human
resources in intra-regional trade has been gaining importance as time passed. Thus,
countries should make an effort to promote more activities to improve the pool ofhuman
capital.
Empirical Evidence on Export Promoting fl£P) Policies1
Very often export promoting policies are implemented under an export-promoting
(EP) strategy. A country is said to follow an export-promoting strategy if the real exchange
rate o f exportable goods (EERJ is approximately equal to or greater than that of importable
goods (E ER J (Baghwati, 1990). Performance o f countries under an EP strategy is
commonly contrasted with other countries following an import substitution industrialization
(ISI) strategy. It has been argued that an export promoting strategy is superior to an ISI
strategy in several aspects. First, EP strategy improves resource allocation efficiency
relative to the ISI strategy. Secondly, directly unproductive profit-seeking and rent-seeking
activities are commonly present under an IS strategy but less often in countries following
an EP strategy. Thirdly, EP strategy tend to lead to a better use of foreign resources relative
to an IS strategy. Finally, saving and innovation are more likely to be present under an EP
strategy.

‘Note: This section relies on the work of Milner etal (1990), “Export Promotion
Strategies: Theory and Evidence From Developing Countries ".
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There have been several alternative instruments proposed to promote exports. For
example, import liberalization, exchange rate regimes, compensatory financial and fiscal
incentives, and export processing zones have been used as such instruments. Milner (1990)
analyzed import liberalization as an instrument in export promotion. The analysis is
developed under a general equilibrium framework. The analysis showed that high rate of
protection in many developing countries make the general lowering of import barriers a
desirable and feasible means o f relative export promotion. On the other hand, policy
makers may choose to selectively import-protect and export-protect particular activities.
However, past experience has shown that policy-makers often fail in adequately choosing
the best commodity candidates for import protection or export promotion.
Falvey et al (1990) summarized the wide variety of export-promoting incentives
used in developing countries. Accordingly, there are input related incentives, output related
incentives, and externality-related incentives. Most of these incentives are given as tax
exemptions, direct subsidies, lower interest rates than the ongoing rates, and monopoly
rights in a given industry, hi addition, theoretical frameworks to analyze compensatory
exports incentives are developed. This included final demand-related policies, directproduction related policies, factor market related policies, and externality-related policies.
Warr (1990) analyzed the impact of export processing zones (EPZ) on economic
welfare. EPZ are described as “especial enclaves, outside a nation’s normal customs
barriers, within which investing firms, mostly foreign, enjoy favored treatment with respect
to imports of intermediate goods, company taxation, provision of infrastructure and
freedom from industrial regulations applying elsewhere in the country" (Warr, 1990). In
exchange, in general, these companies are required to hire local labor and to export most
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o f production outside the country. This situation corresponds to several objective of the
host county with respect to the presence of the EPZ. It has been stated that foreign exchange
savings, employment and technology transfer are the objective of establishing EPZ in
various countries.
A study o f EPZ in four Asian countries is then developed. To do so, the “enclave
approach” proposed by Corden (1974 and 1985) is used. The results showed that indirect
labor export seems to be the main benefits from the EPZ for Korea, Malaysia and the
Philippines. The situation for Indonesia, the fourth country included in the analysis, was a
little different. First, in contrast with the EPZ in other countries, an unusually high
proportion o f raw materials were purchased locally. Secondly, although taxes were low in
the country, there has been a rent-seeking behavior by government officials which has
diverted considerable sums of money into their hands. In addition, technology transfer has
been a difficult task to carry o u t This is so because EPZ are not interested in developing
local industries which in turn could become difficult competitors in local and foreign input
and output markets. Thus, there is an opinion that the overall costs of the EPZ seem to
outweigh the benefits derived from i t hi conclusion, EPZs are not “engines of progress’ as
they were initially thought to be but a temporary relief for labor surplus.
Nam (1990) investigated whether trade policy in Korea has been inward- or
outward-oriented. For this purpose, relative incentive rates on exports and domestic sales
for the Korean economy were estimated for 1978. Thus, the effective subsidy rate for
export sales, the effective protection rate for domestic sales, and the effective incentive rate
for total sales were estimated by the Balassa and Corden methods. The results showed that
Korean trade incentives in 1978 were biased toward export activities. On the other hand,
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in the late seventies, it became apparent that the structure for domestic sales became
increasingly complex and inefficient So, as it was pointed out the experience of Korea in
removing “export bias” has been through the implementation of the so-called ‘exportsubsidy’ route to outward orientation.
This way to encourage exports is somewhat similar to import liberalization with
currency realignment (the ‘free-trade’ route to outward orientation). It is argued that there
are several reasons why an ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation has been implemented
instead of the ‘free-trade’ route. First, political pressure made cutting import protection very
difficult. Secondly, the currency devaluation that may have been required to reduce import
barriers could cause some inflationary pressure. Third, import taxes have been a major
source o f government revenue. Fourth, there was an erroneous belief that both exports and
import substitution can be better promoted by the scheme o f export subsidies with import
barriers. Finally, is should not be overlooked that an ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation
is costly relative to a ‘free-trade’ route and this makes ‘export-subsidy’ outward orientation
a transitional instrument to a ‘free-trade’ outward orientation route.
Applications of Game Theory and the Political Preference Function (PPF1
Framework in Economic Integration Analysis
Kennedy et al (1998) analyzed the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU)
using a PPF analytical framework. To get an idea about how this process o f accession may
be carried out, the importance of various Turkish social and productive groups in policy
making was established and compared to their counterparts in the United States (US) and
the EU. The PPF is a partial equilibrium analysis framework in which it is assumed that the
government maximizes an additive social utility function ofvarious sectors of society. Beef
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and veal, dairy products, com, wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and pork and
poultry were the ten commodity groups included in the analysis. The budget sector
(government) and consumers were also included in the estimation o f the PPF. The MISS
model was used to estimate weights o f each sector in the PPF. These weights represent the
political influence of consumer and producer sectors relative to the government budget in
the formulation of agricultural policies. The results showed that the dairy and rice sectors
are the most politically relevant groups in the US. hi the EU, the dairy sector along with
wheat producers, beef and veal, and soybeans producers appear to be the most influential
sectors. In Turkey, the rice sector along with com producers and consumers were the most
influential groups. These results show that policies are influenced by different groups when
a comparison is made between Turkey and either the US or the EU. By contrast, there are
small differences in the importance of groups among the US and the EU.
Kennedy et al (1996) analyzed multilateral trade negotiations between the European
Union (EU) and the United States (US) in light of recent GATT agreements. The Political
Preference Function (PPF) framework was used to quantify the welfare implications of
different trade liberalization scenarios. The estimates of changes in welfare were then used
in agame theoretical framework to identify the most likely trade agreement between the US
and EU under cooperative and non-cooperative games. Sugar, milk, cereals, oilseeds, beef,
pork, and poultry are the seven commodity groups included in the study. In addition,
consumer surplus and the budget sector are included in the analysis. Weights for each
commodify sector, consumers, and governmentbudget were estimated and then normalized
by dividing by the budget deficit weight Thus, the budget sector is assumed to have a
weight equal to unify and the rest o f weights are analyzed relative to the budget sector.
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These weights are then used to estimate changes in welfare for each commodity group and
get one estimate o f the PPF under each action for the US and the EU.
Four scenarios were employed in the analysis o f trade negotiations between the US
and the EU. Status quo (SQ), no export related subsidies (EX), partial free trade (PF), and
free trade (FT) were chosen as the relevant scenarios of analysis based on the latest GATT
negotiations and agreements. The non-cooperative and cooperative games are modeled. In
addition, simulations are run with a 9.4% depreciation and a 40.2% appreciation of the US
dollar. The results of the various scenarios used are shown in Table 2.14. These results
indicate that in the non-cooperative game the Nash equilibrium outcome is EX for
exchange rate is changed. Under the cooperative game, the outcome for the EU is again
Table 2.14.

Nash Equilibrium Solutions to Games Based on Uruguay Round Options
the EU regardless of the exchange rate whereas for the US the outcome
EU Actions

US Actions

EX

PF

SQ

NR

CR

EX

NA

SQ

FT

PF
FT

ND

CA,CD

Note gamesolutions for non-cooperativeand cooperative gtmes are represented byNs and CErespectively, E«A, R, D. whereA«actual
exchange rate, R-40.2 appreciation of the dollar, and I>9.4 depreciation of the dollar.
Source Kennedy et al (1996).

insensitive to exchange rate variations, hi this case, the Nash equilibrium is PF for the EU.
Likewise, the outcome for the US under the cooperative game is sensitive to changes in
exchange rate regimes. However, with no changes in the exchange rate (A) and exchange
rate depreciation (D), the US optimal outcome turns out to be FT. Oehmke et al (1990)
used a Political Preference Function (PPF) to analyze government intervention in the US
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wheat market. Changes in consumer welfare, changes in producers* welfare, and the budget
sector were assumed to be the relevant variables in the PPF. The study analyzes two
separate years, 1977 and 1985, to determine the dynamics ofpolitical environment in policy
formulation. Since wheat is exported, excess demand was assumed to be represented by a
constant elasticity equation. Likewise, domestic supply and demand are represented by a
constant price elasticity equation. On the other hand, since government intervention is
given through various policies the “policy-optimal” target price, research expenditures, and
sales from government stocks were estimated. The results showed that in 1977 wheat
producers were weighted more highly than taxpayers (government budget). Thus, the
weight for producers in the PPF was 1.43 whereas consumers weight was 0.43. If the
situation of 1985 is taken alone, the picture changes a little. In this case, producers are
weighted at 1.25, which is lower than the weight of 1977. Consumers continue to be
relatively less influential than both groups. However, the fact that producers were less
influential in the PPF than in 1977 indicates that producers have lost some power in the
policy making process. This outcome is consistent with the real behavior of policy-making
in the US. hi conclusion, it is noteworthy that the PPF framework consistently described
real life situations and it is useful as an analytical tool.
Gordon et al (1975) used a Political Preference Function (PPF) framework to
analyze policy changes in the US cattle industry in the years 1959 to 1969. This time,
consumer’s meat costs, margins to breeding cow-calfproducers, margins to cattle feeders,
and beef import quota level were assumed to be the arguments o f the function. Estimation
of the PPF was made under a quadratic mathematical representation. One of the objectives
o f the study was to obtain various estimations of the PPF and to do so the PPF is estimated
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under various sets o f weights for each group. The results show that the PPF framework
adequately described relative sectoral influence when there was a policy change. Thus, it
was concluded that a trade-off o f two to one between aggregate cattle producers and
consumers was the most plausible scenario under which policy changes were made. For
example, with a trade-off o f 2:1 producers weight relative to consumers was 1.62 during
1959-63 (free trade), 5.06 during 1964 (quota imposition), 2.51 during 1965-67 (stable
quotas), and 0.91 during 1968-69 (imports increase). This outcome is consistent with the
observed situations under which policy changes were decided.
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CHAPTER THREE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents the theoretical considerations underlying the economic model
used in this research. To obtain an adequate economic model to analyze economic
integration in Central America, an extensive exercise is developed. First, a review of the
most recent advancements in international trade theory is presented. Secondly, the theory
underlying international economic integration is reviewed. Motivation to enter international
economic agreements, expected benefits from economic integration, and the forms of
economic integration are reviewed. Third, theoretical considerations underlying economic
integration among developing countries, as is the case of Central American countries, are
assessed. Fourth, since economic policies play a crucial role in determining the success of
any integration agreement, a theoretical analysis o f policies and their effects on income,
prices, and consumers’ welfare is developed in the context o f developing countries. Fifth,
since this research will use a game theoretical framework to analyze economic integration
in Central America, a review of game theory is included. Finally, since much of the
research will be based on the use of the political preference function (PPF), its derivation
is also presented in this chapter.
C urrent Situation In Internationa! Trade Theory
The theory o f international trade is crucially important in helping analysts and
policy makers understand trade patterns. With the help o f international trade theory it is
possible to analyze the reasons for trade among countries in a concise manner.
Traditionally, there has been a set of assumptions taken into account to make the analysis
of international trade patterns clear and effective. Effective analysis refers to an appropriate
prediction of trade patterns under specific conditions. The analysis o f international trade
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patterns is made by relaxing some assumptions required for a no trade or autarky situation.
There are five main assumptions for no trade between countries. These assumptions are
constant returns to scale, identical tastes and preferences, identical relative endowment of
resources, identical production functions, and no distortions (Markusen et al, 1995).
M ainstream International T rade Theory
Until recently, international trade theory analyzed trade patterns by relaxing some
of the assumptions of no trade (Markusen, 1995). Classical or orthodox trade theory
focused on trade patterns that arise from differences in production functions and differences
in resource endowment Traditionally, three general equilibrium models have been used to
analyze these differences. In addition, a partial equilibrium framework has been used to
analyze the impact of distortions on international trade. Finally, the assumption o f constant
returns to scale is relaxed under what is known as the new international trade theory (NUT)
(Krugman, 1986; Scherer et al, 1994).
The use of general equilibrium models has made a great contribution to the
development of international trade theory. For example, under a general equilibrium
framework, the Ricardian model deals with differences in technology and the HeckscherOhlin model deals with differences in resource endowment The very simplistic
assumptions of the Ricardian model are used to predict that countries should specialize in
production of goods based on productivity differences that lead to comparative advantage.
By the same token, according to assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries
should export goods that use more intensively resources that are relatively more abundant
in a given country when compared to trade partners. Finally, the specific factor model has
been used to analyze trade patterns that arise from assuming mobile and fixed factors of
production. To some degree, this model is an extension o f the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
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As was mentioned above, the assumption about distortions is relaxed and analyzed
in a partial equilibrium framework. Thus, various governmental policies, such as taxes,
subsidies, tariffs, and quotas, are widely used to shape international trade relations and their
analysis is a very important subject in international trade theory (Markusen et al, 1995).
New International Trade Theory (NUT)
The discussion above indicates that classical international trade theory relies on the
assumption o f perfect competition and constant returns to scale in production. However,
as empirical evidence shows, the applicability of the classical theory to predict actual
patterns of trade is limited (Krugman, 1986). For example, the Leontiefifparadox showed
that the Heckscher-Ohlin model was inconsistent with patterns of trade it predicted when
the model was tested empirically (Krugman, 1986). In addition, if the assumption of
constant returns to scale is relaxed several complications for the use of the classical
framework arise. For example, increasing returns to scale may lead to monopolistic
competition in international markets and to the use of strategic behavior in trade relations.
Under monopolistic assumptions firms are no longer price takers. Therefore, in deciding
their actions, firms will take other firms’ actions into account as well. This situation has
hardly been analyzed by classical theorists of international trade.
Recently, new developments in international trade theory have created the
opportunity to analyze actual patterns o f trade in a more adequate and realistic setting than
under the classical view (Krugman, 1986). However, it seems that there is a division
between supporters o f the classical view and supporters o f the newest ideas developed into
the theory o f international trade. It is widely accepted that the analysis o f trade under
perfect competitive markets leads to different conclusions from those obtained when the
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analysis is made under the assumption o f imperfectly competitive markets. However,
scientists are discussing whether the objective is to defend the theory that advocates free
trade or a theory that acknowledges that free trade is not always possible and, therefore, it
proposes some ideas about how to deal in a world o f imperfect competition.
On the other hand, there is a confrontation, as often there is in economic theory,
about what the central object of analysis in international trade theory should be. Should
economic theory analyze what is really happening in the real world or what the situation
ought to be? This is a struggle between the positive and normative views of economic
theory.
This confrontation easily extends to international trade theory. If the objective is to
analyze patterns of trade under ideal conditions, then the approach used in the last 100 years
is probably appropriate. This approach is mainly based on what the patterns of trade ought
be, given resources and initial comparative advantage. These models include the Ricardian
model, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and the specific factor models. However, if the
objective is to predict the patterns of international trade actually seen, then various factors
of trade such as economies of scale, research and development (R&D), and imperfect
competition should be analyzed using what is now referred to as “strategic trade policy” or
NUT (Krugman, 1986).
At this point, it seems appropriate to describe Ni'lT in a detailed manner. Scherer
et al (1994) mentioned that NTTT focused on five main features. These features are
economies of scale, technology and R&D, the product life cycle, intra-industry trade, and
oligopoly, hi addition, strategic behavior has an important place within this new theoretical
framework.
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One o f the differences in the assumptions made undo* NTTT is that comparative
advantage can be shaped and is not static, as assumed by orthodox theory. This is directly
related to technology and R&D. The relationship between comparative advantage and
technology in international trade is not a novelty. However, the fact that the trade balance
has been shown to be systematically correlated with intensities of technological innovations
efforts, is a new discovery in international trade theory (Scherer et al, 1994).
The product life cycle theory is used to further the analysis of patterns of trade
based on the assumption o f a changing comparative advantage. Since it is assumed that
comparative advantage is something that is fought for, product life cycle theory explains
that developed countries have comparative advantage in the creation and development of
new goods but later the comparative advantage in the production o f the good is lost. One
explanation is that as production gets standardized, developing countries gain comparative
advantage in the production of the same goods. This gain in comparative advantage is due
to cheap labor and raw materials. Therefore, developing countries end up being net
exporters of goods for which they were initially net importers.
Intra-industry trade is another situation that has come to challenge the traditional
views on international trade patterns. The Heckscher-Ohlin model became very popular
after it was published in 1933 and for the following 30 years it became a fundamental
model to analyze international trade. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries
should specialize based on factor endowment Thus, in the early European Union (EU),
economists expected Germany to specialize in exports of automobiles, Italy in the exports
o f labor-intensive goods such as textiles and vegetables, and France in the exports of wine
and haute couture. However, Germany, France and Italy resumed exporting automobiles,
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cheese and wine. This situation in the sixties and seventies indicated that the HeckscherOhlin model was limited in explaining patterns o f trade. This is because a great deal o f
intra-industry trade arose during the sixties and seventies and countries exported various
products close in technology to each other and the Heckscher-Ohlin model could not
predict such a pattern of trade.
Analysts have started to consider economies of scale when looking for an
explanation for the patterns o f trade actually observed. Economies of scale are present due
to several reasons. First, the production of a given good may require very high initial costs
or front-end commitment o f resources. Then, unit cost will fall as output volume rises.
Secondly, market size is important because the greater the market to be supplied, the lower
the per unit costs of production will be. Third, “learning by doing” or the learning curve is
likely to be present as the quantity produced increases. The learning curve helps to reduce
costs as more units of the same good are produced because of the gains in experience and
the fine-tuning o f the process of production.
Finally, the presence of economies of scale may lead to a situation in which few
suppliers of the good will exist When there are few suppliers of a given good then the
question about oligopolistic competition arises. Oligopoly generates two difficulties in
analyzing patterns o f trade. First, oligopoly means that perfect competition is no longer
present and, therefore, traditional methods of analysis are no longer adequate. Secondly,
under oligopolistic competition, comparative advantage depends on the strategies of R&D,
plant location, pricing, product advertising, and so forth. This means that comparative
advantage is no longer exogenous to the economic system but something that is fought for
and won.
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In the NUT views, strategic trade policy seems to be an alternative to free trade
given present international trade relations among countries. It is true that negotiations under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization
(WTO), have led to countries reaching an agreement to lower tariffs. However, other kinds
of barriers still remain. For example, hygienic standards, production standards and other
regulations have come to replace tariff barriers. As a result, bureaucracy has increased,
barriers to trade seem to be the same and, in some cases, the situation is worse than it was
before reaching the agreements.
Thus, it is not a coincidence that Scherer et al (1994) proposed that a strategic
behavior in setting tariffs and targeting markets needed to be developed, hi addition, “trade
enhancing national policies” are proposed to cope with a world in which free trade is still
assumed to be a dream. It is believed, under this view, that government intervention in
international trade relations can be beneficial from the domestic standpoint Accordingly,
twelve such policies are mentioned. These policies are commodity export subsidies, export
financing, government favors tied to export performance, learning curve pricing, home
market protection, coercive market-opening measures, cartel formation and dumping,
coordination of industry investments, provision of cheap raw materials, subsidies to R&D,
intellectual property protection, and subsidies to workers’ education.
Significance of NUT for Developing Countries
The expectations of developing countries regarding trade liberalization can be
helpful to understand the significance of NUT for developing countries. Historically,
developing countries have been unable to influence international trade negotiations,
Therefore, until recently the role o f developing countries in international trade negotiations
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has been limited. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that developing countries do not
expect to be able to change their situation in international trade negotiations. So, it is
reasonable to expect that developing countries will not enjoy free trade in the near future.
Under this light, NUT could be appealing for developing countries.
Even if NUT has appeal in developing countries, the pros and cons of the theory
should be weighed in implementing trade policies according to NUT. Some aspects of
NUT can be named as positive. For example, it is argued that NTTT is more realistic than
orthodox theory of international trade (Krugman, 1986). In addition, it is common
knowledge that national trade policy decisions usually respond to the influence of special
interest groups and, therefore, NTTT could be appealing in shaping national policies
(Krugman, 1986).
On the contrary, some aspects ofNITT can have a detrimental impact on the policy
outcome o f developing countries. Alam (1995) argued that developing countries could be
unable to derive benefits from the use of strategic policies. First, an imperfect market
structure is more pervasive in the industrial sectors o f developing countries than in those
o f developed countries. This happens because ISI strategies and lack o f antitrust laws lead
to oligopolistic market structure. Secondly, the small size o f developing countries reduces
their ability to use strategic trade policies. For example, a restriction from a small
developing country against a large developed country could generate a small loss for the
latter. However, if the large country retaliates, then losses could be great for the small
developing country. Third, developing countries may not benefit from economies of scale
for several reasons. NTTT indicates R&D expenditures are instrumental in generating
economies o f scale but most developing countries lack the ability to spend money on R&D.
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In addition, since the market size of most developing countries is small when taken
individually, there is small room to exploit economies o f scale because it requires, among
other aspects, a large market size.
There are still some other strong arguments against using NTTT in trade policy in
developing countries. Since it is widely accepted that trade policy decisions are strongly
affected by interest groups, there is a risk regarding the possibility that interest groups may
use NTTT concepts to gain at the expense of their own country (Grossman, 1986). On the
other hand, it has been argued that great care should be taken when using strategic behavior
to decide what productive sectors to promote. If the wrong sector is chosen, then, in the
long run, the country’s welfare will be negatively affected (Krugman, 1986).
Finally, it is important to mention that policy makers of developing countries should
be convinced of what international economic order will prevail before engaging in any sort
o f policy making process. If policy makers believe that free trade is a very long term goal,
then NTTT could be the only alternative to propel national social-economic development
in the short and middle term. However, it has been indicated that developing countries will
be better off if they follow a free trade strategy (Alam, 1995). So, it seems that the only
plausible outcome is a mix of both the free trade approach and the strategic trade policy
making approach.
International Economic Integration
Consider why countries may want to get into international economic integration
agreements. A probable answer to this question is that countries expect to get some benefits
or gains by entering an international agreement Delener (1999) mentioned that countries
may be encouraged to form international trading blocs as a result of the sense of
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community, strategic alliances, norms, and rules. These reasons can be termed non
economic reasons. In addition, international trading blocs are usually formed to make up
for shortcomings in international trade relationships. This reason can be termed the
economic reason. Among the economic and political reasons, several factors can be
mentioned as important in forming international trading blocs. First, members can perceive
that economic benefits can be achieved from a more efficient production structure as a
result of the new economic environment triggered by the economic integration agreement.
Second, members may pursue non-economic objectives such as political ties, stabilization,
etc. Third, an internationally integrated region may improve its bargaining power in
multilateral trade negotiations. Moreover, small countries forming trading alliances may
improve their position in securing market access. In addition, international economic
integration opens a possibility to exploit economies of scale (Robson, 1984). From the
previous discussion it can be inferred that member countries’ welfare improvement is one
o f the main objective of international economic integration agreements. International trade
theory analyzes this improvement in welfare as gains from trade liberalization through
international economic integration agreements (Krugman, 1997).
Gains From Trade
Gains from trade has been one the most important factors that influence trade flows
and patterns of trade (Krugman, 1997). In general, trade liberalization through international
economic integration agreements may lead to improvement in the welfare of member
countries (Robson, 1984). In addition, it is assumed that trade increases the welfare of
countries when the production of goods is increased by means o f specialization induced by
comparative advantage. Gains from trade can be explained in a very concise manner with
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the help o f Figure 3.1. Suppose there is a two-country world. In addition, assume that there
are only two commodities produced, namely, X and Y. Let the curve PPFj, for i=l,2
represent the production possibility frontier (PPF) o f each country. Disregard inputs for the
time being. The way both PPF are drawn indicates that production of X is more intensive
in country I than in country 2. By the same token Y is more intensive in production in
country 2 than in country /.
Consider the situation without trade. Under autarky (no trade), equilibrium
production and consumption in country 1 is given at point A. At this point, country I is
consuming its own production. For example, production of X (X,A) equal consumption
(C„A). By the same token, production of Y (Y,A) equals consumption (C,yA). The
community indifference curve (CIC) is given by U A. Relative prices are given by the line
P,A. The same situation applies for country 2. Point B shows the point of production and
consumption of country 2. PPF2 shows that production of Y is more intensive than in
country I. The community indifference curve (CIC) is given by U2A. production ofX(X2K)
equal consumption (C ^ ) and production o f Y (Y2A) equals consumption (C2YA). Relative
prices are given by P2A.
Now consider the situation when countries engage in trade. With the opportunity
o f increased demand for good given the presence o f a greater market, countries will
increase production of the good in whose production they have comparative advantage.
This may lead to either a complete or a partial specialization in the production of the good
in whose production there is comparative advantage. Therefore, after countries open up
their economies, terms o f trade between countries changes and a common relative price line
(P jF=P2^ is obtained. In addition, trade leads to a high degree of specialization in the
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production o f one good. However, there is not complete specialization. This is conditioned
by the shape o f the PPF curve in both countries and international prices.
Under these new relative world prices, total production of each good increases and
welfare of countries improves. This improvement is shown by the shift o f the CIC upward
to UjF, for r=l,2. Thus, for country Ithe new point o f production is F. At this point, country
1 produces X,F and Y,F. However, consumption is at point C along U,F. This new CIC
conveys a higher level of utility or welfare since it lies to the northeast of the CIC under
autarky. This is possible because under free trade countries have a greater supply of goods

X and Y than under autarky. Moreover, this new higher level of consumption is possible
because o f export and import possibilities that countries obtained after engaged in trade.
Import and export of goods are crucial in increasing the welfare of countries. In
Figure 3.1 this is shown explicitly. Under free trade, country 1 ended up producing X,Fand
Y,f and consuming CIXFand CIYF. Moreover, X,F< ClxFand Y,F> C,YF. This implies that
country 1 imports X and exports Y. The opposite is true for country 2. Thus, M,XFshows
how much X is imported by country 1. By the same token, M2YFshows how much of Y is
imported by country 2. On the contrary, EtYFshows how much of Y is exported by country
1 and E2Xf shows how much of X is exported by country 2.
In summary, countries gain by trading with each other. First, as countries open their
economies, increased production possibilities are obtained. Second, increased levels of
production and specialization lead to a greater supply of goods. Third, trade leads to a
greater supply of goods and more favorable terms o f trade which in turn allows countries
to increase their welfare. Finally, import and export possibilities become new sources of
increased consumption and, consequently, increased levels of welfare.
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Theoretical Considerations in International Economic Integration
International economic integration is generally used as a means for domestic
economic development However, there must exist a set of conditions to secure a successful
economic integration (Robson, 1984). First, if the trade barriers prior to implementation of
the agreement are high, then there is an increased opportunity for a successful integration.
Secondly, if in the post-economic integration scheme common external tariffs (CET) are
lower than before economic integration takes place, it is less likely that trade diversion will
be present Third, the larger the number and the area of the economic integration, the
greater the scope for net trade creation since there is an increase in the likelihood that lowcost consumers and producers will join the agreement Fourth, trade creation is more likely
to result as the competitiveness of the member countries increases. This is so because if
economies are competitive, then there are increased opportunities for specialization and net
trade creation. Finally, if member countries are located geographically close, then welfare
is more likely to increase because of lower transportation costs than those of countries
located far from one another.
Given the previous discussion, it is worthwhile to assess what specific benefits may
be obtained by member countries when entering an integration agreement. Static and
dynamic benefits from international economic integration are usually mentioned in
international trade literature (Robson, 1984). Several benefits can be mentioned as static
benefits. First, benefits are derived from the elimination o f customs and border officers.
Secondly, terms o f trade usually improve under an integration agreement Third, the new
formed economic bloc may exert bargaining power in international negotiations in a more
effective way than member countries did individually. Robson (1984) mentioned the effects
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of market enlargement on the efficiency o f factor utilization and on output and its rate of
growth through its impact on the location and rate of investment as sources o f dynamic
benefits. Thus, dynamic benefits o f integration are more likely to be seen in the long run.
Thus, economies o f scale, investment stimulation, increased competition, and better
utilization of economic resources encompass dynamic benefits expected from an integration
agreement
International economic integration may take different forms and it depends on the
intended degree of economic integration (Robson, 1984). Depending on the degree of
integration there are free trade areas, custom unions, common markets and economic
unions. A free trade area involves the free movement of product in the area, i.e, it involves
elimination of trade barriers between the members of the free trade area. In addition, each
member retains it own tariff with respect of the rest of the world. By contrast, a customs
union involves not only the free movement of products in the area, but also a common
external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world. A common market is a deeper form of
integration. A common market contains the elements of a custom union and additionally
allows for free labor and capital flow in the area. Thus, in a common market factor and
product market are integrated. Presently, the deepest form of international integration is
represented by an economic union. An economic union contains all the elements of a
common market and a high degree of unification of monetary, fiscal and other policies, hi
this case, depending on the degree of integration a wide spectrum o f forms of integration
can be seen. Finally, political integration refers to the formation o f a single nation with one
political authority. In this case, members are no longer sovereign states but part of a single
country. The degree of integration mostly will depend on the degree of harmonization
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policies among the members. In general, most agreements on international integration are
focused on the suppression of discrimination among members, the maintenance of
discrimination against the rest of the world, and the lasting character of the agreements
which limits the use o f certain instruments of economic policy.
Trade Diversion and Trade Creation in a Customs Union
Since the objective o f Central American countries appears to be the creation of an
adequate customs union for the area, it seems relevant for this research to pay special
attention to the theory of customs union. According to Robson (1984) there are three
features in a customs union. First, tariffs on imports from member countries are removed.
Secondly, a common external tariff (CET) on imports from the rest o f the world is imposed.
Finally, member states divide customs revenue according to an agreed upon formula.
Robson (1984) argued that gains and losses arise from the impact of the customs
union on several factors. First, a customs union has impact on resource allocation and
international specialization. Secondly, economies of scale are likely to be present. Third,
a customs union affects terms of trade. Fourth, productivity of factors is also affected by
a customs union. Fifth, economic integration in the form of a customs union may affect
economic growth o f member countries. Sixth, economic stability may be one of the
objectives of economic integration and it may be affected by a customs union. Finally, the
formation o f a customs union will surely affect the distribution of income in member
countries.
As it was mentioned in the previous discussion, resource allocation is one of the
most important aspects for assessing the success of a customs union creation. In general,
the theory of customs union analyzes resource allocation in terms o f trade creation and
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trade diversion (Robson, 1984). Accordingly, trade creation is represented by a shift from
the consumption o f higher-cost domestic production to lower-cost products o f partner
countries. There are two aspects o f this shift First, domestic production o f goods that are
identical with those produced abroad is reduced or eliminated. This effect is termed the
saving effect Secondly, there is an increase in consumption of import o f the goods that
were previously purchased at higher prices. This second effect is referred to as the
consumption effect On the other hand, trade diversion is a shift in the source of imports
from lower-cost external sources to higher-cost partner sources. Trade diversion has two
aspects. First there is an increase in the cost of goods previously imported from abroad.
Secondly, because o f the higher price of goods, there is a loss in consumer surplus. Finally,
if a customs union is on balance trade creating, then it is assumed to be beneficial. A trade
diverting customs union is assumed to be detrimental.
To get a clear idea about trade creation and trade diversion, the formation of a
customs union is analyzed in Figure 3.2-3.4. For this purpose, consider a three-country
world, hi addition, for purposes of the analysis, assume there is only one traded good. Also,
for simplicity purposes, assume no terms o f trade effects and constant returns to scale.
According to Figure 3.2, countries I and 2 are exporters of the commodity and country 3
is the importer. Therefore, Figure 3.2 shows the excess supply o f country 1 and 2 (ES, and
ES2) and excess demand for country 3 (ED3). If free trade (FT) is allowed, an equilibrium
is obtained where the excess supply curve ( E S ,^ and the excess demand curve (ED3)
intersect Points shows the equilibrium price (Pj) and quantity (Q l+f). However, suppose,
as in many real world situations, that exporters face a tariff T from the importer (Figure
33). Call this situation status quo (SQ). Under SQ the excess supply o f country 1 and 2 is
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given by ES1+2T. Point B shows the equilibrium outcome under tariff with price PW
T and
quantity QI+2T. Now suppose that country 1 and 3 decide to form a customs union (Figure
3.4). Then, country 1 will not longer face the tariff from country 3 since trade barriers
between them will be removed. However, country 2 still faces this tariff. Under the customs
union (CU) situation, the new excess supply is given by ES,^™13. The new equilibrium
point is C. the new price is Pw“ and quantity is Q^™13.
Consider the quantity supplied by each exporter under each situation. Under SQ
country 1 export the amount corresponding to segment QtT and country 2 exports the
segment Q /. If FT prevailed, then both exporters would have experience an increase in
their exports. Thus, country / would have exported the segment Q,Fand country 2 would
have supplied Q2F. Notice that under FT the quantity exported by each country is greater
than under SQ and, consequently, the price is lower than under SQ. Under the CU
situation, country 1 exports the segment Q,“ 13and country 2 exports Q2CU|3. It is clear that
the total quantity exported under CU is greater than under SQ (Q,^™13> Q[+2T). Thus, the
customs union has caused overall trade to increase and price to decrease with respect to the
SQ situation. The segment TC indicates how much trade was created by the customs union.
However, it is clear that country 2 under CU is exporting less than under SQ since Q2T >
Q2cu13. This reduction in exports is shown by the segment ID which is how much trade was
diverted by country I from country 2 when the customs union was implemented. Thus, TD
is trade diversion. Finally, the customs union benefits or losses are assessed. If trade
creation is greater than trade diversion, then the customs union is said to be beneficial for
member countries. On the other hand, as is was mentioned before, a customs union is said
to be detrimental if trade diversion is greater than trade creation.
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Farther Considerations on the Theory of Customs Union
Since exploitation of economies of scale is often mentioned as one of the key
objectives when developing countries enter economic integration schemes (Robson, 1984),
it seems reasonable to analyze the possible effect of economies of scale on a customs union,
hi analyzing economies o f scale, orthodox theory is of little help since in its analysis it
assumes constant returns to scale. Therefore, some modifications o f the theory are in order
to get some insight when economies o f scale are present Markusen et al (1995) employ
extensions to international trade o f imperfect competitive models such as the Cournot and
the Bertrand models to explain how economies of scale can lead to a strategic trade policy
setting. Robson (1984) uses a case by case situation and a graphical approach without
referring to any of the afore mentioned models to explain the effects of economies of scale
on the welfare of countries entering an economic integration agreement This approach will
be followed here.
The analysis of the effects of economies of scale is as follows. First, suppose there
are two countries, namely, H and F entering a customs union, and a passive rest of the
world (ROW). Second, suppose there is only one homogeneous product being traded.
Third, assume that countries set a common external tariff (CET) to equate average costs to
tariff-inclusive import price. In this case, there will be no tariff revenues and excess profits,
and all gains or losses will accrue to consumers, hi addition, suppose that two situations are
possible regarding production o f the good. Either there is production in one country or in
both countries. Let us consider each case in turn.
Assume initially that, in the pre-union situation, there is production in both
countries. After the union is enforced it is likely that one of the countries, either HorF, will
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capture the entire market. For purposes of the analysis, suppose that i f captures the whole
market Since there are economies o f scale, the average costs of country

s producers will

be less than their costs when they supplied only its home market. Moreover, country H
production costs will be lower than cost in country P. Thus, the union domestic price will
be less than the pre-union price. Therefore, the CET rate will be lower than the pre-union
levels and consumers in both countries will gain from the implementation of the integration
scheme, hi country P, there will be a trade creation effect due to replacement of dearer
domestic production by cheaper imports from country H. hi addition, there will be an
increase in consumption of the good induced by the reduced price, hi country H there are
also gains in consumers’ surplus due to reduced prices. In addition, quantity supplied by
domestic producers increases.
Let us now assume that in the pre-union situation, there is production only in one
country, say, country H. If country H captures the whole market, this will be a result from
country P imposing a tariff and not from trade liberalization, otherwise country H would
not have needed a tariff to compete in the market of country P. Under this situation, the
domestic price in country P will rise. Since price increased in country P, then quantity
demanded will be lower than the pre-union level. Thus, there is a loss in consumer surplus
due to higher prices. In addition, there is trade diversion since country P shifted from a
cheaper source of the good to a more expensive one.
From the previous analysis, several problems arise. First, if in the pre-union
situation the good whose production is subject to economies of scale is produced in both
countries, then, after the union is implemented, it is expected that one firm will take over
the whole market. However, it is not clear which country it will be. The final result will
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depends on ‘dynamic’ factors such as the nature of oligopolistic competition, the reaction
functions of the firms, and other factors (Robson, 1984). In this regard, it is argued that
trade liberalization will not necessarily produce optimal specialization and, instead, it may
lead to “perverse specialization”. Perverse specialization occurs when the firms with the
highest average costs curve takes over the whole market because of oligopolistic
competition. Moreover, it is argued that in the presence of economies of scale,
specialization may fail to occur because the price mechanism may fail to promote
specialization if equilibrium is stable in the pre-union situation. Thus, trade liberalization
through economic integration is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to secure the
benefits that can be derived from free trade (Robson, 1984).
In summary, the theory of customs union within the traditional or orthodox
approach warns about the benefits and losses countries may incur when entering a customs
union. Overall benefits are represented by net trade creation and losses by net trade
diversion. In addition, the formation of a customs union may lead to the presence of
economies of scale, hi this case, orthodox theory has to be modified to deal with this
situation. A closer analysis o f the effects o f economies o f scale on the welfare o f countries
entering a customs union is then made under a oligopolistic market competition structure.
The analysis showed that when economies o f scale are present, there is a real possibility of
no specialization or ‘pervasive specialization' which negatively affect the welfare of
member countries. Finally, this analysis is very relevant for Central American countries
since one o f the stated objectives o f economic integration is to exploit economies of scale.
Nonetheless, the previous analysis indicates that to reap any possible benefits, countries
will have to negotiate and reach agreements about country specialization through planning
and supplementation of market forces through regional policies and compromises.
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Does a Customs Union Lead to Free Trade?
Several questions arise when countries form trading blocs. One of the most
important questions is whether or not a customs union is an adequate path toward free
trade. Experiences around the world have shown that economic integration has been used
as a means to develop regional trade and to attain a more solid position in international
trade relations when is not possible to achieve that as individual countries. Moreover,
depending on the stage of development of countries, the formation o f a customs union may
impact trade relationships differently. For example, the formation o f the EEC and the
subsequent implementation o f the protectionist common agricultural policy (CAP) made
the EEC become a net exporter of wheat. This change in the pattern of trade of wheat
affected international prices and quantities of wheat traded.
On the other hand, the Central American Common Market (CACM) never had the
opportunity of implementing protective policies to develop domestic agricultural and
industrial sectors of member countries. Thus, after the creation o f the CACM there was not
significant change in the terms of trade and trade patterns with the rest of the world.
However, regional trade increased considerably under the CACM. Thus, a customs union
is a move toward free trade because barriers to trade among member countries are removed.
At the same time, the formation of a customs union is a move away from free trade because
restrictions on trade with the rest o f the world are solidified. The theory o f the second best
warns analysts regarding this issue. Although the elimination o f tariffs may increase total
world welfare, the implementation ofpiecemeal tariff reductions may lower overall world
welfare (McMillan, 1986).
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flame Theory In International Trade
This section analyzes the importance o f game theory in international trade theory
and in analyzing real life situations in international trade negotiations. A basic description
of the game theory analytical framework is then introduced.
Importance of Game Theory in International Trade Issues
According to McMillan(1986), game theory has an important place in international
trade. Every time there is a situation in which an agent’s utility depends not only on his own
actions but also on the actions of other agents and all agents take these interdependence into
account, game theory is a powerful tool of analysis. Therefore, many important trade issues
can be modeled within a game theoretic framework. These include negotiations over mutual
tariff reductions, indebtedness of less developed countries such as Brazil and Mexico, the
formation and preservation of customs unions, and others, hi all the examples mentioned,
there is strategic interdependence; one agent’s action depends on other agent’s action and
vice versa. So, when there is strategic behavior involved, game theory is an appropriate
framework o f analysis.
Basic Concepts of Game Theory
According to Rasmusen (1996), the paradigm of game theory is that the analyst
assigns payoff functions and strategy sets to players, and considers what happens when
players select strategies to maximize their payoffs. Accordingly, the essential elements of
a game are players, actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes, and equilibria.

Players are the individuals who make the decisions. Each player’s goal is to maximize his
utility by choice o f action. In international trade, individual countries or blocs of countries
are the players. An action or move by player /, denoted

is a choice the player can make.
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By the same token, player i ’s action set, denoted

is the entire set o f actions

available to him or her. In addition, an action profile is an ordered set, denoted a-{aj} V
r=l,...,n, of one action for each o f n players in the game. The information set is formed by
the knowledge at a particular time of the values of different variables, i.e., it is the different
values the player thinks possible. If the information set has many elements, there are many
values the player cannot rule out; if there is one element, the player knows the value
exactly. Player i ’s strategy s{is a rule that tells the player which action to choose at each
instant of the game, given the player’s information set Player i ’s strategy set or strategy

space Sj={Sj} is the set of strategies available to the player. By the same token, a strategy
profile s={sj} V r=l,...,n, is an ordered set consisting of one strategy for each of the n
players in the game. The player i ’s payoff p^s,,...^,,) is defined as the utility or expected
utility player i receives after all players have picked their strategies and the game has been
played out The outcome of the game is the set of interesting elements that the analyst picks
from the values of the actions, payoffs, and other variables after the game is played out.
Finally, an equilibrium s*={s*„...,s*n} is a strategy profile consisting of a best strategy for
each of the n players of the game.
From the previous definitions, it is clear that a game or more formally a game in

strategicform consists of a set of agents, a set of strategies for each agent, and a utility
function for each agent Because it is a game, each agent’s utility, vt, depends on every
agents’ strategy, i.e., u ^ 'C a ,,...^ (McMillan, 1986).
Since strategic behavior may take various forms, games may also vary. Therefore,
games can be cooperative or non-cooperative, played in pure or mixed strategies, hi
addition, there could be zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. Also, games may be static or
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dynamic (McMillan, 1986). If an agent randomizes his choice o f strategy, he is said to be
using a mixed strategy. On the contrary, if the choice is made non-stochastically, the player
is said to be using a pure strategy. A zero-sum game is a game o f pure conflict: what one
agent wins, some other agents must lose. So, the sum of all agents’ utilities is always zero.
A non-zero-sum game has elements of both conflict and cooperation. For example,
oligopolistic firms have a common interest in keeping total output low and market price
high. However, it is in the interest of each firm to have a large market share.
It has been stated that different games have different types of equilibria (McMillan,
1986). For example, it is argued that the equilibrium of a cooperative game is Pareto
optimal (McMillan, 1986). By contrast, non-cooperative games lead to non-Pareto optima.
In this case, the concept of dominant strategies and dominant strategy equilibria become
important Thus, the strategy s’; is a dominant strategy if it is a player’s strictly best
response to any strategies the other players might choose. This means that whatever
strategies the other players pick, player / ’s payoff is highest with s’;. The players inferior
strategies are termed dominated strategies. A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy
profile consistent o f each player’s dominant strategy. This equilibrium is called a Nash

equilibrium.
After having defined all the terms involved in the stipulation of games to be played,
some formal definitions are in order. For this purpose, assume that the games are played
by two players.
Definition 3.1:

the normal-form representation o f a two-player game specifies the
player’s action spaces A1and A1 and their payofffunctions P1, P2.
This game is denoted by CNfA1, A2, P1, P2}.
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Definition 3.2:

In the normal-form game G={A‘, A2, P \ P ^ let A1; and A‘j, V i *j,
be feasible strategies for player 1, i.e., A1: and A1j are members of
A1. Action Alj is strictly dominated hv A1, if, for all actions available
to the other player, player / 's payoff from playing A’j is strictly less
than the payofffrom playing A1;, such that: P'(A‘j, A2;) < P ‘(A‘i, A2j)
V A2 e A2.

If a unique solution to a two-player normal-form game non-cooperative game is to
be found, it must be self-enforcing. Since there are no appropriate authorities to enforce
international agreements, this is clearly the situation in any international trade negotiation.
Thus, each player’s predicted action must be that player’s best response to the predicted
action o f the other player. This is the Nash equilibrium definition given earlier (Kennedy,
1996).
Definition 3J :

In the two-player normal-form game G={Al, A2, P1, P2}, the actions
(A1*, A2*) are a Nash equilibrium if, for players /and 2, A1*is player
/ ’s best response to the actions specified for the other player, 2, and
vice versa, such that: Pl(A‘\ A2*) * Pl(A‘, A2*) V A‘j e A1.
Derivation of the Political Preference Function fPPFl

The political preference function (PPF) is the tool used in this research to estimate
the payoffs o f the countries analyzed given their chosen actions. So, the description of the
PPF follows as a logical sequence in the development o f the theoretical framework used
in this research. The framework underlying this analysis is based on Johnson et al. (1993)
and Kennedy et al. (1996). hi this model, countries produce, consume and trade N number
of commodities. The aggregate level o f production, consumption, and trade in country i is
provided by vectors of supply, demand, and excess demand. Farmers in country i produce
a subset of theN traded commodities in order to maximize profit, given prices, technology,
and endowments. Aggregate supply is given by (3.1)

7(P/ ,Z/ ),...rn(P/ ,Z/ )
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where Pp.(Pfi, ..JV ) is the vector o f the producer prices o f the N traded commodities, and
2)- is a vector o f exogenous factors, such as prices of inputs and factor endowments.
Demand for agricultural commodities is given by the vector of demand functions (3.2)

X(PctZc) = {X liPc\Zc\...X NiPciZey^

(3 2)

the corresponding indirect utility function is given by (3.3)

U(Pe;Ze)
where P=(Pc» Pc2>P«a» •••>

(3.3)

is the vector of consumer prices for the N commodities, and

Zc is a vector of exogenous variables. Trade in N commodities is summarized by excess
demand (3.4)

E(Pf,Pc\Zf ,Zc) = X(Pc,Zc)-Y{Pf -Zf ).

(3.4)

Governments intervene in the domestic markets through price instruments and
demand/supply shift instruments. Price instruments, denoted b y ^ , for producers (/) and

Apcn for consumers (c) o f commodity N, affect the farm and consumer prices directly or
indirectly. Let us assume that P^, is the world price of commodity N. Then the following
domestic price functions are defined (3.5a)
P fn = P f n ( A ^ f n , P w n )>

(3.5a)

and (3.5b)
P cn = P c n ( A P c n , P w n ) ,

V/i = 1....JV.

(3.5b)

If world prices are functions of the actions of the two governments, then (3.6)

Pw = Pw(Apf i , A Pci,AIf i , A Sci,Apf2 ,A Pc2,Asf 2,A Sc2;Zl,Z2,Z3).
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where A*fc and A '^ are shift instruments that shift supply and demand functions, such as
input subsidies and acreage reduction programs.
When governments choose agricultural policies, they consider the effects o f their
policies on the welfare of various groups, such as producers, consumers, and taxpayers.
Since agricultural policies, like any other policies, can make some groups better off at
others expense, governments must weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare
losses of others. These trade-offs are represented by apolitical payofffunction (PPF) which
is a weighted additive function of producer quasi-rents, indirect utilities of consumers, and
the cost of agricultural policies of the two governments. Let -i represent other country, let
Aj= (A,,, A ^ (Apb, A*fi, Apd, A’*), and suppress Z„ Z* Zj. Producers are aggregated by
commodity group. The welfare of each producer group is the profit obtained from the
production and sale of the commodity. Thus, assuming differentiability, the welfare
associated with the production of the nthcommodity is the line integral (3.7)

n „(/> „)= ] p » r „ ( p ) d p ,
o

(3.7)

as commodity N is a net output or net input, respectively. Let (3.8a)

m P f \ Z f ) = (Ili(fy -;2 /)» —» n iv (f /;2 y ) ) ,

(3.8a)

be the vector of quasi-rents as a function of the policies o f the government, then substitute
for Pf by using equation (3.5a) and (3.5b), suppressing Zf and substitute for Pwby using
equation (3.6) to obtain (3.8b)

n

=n
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By the same token, substituting the domestic price function into equation (3.3), we can
obtain indirect utility (3.9)

U M M - i ) = Ut{Pcl{APct,PwiAiyA_/) \ A sci).

'

(3.9)

In order to define the government budget in the N agricultural commodities, let t
denote a transpose. Then, aggregate consumer expenditures are Pc X*, producers receive
PfY*, and excess demand is purchased at world markets at prices Pwfor P^*. Thus, using
equations (3.1) and (3.2) and substituting for E with equation (3.4), the budget is (3.10a)
B ( . P f , P c , P w ', Z ) = ( P c - P w ) * X l ( P c ; Z c ) - ( P f

After making the proper substitutions for

- ?

„

) *

¥

*

(3.10a)

Pc, Pw, and Z as before, the budget of

government i becomes a function of both governments agricultural policies as in (3.10b)
B i ( A i , A - i ) = B i ( P J }( A p / } , P w ) , P c i( A p c i , P w ) , P w ( A s / i , A c i) .

(3.10b)

Finally, normalizing on the budget and using equations (3.8a), (3.9) and (3.10a), the PPF
is shown as (3.11)
^ ( 4 ,- / ) = r U A ^ y X j t + U ^ A ^ y X ' t + Bt(AiH)

(3.11)

whereAjy is an N by one strictly positive vector and xcj is a positive scalar. The
are the political weights of the respective commodity groups and the aggregate consumer
in country i.
Equation (3.10a) explicitly links the policies of two governments with their
objectives. However, the way either government chooses its agricultural policies also must
be determined. An equilibrium point can be constructed such that in formulation of the
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polices, a government chooses policies to maximize its PPF given the policies of the other,
hi this case, a best response correspondence is defined for each government. Then, the
equilibrium is defined using the best response correspondence. For a given A^-, government
i chooses Aj*, which is a best response to A4, such that (3.12)

r M '.A -,)*

Vl(A,,A_,')VAl e A , .

(3.12)

where Aj is the set o f actions or policies available to government i. Therefore, every Aj
A.; has a set of actions in Aj that satisfy equation (3.12). This set defines the best response
correspondence o f A.f. A pair of actions (A,*, Aj*) is an equilibrium if A,* is a best
response to A f and vice versa. Thus, (A,*, Aj*) satisfies equation 3.12 for all /. Now
consider the differentiable case of the model. In this case, differentiating equation (3.11)
with respect to Ag and A*, the first order necessary conditions for a maximum are given in
(3.13)

1
i*r

l..

\d n ,
d Afi

d U al
d Afi

\fi
*

=

dVt

<*>
i

Yd Va \

*11,

+

d V al
d Aa

’ dB, '
d A fl

1

4

.

0
(3.13)

=

dBt

0

. dA«.

For a given A^, if V( is concave in Aj, then any Aj* that solves equation (3.13)
maximizes V;, so it is a best response to Aa. Thus, equation (3.13) implicitly defines the
best response correspondence as Aj* (A J. The Aj* (A J is a function if and only if Vj is

\*Vx]
d Ax
d V2
d a2

r

*1

0

=
0
|W V >
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strictly concave in Aj for all values o f A4. (A,*, A^*) is a Nash equilibrium (Johnson et al.,
1993) if (3.14)
Suppose the governments of two countries or trading blocs negotiate to improve their
positions relative to the one period equilibrium that they currently pursue. If both
governments are rational, then no treaty will be signed or complied with that does not
make both governments at least as well off as prior to the agreement Also, if governments
can delay agreement, a necessary condition for a treaty to be signed and complied with
would be existence of actions (A,', A2' ) such that (3.15)
V, (A,', A,1) * V ,(V , A2*) and V2 (A,', A,*) * V^A,*, A,*).

(3.15)

The set o f actions that satisfy equation 3.15 are called the treaty action space and the
elements o f this space treaty actions.
Estimation of PPF Weights
In order to estimate the PPF weights, it is assumed that the observed policies are
a single period Nash equilibrium o f a non-cooperative game (Kennedy, 1996). The
countries o f Central America included in this research choose their policies such that they
maximize their PPF given the action of other. Given differentiable indirect profit and
utility functions, inference of dn/dAj and dU/dAj can be calculated from observable
demand and supply functions (Johnson et al., 1993). Let Aj, for f =1,...,5 be the instruments
set by the five Central American countries in the base year. The weights ^ are estimated
using approximations ofpartial differentials ofprofits o f producers and utility of consumers
with respect to producer and consumer protection instruments. The approximation o f the
differentials is obtained by taking small changes in As and A,* in the MISS model.
Considering the discrete approximation o f equation (3.13), the weights can be calculated
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by rearranging equation (3.13), such that (3.16)

' A n f

w

*

]

[A B ,]

-I

<3

<i
*

.

>

A A cl

i___

i

t>

Ll C J

(3.16)
AB (

AB,
1

A n ,

The weights calculated according to the above formula represent the political
influence o f various producer groups and consumers as an aggregate in the agricultural
policy formulation of Central American countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR - SUPPLY AND DEMAND ELASTICITIES
The empirical model used in this study requires estimates of elasticities of demand
and supply. Since these elasticities are not readily available, it is necessary to estimate them
through modeling tools, hi this chapter, elasticities o f supply and demand for eight
commodities included in this study are estimated. The theoretical as well as empirical
considerations are included prior to elasticity estimation. The first section of this chapter
includes the estimation of supply elasticities. The second section includes the estimation
o f demand elasticities. Finally, an evaluation o f the validity of the estimates is developed
as a conclusion for this chapter.
It is important to mention that the empirical estimation of economic relationships
is often a very difficult task. Lack of reliable data, limited number of observations, and
incomplete data sets have been mentioned as serious limitations in dealing with modeling
production in developing countries (Fischer et al, 1980). Therefore, the researcher is
compelled to exercise a high degree of creativity when the research is focused on
developing countries. On one hand, the researcher should keep in mind that the basic
economic relationships are the basis for any model to be acceptable. On the other hand,
traditional supply and demand relationships are not readily established because of the
problems mentioned above.
Supply Elasticities
Theoretical Considerations
A supply curve is based on the assumption that producers seek to maximize net
returns (Tomek and Robinson, 1990). This is obtained by equating marginal costs to
marginal revenue. Since the individual firm is assumed to be a price taker in a competitive
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industry, the firm's marginal revenue is the prevailing market price. Marginal cost is
defined as the increment in total cost associated with producing one more unit o f output.
For an individual firm, the supply curve consists o f the portion o f the marginal cost curve

Marginal Costs

'Average Costs

Figure 4.1 Marginal and Average Costs

above the average cost curve as shown in figure 4.1. Economic theory suggests that in the
long run the individual firm will produce at point / where average and marginal costs are
equal, because at this point all costs are covered. At point 2 the firm would be making a
profit given by the distance between the average cost curve and the marginal cost curve.
The firm would prefer to produce at this point instead of at point 1 but free market
conditions would move production to point 1.
At this point, it is important to mention the factors affecting production and supply
of goods, hi general, two kinds of factors affect supply. A change in the price of a product
will cause a change in the quantity supplied, such that quantity supplied and price move in
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the same direction. On the other hand,,there are several factors that cause the supply curve
to shift Changes in inputs or factor prices, changes in the returns o f commodities that
compete for the same resources, changes in technology, institutional constraints, and
changes in the level o f price and yield risk faced by producers are among the most
important factors that shift the supply curve.
The supply elasticity is usually used to evaluate the effects of the factors mentioned
above on the supply of goods and services through price signaling. The supply elasticity
is defined as the percentage change in the quantity supplied o f a given commodity or
service given a percentage change in the price of the commodity or service. The own price
elasticity refers to changes in the price of the commodity or service. The cross price refers
to changes in prices o f commodities that compete or complement the commodity under
scrutiny. In general, the elasticity of supply is given by 4.1:

y

%A Pj

d\o%(pj)

-

<4»

where e*/y is the elasticity of supply (s) of commodity qt with respect to price py. The
elasticities can also be obtained as the derivative (d) of the natural logarithm (log) of
quantity with respect to the logarithm of price. The own price supply elasticity is obtained
if i=j, cross-price supply elasticities are obtained otherwise, hi general, the own-price
elasticity o f supply is expected to be positive. The cross-price elasticities are positive if
commodities are complements and negative if commodities are substitutes in production.
Empirical Estimation of Supply Elasticities
A considerable amount of creativity must be exercised to estimate supply
elasticities of the commodities under analysis in the present research. The empirical
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estimation must adhere to the theoretical framework. However, as often happens, because
of data problems or problems o f other sorts, the direct empirical estimation o f the
theoretical model is not possible. Therefore, other means must be resorted to if we are to
overcome such limitations.
In this study, after a literature review, the basic empirical considerations to estimate
the supply elasticities of commodities were taken and simplified from the Linked Basic
Model (LBM) modeling framework. Fischer and Frohberg (1980) and Fischer et al (1988)
proposed the LBM as a tool of international food policy analysis. The LBM model is a
national level model that includes a supply module, a demand module, and an exchange
module. Accordingly, in the supply module, production is a function of labor, fertilizer and
capital as in 4.2:

Q = f{L ,F ,K )

(4.2)

where Q is the quantity produced, L is labor, and K is capital. There is a representative
producer who must allocate these scarce resources among the production of the
commodities produced. To do so, the producer is assumed to maximize expected net
returns. The net expected returns maximization problem can be expressed as in equation
(4.3) where NR, is net expected returns, for v= 1 ton-1 net revenues correspond to crops
and, for r=n, net revenue corresponds to cattle production (beef), A, is acreage for crop i,

M is quantity produced ofbee£ H is number o f cattle stock or number of sacrificed heads
and L, K, F, are the maximum quantities of labor, capital, and fertilizer, respectively.
In an initial step (figure 4.2), labor, capital, and fertilizer requirements had to be
established in order to generate a production function for each commodity under analysis.
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Step 2:
Random Generation of
Time Series o f L,F,K.

Step 3:

Parameter Estimation

Figure 4.2

Step3.a:
Expected Total Revenne(ETR)
ETR=Expected Price x Yield

Step 4 ^:
Expected Net Return (NR)
NR=ETR-EC

Estimation Procedure o f Central American Countries Supply
Elasticities Based on Fischer et al (1980).
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Max *1 NR * A + NR„ * M

L,F,Ki.0i=l

Subject to:
A - fiLttFfyKf)
(4.3)

IL<L

i = i l

ifL<K

/=t

IE<F

/=i *

This was done by using data from several Nicaraguan sources. The assumption made is that
all Central American countries are similar in technology and, therefore, the use of the same
technological requirement for each crop for all countries is acceptable. Thus, Table 4.1
shows the technological structure and input requirements for all Central American
countries. Once input requirements were established for each commodity under several
technologies, a random data generating process was used to create time series of weighted
average requirements of inputs for IS years. The normal distribution was used for that
purpose (appendix D). This procedure made it possible to relate output to inputs, i.e.,
estimation o f the production function for each commodity in each country. Step 4 dealt with
the estimation o f the production functions parameters to be used (Appendix D). For this
purpose, Cobb-Douglas production function were assumed and the parameters estimates
for fertilizer (f), labor (I), and capital (K) were estimated using ordinary least squares
estimation (OLS). The tests for autocorrelation showed small autocorrelation coefficient
(less than 0.3) and, therefore, no further corrections were deemed necessary (Table A2-A7).
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Table 4.1.

Input Prices and Input Requirements for Eight Commodities in Five Central American Countries
Rice

Input Prices
C

S

G

H

N

Techno.

1

2

3

4

5

Yield

20

28

35

70

55

7.15

2.97

4.0

1.9

1.3

Labor

54

28

34.5

19.0

18.0

12.0

15.0

12.0

14.0

6.0

Animal

0

5

5

0

0

35.0

40.0

30.0

40.0

25.0

Machine

0

0

0

8

6

12.92

14.0

10.9

9.26

11.2

Fertilizer

1

1

2

4

4

4

5

Com

Beans
1

2

3

—

20

70

80

—

—

—

—

47

54

5

—

—

0

—

—

4

12

0

—

—

0

4

—

—

0

0

10

—

—

1

1

—

—

0

3

5

—

—

Techno.

1

2

3

Yield

12

20

25

—

Labor

50

39

45

Animal

0

5

Machine

0

Fertilizer

0

4

5

Coffee

Sorghum
Yield
Labor
(Continued...)

50

50

—

—

—

22

20

15

5

—

61

20

—

—

—

175

133

114

39

—
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Table 4.1.

(Continued)
Coffee

Sorghum
3

1

2

3

4

—

0

0

0

0

—

—

—

0

0

0

0

—

—

—

9.0

8.0

6

0

—

Technolo

1

2

Animal

5

0

—

—

Machine

0

7

—

Fertilizer

2

4

—

4

5

Bananas

5

Sugar Cane

Yield

72.1

—

—

—

—

55

45

—

—

—

Labor

54

—

—

—

—

19

18

—

—

—

Animal

0

—

—

—

—

30

19

—

—

—

Machine

.3

—

—

—

—

10

8

—

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2
2
Fertilizer 8
Source: FNI, 1993; INTA, 1995; INTA 1997; INTA 1999; BND, 1997; BND, 1998; ECLAC-Mexico, 1999.
Note: Countries: C=Costa Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua
Yield: Rice, Beans, Corn, Sorghum, Coffee: cwt/manzana (mz); lcwt=100 Lbl,lmz=0.7 Ha. Bananas, Sugar Cane: TM/mz.
Input Requirement: Labor=person-days, Animal force=animal-days, machinery=hours, fertilizersw t.
Input Prices: Local average 1995-97 in US$/unit o f measurement.

K
N>J
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On the other hand, hi steps 2.a-4.a, expected net returns were estimated on the basis of total
expected returns and expected per acre costs as described in Appendices B, B l, and C.
Expected net returns were obtained for each commodity in each country and then used to
maximize expected net returns (Table A l). These expected returns were obtained on the
assumption that the producer has naive expectations, i.e., the producer expects that the
price prevailing at the moment o f production decisions (planting decisions, breeding
decisions, and so forth) and the price at the moment of the sale of the producer’s
production output in the future will be the same. This generates a series of lagged prices.
For perennial crops, such as coffee, or cattle production, this lag could be several years. For
other commodities, the lag is usually one year.
In the next step (step 3) the minimum and maximum output of each commodity
under analysis were obtained from data from the Economic Commission for Latin America
of the United Nations Organization (ECLAC) (Appendix E). In step five, the model in
equation 4.3 was optimized using nonlinear programming because the production function
is assumed to have a flexible form, i.e., a nonlinear form. A non-linear estimation
procedure to estimate equation (4.3), as described in Appendix G., was used to estimate
quantity-price relations in supply of the commodities included in this study. Finally, in step
6, estimates of the supply elasticities are obtained using a procedure recommended by
Seeley (1985, 1986). Initially, an optimum solution for the maximization problem is
estimated. Then, the price o f each commodity is changed by 10% one at a time and the
model is optimized. Finally, the percentage change in output o f all commodities given a
10% change in the price of only one commodity gives an estimate o f own-price and cross
price elasticities of supply. The elasticities estimated in this fashion are to be considered
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long-run supply elasticities because they reflect the full change in price without taking into
account time and other factors.
To obtain the short-run elasticities the following assumptions were used. First, it
is reasonable to expect that elasticities are smaller in short-run than in the long-run. This
is so because long-run supply is more elastic, i.e., the supply curve has a smaller slope than
in the short-run. Secondly, the estimation of the long-run elasticities is based on the
assumption of the representative farmer, i.e., a farmer who produces all commodities at the
same time. However, in real life, climatic, equipment limitations, and other conditions
cause producers to focus on the production of a small number of commodities. So, in real
life, cross-price responsiveness should be smaller than under the assumption of a
representative farmer. Third, profit maximization was the only criterion used in the non
linear procedure. Therefore, it is expected that responsiveness of supply to prices will be
more sensitive when a sole criterion is used to estimate elasticities. Therefore, it was
assumed that the long-run elasticity estimates are upper bound estimates of the true
elasticities. Four, a review o f elasticity estimates by other authors (Dargay et al, 2000; Lass
et al, 1996; etc) indicate that short run elasticities are 40-80% lower than long-run
estimates, hi conclusion, based on the facts mentioned above, it was determined that for
purposes of this study, it would be reasonable to assume that short run elasticities are one
third of the estimates obtained in the non-linear procedure estimates.
Empirical Results o f Supply Elasticities Estimation
Although, technologically speaking, Central American countries are assumed to be
very similar, the responsiveness to changes in commodity prices is different for all
countries as it is shown in Tables 42-4.6. It seems reasonable to expect perennial crops
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(coffee and bananas) to be less responsive to changes in prices than annual crops, hi
addition, export commodities have kept a fairly stable production despite strong
oscillations in world prices o f those commodities (coffee, sugar, beef, and bananas), hi
most countries, bananas and coffee were not responsive to prices, hi those cases, the
elasticity estimates for other countries or from other sources were used. In general, the
estimates of the elasticities are close to those of Gardiner(1989) and Tyers et al (1986).
Table 4.2.
Guatemala Supply Elasticities
Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee
Product
0.00
0.00
Rice
0.95
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
Beans**
-0.00
0.39
0.00
0.00
1.09
-0.30
0.00
Com
1.09
1.10
1.46
1.19
-0.21
-0.54
0.51
Sorghum -0.21
-021
Bananas

0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.96

0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.95

0.00
0.00
0.00
-1.18

0.00
0.00
-0.02
-1.7+3

1.52
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
*0.40
0.00
-0.96

Sugar

Beef

0.00
0.00
-0.34
-1.76
0.00
0.00
0.17
-2.02

Coffee
Sugar
Beef
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
**: Elasticities for Honduras

0.00
-0.01
-0.03
0.99
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.92

Table 4.3.
El Salvador Supply Elasticities
Beef
Beans
Product Rice
Com Sorghum Coffee Sugar
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.20
0.21
0.21
Rice
0.03
0.00
0.45
-0.01
-0.08
0.00
Beans
0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Com
0.00
0.05
-0.00
0.05
-0.07
-0.02
-0.00
-0.00
0.60
Sorghum
0.00
0.00
*0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Coffee
0.23
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
Sugar
0.14
-0.05
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.18
Beef**
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
**: Elasticities for Costa Rica
Table 4.4.
Honduras Supply Elasticities
Beef
Sugar
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee
-0.20
0.61
-0.30
0.49
-0.20
-0.35
Rice
0.75
0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.00
0.39
0.00
Beans
-0.02
-0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.04
Com
-0.00
-0.15
0.76
0.04
-0.03
0.75
0.00
Sorghum 0.02 -0.03
-0.04
-1.11
-0.85
* 0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00 -0.03
Bananas
0.00
0.00
*0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Coffee
0.00
0.08
0.09
-0.01
0.11
-0.17
Sugar
0.00 -0.01
0.00
129
-0.04
0.94
-0.15
-0.14
0.00
0.03 -0.04
Beef
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
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Table 4.5.
Nicaragua Supply Elasticities
Product Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Rice
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.47
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Beans
0 .0 0
0 .0 1
0 .0 0
0.13
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Com
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
1.32
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 1
0 .0 1
Sorghum
0 .0 1
0.03
-0.41
0 .0 2
-1.27
0.40
-0.14
-0 . 0 2 -0.03
Bananas
-0.05
-0 . 0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.49
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.30
Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.05
Beef
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .1 1
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
Table 4.6.
Costa Rica Supply Elasticities
Product Rice
Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Beans
0 .0 2
0 .0 0
-0 . 1 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.03
Rice
0.24
0 .0 0
0.03
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.05
Beans
0.29
-0.13
0 .0 0
0.07
0 .0 0
0.56
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
-0.05
Com
-0 . 0 0
-0 . 0 0
0 .0 0
-0.19
0.15
0 .0 0
-0.57
0.30
Sorghum
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Bananas
0
.
0
0
0 .0 0
*0.40
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
2.70
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
*0.40
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.34
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.14
0 .0 0
0.06
-0.05
0.18
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Beef
*: Source: Elaborated from Gardiner (1986) and results for Central America.
Demand Elasticities
Theoretical Considerations
Economic theory assumes that consumers purchase goods and services to maximize
their utility (Varian, 1992). At the same time, consumers maximize utility subject to an
income constraint Thus, the consumer’s problem can be depicted as a constrained
optimization problem. Mathematically, the problem can be specified as in 4.4:

Max w(x) s . t .p x < m
j* 0

(4 .4 )

where u(x) is utility u as a function of the vector o f goods x, p is the vector o f prices, and

m is consumer income. Economic theory indicates that u(x) in 4.4 should meet a set of
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mathematical properties to be an adequate representation o f utility. First, the function
shouldbe continuous. Second, the economic axiom of non-satiation, i.e., "more is preferred
to less", indicates that u(x) should have a positive first derivative. Third, since the
consumer’s objective is to maximize utility, then u(x) should have a non-positive second
derivative to reach a maximum, i.e., the function should be concave or quasi-concave.
Demand equations should be obtained from the optimization problem in order to
estimate demand elasticities. Accordingly, non-linear programming is commonly used as
a tool to estimate optimal demand functions when the utility function is non-linear, which
is commonly the case. The Lagrangian function is used and from the first order conditions
the optimal demands (x*) as a function o f prices and income are derived as in 4.5:

X, *=

(4.5)

As in the supply side, there are two types o f factors that affect the quantity
demanded of a good. A change in the price of a good will cause the quantity demanded to
move in the opposite direction of, i.e., an opposite movement along the demand curve as
shown in figure 4.3. On the other hand, changes in population, income, and tastes and
preferences have been mentioned to cause a shift in the demand curve.
As in the supply side, the elasticity of demand is mainly used to evaluate the impact
ofvarious factors on the quantity demanded and the demand curve through price signaling.
Therefore, it is important to estimate these elasticities for many economic questions and
decisions. The elasticity o f demand is defined similar to the elasticity o f supply, i.e., it is
the percentage change in quantity demanded given a percentage change in prices as in 4.6:

(qt)
V itj =
d logCPy) *

rf_ % A < ? l o g

e‘J % kpj
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Figure 4.3

Effect of Price Changes on Quantity
Demanded

where d stand for demand and the definition o f the remaining variables is the same as in
equation 4.1. As it is shown in Figure 4.2, the slope of the demand curve is negative, so
it is expected that the own-price demand elasticity will be negative, i.e., when i=j. For
cross-price elasticities the sign will be positive for complements and negative for
substitutes.
Empirical Estimation of Demand Elasticities
Although many models have been proposed to estimate demand relationships, in
this study elasticities of demand were estimated with the Linear Approximate (LA) of the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The
AIDS model assumes a flexible utility function and non-separability. These assumptions
are convenient in this study because agricultural commodities and, specifically, food are
sensitive to own- and cross-relationships o f commodities. The demand functions in budget
form according to the AIDS model are specified as in equation 4.7:
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wi =ai +Z Ts * loSP/ +Pi *

’V*»■/= lj- ’n

(4/7)

where w{is the budget share of commodity i, logpj is the logarithm of price of commodity
/ , E is total expenditures on the group o f commodities under analysis, P i s a price index,
and Oj, Yjj, and ft are parameters to be estimated. The use o f the Stone’s index (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980) makes the model linear as defined in 4.8:
n

l o g P = £ w i* l° g P u
/=l

(4 -8)

Therefore, the model which uses Stone’s price index is called the Linear Approximate
AIDS (LA/AIDS) model. Thus, equation 4.7 implies that the budget shares of various
commodities are linearly related to the logarithm of the real total expenditure and relative
prices. In addition, the general demand restrictions o f adding-up, homogeneity, and
symmetry are satisfied by the following parametric restrictions on the AIDS model:
n

Adding-up:

n

it

£ a/ =1>Z Yij =°> Z A=0
i=i

V’

Homogeneity: 2a Yij -

f=i

i=i

«

(4 -9)

7=1

Symmetry.

Yij = Yji

To estimate the elasticities of demand for all commodities in all countries included
in this study, some preliminary data estimation were needed. First, individual consumption
of all commodities for all countries were obtained from the FAO Food Balance Sheet
(FAO, 1993,1995). However, there was not a time series for all the years under analysis
(1985-1998). Therefore, a random number generating process was used to create the data
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sets (Fischeret al, 1980) (Appendix H). Secondly, once the data for personal consumption
were estimated, the expenditure share o f each commodity was calculated by multiplying
personal consumption by price and dividing this product by the sum o f the expenditures
on all commodities. Third, since the data set only included IS observations, some strong
assumptions had to be made for the sake of the statistical properties of the model. For
example, it was assumed that there were no price relationships between basic staples (rice,
beans, com, and sorghum) and three o f the four export commodities (bananas, sugar,
coffee). This assumption could be imposed for two reasons. First, since Central American
agriculture is divided into domestic and export sectors, it could be safely assumed that
there is a small cross-price relationship between those two groups of commodities (Alonso,
1994). Secondly, the elimination of unimportant parameters in the econometric equations
increases the number o f degrees of freedom which is a convenient condition to improve the
statistical properties of the results of the estimated model (Judge et al, 1988). Finally, based
on tables A7-A11, elasticities were estimated as (4.10):

(—N
2!l
\ WfJ

(4.10)

where 8 = 1 for i=j, and 8 = 0 otherwise.
Empirical Results of Demand Elasticities Estimation
The estimation of the statistical model proposed above yielded encouraging results
despite the limitations mentioned earlier. For most countries and commodities, own-price
elasticities were negative, as economic theory would suggest. It is true that during the
estimation process the level of significance of the parameter estimates was low (not shown)
and therefore the results should be interpreted as a rough approximation of the true
elasticities. Tables 4.7.- 4.11. reveal that the elasticities estimates are in the range of
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elasticities estimates for other countries by various authors (Gardiner, 1989; Tyers et al.,
1986; Mahe et al, 1988). In addition, to assure compliance with economic theory, in cases
when the parameter estimates were different from those expected (positive sign for ownprice elasticities, absolute magnitude too large, and so forth), elasticity estimates were
replaced by those estimated for other Central American countries which were deemed to
be more reliable, accurate, and more appropriate for each country and commodity case.
Table 4.7.
Guatemala Demand Elasticities
Product Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Baiaanas Coffee Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
1.65
0 .0 0
-1.59
-0.41
Rice*
-0.27
0
.
0
0
0
.0 0
0
.
0
0
-0.34
025
Beans
-0 . 2 0
-0.93
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.16
0 .0 0
0.07
-1.14
Com
0 .1 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.29
-0.80
0 .0 0
-0.06
Sorghum
-0 . 1 1
-1.26
0.15
0 .0 0
-0.28
Bananas
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.06
-0.41
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.31
-0.27
-1.08
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar**
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-2 . 0 2
-1.16
1.63
Beef
0.47
*: Elasticities for Honduras. **: Elasticities for Costa Rica.
Table 4.8:
El Salvador Demand Elasticities______
Product
Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
1.65
0 .0 0
-027
-1.59
-0.41
Rice*
0 .0 0
-0.14
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Beans
-0.26
-0.09
-0.73
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .1 0
-0.63
0.08
0 .0 0
Com
-0.39
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.90
0 .0 0
Sorghum
0.47
-0.42
-0.59
0.15
-1.08
0 .0 0
-0.14
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Bananas
0 .0 0
-0.38
0 .0 0
-0.28
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
-0.42
-0.07
-0.32
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.29
0 .0 0
0.05
-0.28
-0.53
Beef
*: Elasticities for Honduras
Table 4.9.
Honduras Demand Elasticities
Product Rice Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.41
1.65
-027
-1.59
Rice
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
3.03
-0.47
Beans
-0.61
-2 . 6 6
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.89
-0.98
021
0.63
Com
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.06
-0.80
Sorghum
029
-0 . 1 1
-0.09
-0 . 8 6
-0.34
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Bananas
-0.67
0.15
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.31
-0.27
-1.08
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar**
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Beef*
-0.37
0.08
-0.57
-039
*: Elasticities for Nicaragua. **: Elasticities for Costa Rica.
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Beef
-0 . 1 0
0.23
0 .0 2

0.42
0 .0 0

-0.45
0 .0 0

-0.08

Beef
-0 . 1 0
0 .0 0

-0.09
0.30
0 .0 0

-0 . 2 1
0 .0 0

-0.42

Beef
-0 . 1 0
0.19
-0.15
0.42
0 .0 0

-0.34
0 .0 0

-2.52
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Table 4.10. Nicaragua Demand Elasticities
Product
Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-037
-0 .0 1
-0.05
Rice
-0.31
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0 . 0 2
0.08
0 .0 0
Beans
-0.09
-0.53
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0 . 2 2
-0 . 1 0
-0.48
0.06
Com
0 .0 0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
-0 . 1 1
-0.06
-0.80
Sorghum
0.29
Bananas*
-0.73
-0.34
-0.13
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.62
2.60
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
-0.27
-1.08
0.31
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar*
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.37
0.08
Beef
-0.57
-0.39
"^Elasticities for Costa Rica
Table 4.11. Costa Rica Demand Elasticities
Product
Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.41
1.65
0 .0 0
-1.59
Rice*
-037
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.17
-0 . 1 2
-0.23
Beans
-0.49
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.41
-0.45
0.19
Com
-3.27
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0 .0 1
0 .0 0
-0.15
Sorghum -1.59
-0.09
-0.73
0 .0 0
-0.34
-0.13
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Bananas
0 .0 0
-0.58
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.48
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Coffee
0 .0 0
-037
-1.08
0.31
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-038
-0.53
0.29
Beef
0.05
*: Elasticities for El Salvador
Summary and Conclusions

Beef
1.35
-0 .0 1
-0.33
0.42
0 .0 0

3.83
0 .0 0

-2.52

Beef
-0 . 1 0
-0 . 0 2
0.85
0.55
0 .0 0

-0.07
0 .0 0

-0.42

This chapter focused on the estimation of supply and demand elasticities of eight
commodities for five Central American countries. The commodities included are rice,
beans, com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar and beef. The countries are Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The first se c tio n fo cu sed on the
estimation o f supply elasticities. For this purpose, a theoretical model of supply was
developed and the empirical estimation was based on the model proposed by Fischeret al
(1980,1988). Since the adaptation of the LBM to the present research generated a model
that allowed for the full adjustment to changes in prices, the elasticities were interpreted
as long-run elasticities. An adjustment mechanism based on the strength and limitations
o f the model was used to obtain short-run elasticities. The resulting short-run elasticities
are in agreement with estimates from other authors.
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Having estimated supply elasticities, the second section focused on the estimation of
demand elasticities. For this purpose, a theoretical model o f demand was developed. Later,
the linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand Model OLA/AIDS) was used as the
empirical model to estimate the demand elasticities of the commodities under analysis. The
estimation had to be done taking into account data limitations, statistical properties of the
model, and economic theory. The results showed that the parameter estimates were in the
range o f estimates obtained by various authors.
Finally, it is important to mention that there have been few attempts to estimate
supply and demand elasticities for Central America. The results showed that it is difficult
to estimate these elasticities (Gabriele, 1994). So, this chapter is one of many attempts by
serious researchers to deal with the difficulties of empirical work. The supply and demand
elasticity estimates should be interpreted as an attempt to obtain approximations o f rough
quantity-price relationships in Central American countries. The resulting elasticities should
be used with caution.
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CHAPTER FIVE-GAM ES SIMULATION RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the simulated games o f various levels of
agricultural trade liberalization in Central America. The first section includes a concise
description of the MISS model. The second section gives the justification for the use of the
nominal protection coefficient (NPC) as the main criterion to model trade liberalization in
Central America. The third section deals with the data used. The fourth section describes
the empirical results of several game simulations based on a set o f government actions from
each country perspective. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter with a summary
and discussion of the results.
Description of the MISS Model
hi order to examine the effects of agricultural trade liberalization for Central American
countries and various trade policy strategies, the previously developed PPF theoretic
framework will be used. Analysis of the effects of various scenarios is implemented using

Modele International Simplifie de Simulation (MISS) (Mahe et al, 1988). MISS is a partial
equilibrium trade model that simulates, in a comparative static framework, the effects of
various policy decisions. The model operates on the principle o f Walrasian equilibrium.
The model takes a change of policy by a country and identifies the corresponding changes
in world prices, production, and consumption.
The description of the model is as follows. Quantity supplied will equal quantity
demanded plus initial stocks in the world markets. The initial equilibrium is given by (5.1)

Sik =
for all r= l,

A*

Qik

C51)

N, where i represents commodity and, k represents the country. Slkr Dtb Qik

represent production, derived demand, and total demand, respectively, for commodity i
134
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in country k for the base year, Imrepresents initial stock o f commodity i in country k.
Change in supply is given by (5.2)
• PJk +• Efj%• Pfi ) + 0^,

=£

(5.2)

for all i=l,...N, where E'IJk>(£” yt) represent the matrix of supply elasticities with respect
to output (input) prices, FJk and P°jk represent the domestic price for production and
derived demand i in country k, and<x* represents a quantity shifter for production.
Change in derived demand is given by (5.3)
(5.3)

while change in final demand is given by (5.4)
=

<5-4>

for all r=l, ...N, where Gyk represents the matrix o f final demand elasticities with respect
to consumer prices, P®*represents the domestic price for final demand for commodity i in
country k,

represents a quantity shifter for final demand for commodity i in country k.

The domestic /world price linkage is shown by the equation (5.5)

or in logarithmic terms Wk is fixed so it disappears as in (5.6)
PjJ1 = In f* + taC, + Inf£; V N = (S ,D ,Q ),

(5.6)

where PW
j represents world price o f commodity i, Ckrepresents the currency exchange rate,
and Wk are the margin coefficients representing transportation costs, freight, insurance, or
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other costs. The final equilibrium of the model, using previous equations is given by (5.7)

= I * Z V A D tt + I * a * - A 0 ; V i = l, ...N .

(5.7)

Net budget costs for country k are shown as in (5.8)
bc, =

l (% - p ’ y s* - 1 ,(/>*)a , - 1 , ( / * ■- p ‘ y a ,

(5.8)

where P8^ represents the border price o f commodity / in country k. The system in equation
(5.2)-(5.7) can be viewed as an Ndimensional vector valued function of M variables (5.8a):

F

y

0,

n= 1

N;

M iN

O r F N ( x x.. .x N |x Af+1 ...x A/) = 0

(5.8a)

when//independent relations are available, (M-N) arbitrary exogenous policy variables can
be specified. There is no a priori rigidity that the price should be exogenous and taxes (or
quantities) endogenous, hi addition, domestic prices, demand, and supply changes are
derived endogenous variables as implied in the system in equations (5.2H5.7). Therefore,
World prices are the only primary endogenous variables and the system reduces to (5.8b):

(5.8b)

where I is the number o f commodities in country n. Equation (5.8b) indicates that world
prices are mainly a function of the rates protection t. This outcome leads to a more efficient
and faster solution of the system.
Solution Algorithm: The Tatonnement Process
The MISS model makes use of the tatonnement process to attain a solution for the
system in equations (52)-{5.7). Therefore, it is worthwhile to describe how this algorithm
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works. Walras stated that a collection o f interrelated markets can achieve a perfect balance
o f supply and demand (Cheng et al, 1995). The idea is that such equilibria could be realized
through a price-adjustment process called "tatonnement", "groping", or

"tentative

proceedings" (Cheng et al, 1995). In this process, agents respond to price signals for the
individual goods. The agents' interactions are thought to be coordinated by a central
"auctioneer", who adjusts the general price levels toward a general balance, announcing
interim prices to elicit responses from the agents. Competitive agents receive a price signal,
and report their excess-demand at these prices to the central auctioneer. The auctioneer then
adjusts the prices incrementally in proportion to the magnitude o f excess demand, and
announces the new incrementally adjusted price level. In each round, agents recalculate
their excess demands upon receiving the newly adjusted prices signal, and report these to
the central auctioneer. No trade is allowed until the equilibrium vector is found (Silberberg,
1990). The process continues until the prices finally converge to an equilibrium and a price

p* would be located (Cheng et al, 1995). The tatonnement process can be given in
mathematical terms (Silberberg, 1990). Let excess demand be (5.9):

E(p) = D (p,M )-S(p)

(5.9)

where E(p) is excess demand, D(p,M) is the quantity demanded as a function of price p and
income M, and S(p) is quantity supplied as function o f its own price p. Now suppose that
the rate of change of prices move directly with excess demand (5.10)

/> - | r = g O X p , M ) - S (p)) = g ( E ( p ) )

(5.10)

where t is time, g is the derivative of price with respect to time. Assuming that the
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tatonnement process is successful, at least in prices in the neighborhood of pe, the
mechanism in (S. 10) generates a path o f prices which will approach p* as t increases (5.11)

K m p ( t ) =p e

(5.11)

relation in (5.11) is called stability. Ifp* is unique, the system is called globally stable. If
there is more than one equilibrium price vector, the system is called system stable. A model
is locally stable if (5.11) holds for all pricesp in some neighborhood oipe. At prices "close"
to pe, the function g(E(p*)) can be represented by a Taylor series expansion. Neglecting
terms of order 2 and above, (5.10) becomes (5.12)

g ( £ ( p ') ) + g ' E ' ( p ' ) ( p - p * )+ ...

(512)

Since E(pe)=Qby definition of E(p), the adjustment mechanism becomes the differential
equation (5.13):

^ = ( g ’£ ’) ( p - p ‘ )

(5*15)

The solution of this differential equation is giving by (5.14)

p{t) = p* + (j>° - p ' )e'g'Ey

(5.14)

where the initial price p° is the arbitrary constant of integration, presumably the old
equilibrium price. The assertion of stability requires that the exponential term approach
zero as t -*«». This will occur if the exponent g ’E ’< 0. Since g ' > 0. Therefore, asserting
Walrasian local stability is the assertion that (5.15) holds in some neighborhood of pe:
£ • = Dp(p,M )-Sp(p) < 0
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Solution Procedure in MISS
MISS follows directly the description given earlier of the "tatonnement” process in
order to reach an equilibrium solution. Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of the iteration
procedure used by MISS to reach a solution. Initially, an initial equilibrium is given, i.e.,
a base equilibrium is specified in which quantities supplied and demanded are provided as
well as world prices, transportation margin coefficients, initial protection levels, world
stocks, supply and demand elasticities, and exchange rates. Then policies changes are
specified. Changes in the level of protection are the only policies used in the present study
(changes is protection rates). MISS estimates changes in quantities supplied and demanded
of all commodities and in all countries upon the changes in the rates in protection using the
"tatonnement" algorithm explained earlier. Thus, a new equilibrium vector of prices,
quantities demanded and supplied, trade balances, and protection levels are obtained. In
addition, MISS allows for the estimation of a large number of indicators such as budget
costs of policies, changes in consumer and producer surplus, the values of the PPF function
used as actions’ payoffs in the present study, changes in terms o f trade, and others.
The Nominal Protection Coefficient fNPCl and Trade Liberalization
This research uses the NPC to analyze trade liberalization. A logical question is:
Why use the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) to analyze trade liberalization instead
o f another criteria? The use o f the NPC in this research is based on the following reasoning.
First, the NPC shows the relationship between domestic producer price and border price
and this is a very concise way to see how distorting trade policies are in a country. The
NPC is defined as in (5.10)
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Initial Equilibrium
Policy Changes
Shadow Prices ^ Protection Rates
Supply and
/
Demand /
Variations
Net Trade

Domestic
Prices
(Endogenous)

Convergence
YES

World Prices
(Endogenous)

Final Equilibrium

Figure 5.1.

Iterations Structure for MISS Resolution
Source: Mahe et al, 1988
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NPC, = | r

(5.10)

where NPCt is the nominal protection coefficient of commodity /, Pdi is the domestic price
received by producers of commodity i, and P6, is the border price of commodity i. For an
import commodity, the border price is the price at the border or port of departure plus the
cost of freight and insurance, i.e., the CIF price in the importing country. For an export
commodity the border price is the price on the domestic border or port o f shipment or the
FOB price (free on board), i.e, the O F price in the country of destination minus the cost of
freight and insurance. Secondly, most policies directed to affect specific industries have to
deal with mechanisms to change price relationships. For example, the government may
have in effect target prices, procurement prices, loan rates, etc. Third, although the NPC
may not show all the price distorting policies implemented in a given country, it usually
shows at least the most important effect of such policies.
The practical meaning o f the use of the NPC as the criterion to model trade
liberalization is intuitive. For example, for a dis-protected sector (or taxed sector) a
movement toward an NPC equal to one will indicate that not only taxes are reduced or
eliminated but also that some policies are directed to improve production conditions in that
sector. Those policies mayincludetransferoftechnology, reduction or elimination oftaxes,
improvement in infrastructure (Roads, storage capacity, etc.) which would lead to lower
transportation and other costs, policies directed to lower the cost of capital (interest rate,
finance charges, etc.). The case o f staple foods may illustrate how these changes may work.
Central American countries are net importers o f beans and rice, two main staples. On one
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hand, the lack o f attention to these sectors from the respective or relevant institutions
(Ministry o f Agriculture, the Institute of Agricultural Technology, etc) has led these sectors
to the use o f inefficient production technologies. Therefore, these sectors have not been
able to compete with foreign producers and their market share has been reduced. On the
other hand, as economic theory would suggest, when sectors are taxed, smaller quantities
are produced than without taxes (Krugman, 1998).
By contrast, for a “protected” sector, i.e., a commodity with an NPC larger than one,
an NPC movement toward one should indicate that any price support policy is eliminated.
However, in developing countries, for import commodities such as basic staples, and NPC
movement towards one may imply the need for a movement along the average cost curve
and a downward shift of the average cost curve as well. This movement and shift of the
average cost curve implies an increase in the supply of staples at a lower per unit
production cost until the point, assuming perfect competition in the international market,
where average costs equal border price. This shift and movement along the average costs
curve may be conditioned by the implementation of policies directed to technological
change and to lower the costs of inputs and capital.
Data
The MISS model requires a considerable amount of data to estimate the PPF payoffs
of various government actions. Initially, a base year was chosen. The base year chosen is
the last year before any integration agreement is enforced. In our case, 1990 is the base
year. Then, data on quantity demanded and supplied, domestic and international prices, and
quantities o f imports and exports were obtained from the most reliable sources. These
sources included the Food and Agricultural Organization o f the United Nations (FAO), the
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Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations (ECLAC-Mexico), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Transportation costs between
countries were estimated accordingly as the difference between the value of exports
declared in one country and the value o f imports reported by the country of destination
(IMF, 1998). Table S.l. shows the transportation margin coefficient between Central
American countries. In general, Central American countries are considered to have very
high transportation costs (Caceres, 1994) and this situation may influence the outcome of
integration agreements. For example, the average transportation cost for Honduras is 42%
o f the value of exports whereas for Guatemala it is 5%. A transportation cost higher than
10% is considered high (IMF, 1999)
Besides the data requirement mentioned above, the MISS model also requires
estimates of the elasticities o f supply and demand for the eight commodities analyzed in
this study. The literature review revealed that there were no estimates of these elasticities
in other studies. Therefore, the required elasticities were estimated as described in Chapter
four Protection levels were estimated as defined in the MISS model. Initially, the border
Table S.l.
FromNTo

Transportation Margin Coefficients of Five Central American Countries,
weights of the Value of Exports, 1990.
Costa Rica

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

0.03

0.26

0.18

0.09

0.14

0 .2 1

0 .1 0

0.14

0 .1 2

0 .0 1

0 .1 0

0.05

0.54

0.42

-------

El Salvador

0.04

Guatemala

0 .1 0

0 .0 1

Honduras

0 .6 6

038

0 .1 0

Nicaragua

0.25

0.07

0.39

-------

-------

0.18

-------

Averag
e

0 .2 2

prices of the commodities were estimated and the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) was
used to represent the level o f price protection in each country for each commodity included
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in the analysis. The coefficients shown in Table 5.2 indicate that export products are less
protected than commodities for domestic consumption. It is important to mention that in
developing countries agricultural production is taxed and therefore there are not “protected
commodities.” The nominal protection coefficients (NPC) shown in Table 5.2 indicate
that imported commodities (com, rice, beans, sorghum) have a higher local price than
world price but this is because importers have to pay for the high costs of transportation,
import duties, and taxes. So, in the base period (1990) agricultural producers did not
receive any support as is seen in many developed countries.
Table5.2.
AverageNominal Protection Coefficients (NPC) For Five Central American
___________ Countries, 1990-92.__________________________________________
Commodity

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Rice

1.05

0.67

1.09

0.59

0.64

Beans

1 .2 0

0.95

0.97

1.29

0.64

Com

1.71

2.05

1.77

1.05

1.09

Sorghum

1.04

1.63

1.37

2.09

1.81

Bananas

0.58

1 .0 0

0.43

1.42

0.57

Coffee

0 .6 6

0.71

0.70

0.97

1.19

Sugar

1.25

1 .2 0

0 .8 6

0.49

0.90

Beef

1.18

0.93

0.60

1.50

1 .2 0

Empirical Results of Game Simulations
This section consists of four games. Every game shows the dominant strategy and
the Nash equilibrium from each country's perspective given a set of various governmental
policy actions. Initially, each game includes a set o f protection reductions: no reduction or
status quo (SQ); 25% reduction in protection or dis-protection (25); 50% reduction in
protection or dis-protection (50); 75% reduction in protection or dis-protection (75); and
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100%

reduction in protection or dis-protection which implies a free trade situation OFT).
The games were designed based on the following conditions. Based on the

importance o f each commodity group to the government, games are simulated using PPF
weights equal to and different from one. In addition, since variations in the exchange rate
may affect equilibrium outcomes, scenarios with PPF weights equal and different from one
are simulated with a 5% depreciation of the exchange rate.
The exchange rate is an important tool in international trade. Schuh (1974) analyzed
the role of the exchange rate on trade and the development of U.S. agriculture. He argued
that an overvalued US dollar tended to depress the price of agricultural output domestically
during the mid-seventies because it became more expensive for foreign countries to buy US
agricultural commodities. Schuh (1974) argued that the exchange rate had a significant
impact on the increase o f agricultural prices during the mid-seventies. De Franco (1996)
notes that the exchange rate should be managed appropriately without overvaluation or
undervaluation to make agricultural production more competitive in the international
market. De Franco observed that an overvalued real exchange rate tends to increase costs
of production, in turn reducing the ability of commodities to compete in international
markets.
The games are set as follows. Game one analyzes agricultural trade liberalization
with PPF weights equal to one. Game two includes the results when PPF weights are
different from one. Game three analyzes the effects o f an exchange rate depreciation with
PPF weights equal to one. Finally, game four analyzes the effects o f an exchange rate
depreciation with PPF weights different from one. In all games, the payoffs are given in
millions of US dollars. A positive magnitude indicates a gain for the player and a negative
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magnitude indicates losses. The first number in the cell indicates the payoff of the country
(row player) and the second number indicates the payoff of the rest o f Central American
countries (column player).
Game One: Simulations with PPF Weights equal to one
In game one, the commodity groups are assumed to have the same importance for
the government, i.e., their weights in the PPF are identical, or in this case, equal to one. The
results in Tables 5.3-5.7 includes the outcome of the game from the perspective o f each
country. The results, as indicated by the Nash equilibrium show that all countries with the
exception of Guatemala will choose free trade when the rest of Central American countries
choose 50% reduction in protection. The Nash equilibrium solution is shown in the
darkened cells of the results tables. The results indicate that all countries have the incentive
towards trade liberalization and that any country will choose free trade given that the rest
of the other countries choose 50% reduction in protection. This outcome is in agreement
with the fact that Central American countries have taken several steps toward trade
agreements at this very moment.
Table 5.3.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Costa Rica Versus Rest of Central
__________________
America
Rest of Central America

C
o
s
t
a
R

i
c
a

Actions

SQ

25

50

75

FT

SQ

0

;0

-16; 157

-34; 262

-51;-135

-61; -41

25

29; - 6

13; 150

-5 ; 255

-23; 141

-34; -47

50

48;-11

31 ; 144

13; 248

-5 ; -147

-16; -53

75

57; -16

41;138

22; 241

4 ;-15 2

-6 ; -59

FT

58; -20

4 2 ; 133

5;-157

-5 ;-6 4

■

■
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Table S.4.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central
America.
Rest o f Central America
Actions

E

25

SQ

50

75

FT

1

ac
a
I
V

a
d
0
r

Table 5.5.

SQ

0

;0

-7 ; 161

-13; 259

-19; -134

-20; -70

25

10;-2

4 ; 159

-2 ; 257

-8 ; -137

-9;-72

50

19;-4

12; 223

6

; 254

0 ; -147

-1 ; -75

75

2 6 ;-6

19; 155

13 ; 252

-6 ; -142

6

FT

-9 ; - 8

24; 153

12; 144

11; -79

;-77

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central
America.
Rest of Central America
Actions

G
u
a
t
e
m
a
1

a
Table 5.6.

25

SQ

FT

75

50

-4 ; 157

-8 ; 266

-10;-134

-15; -40

153;-6

147; 150

142; 255

132;-141

131;-47

50

288;-11

281; 144

bbi

152; -146

261;-53

75

-83; -15

-89; 138

-94; 241

-98; -152

-140; -59

FT

-332; -20

-39; 133

-45; 236

-48; -156

-59; -64

SQ

0

25

;0

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Honduras Versus Rest of Central
_______
America.
Rest of Central America

H
0

n
d
u
r
a
5

Actions

SQ

25

50

75

FT

SQ

0 ;0

-14; 168

-40; 278

-60; -89

-6 6 ; -30

25

18;-2

-2 ; 159

-23; 275

-44;-91

-49;-31

50

2 9 ;-5

9 ; 162

-12; 254

-33; -93

-39; -34

75

17;-2

-2; 164

-23; 275

-45; -14

-50; -32

FT

40; -10

-20; 164

HlBi -24; 103

-30; -79
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Table 5.7.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights equal to one, Nicaragua Versus Rest of Central
America.

P

Rest of Central America

S

u
a

SQ

25

50

FT

75

-2 ; 162

-4 ; 262

-6 ; -143

1

; 161

- 1 ; 261

-3 ; 144

-4;-82

-1

2

; 162

- 1 ; 260

-3;-144

-3; -82

;- l

0

; 161

-2 ; 261

-4;-144

-4;-83

8

; 172

15; -145

14;-83

SQ

0

;0

25

3 ;-l

50

4;

75

2

FT

2 1

;0

• *

Actions

CN
oo
1

N
i
c
a
r
a

Game Two: Simulation with PPF Weights not Equal to One
Game two makes the realistic assumption that the government assigns different
degrees of importance to various agricultural commodity groups. Although the MISS model
allows for the estimation of PPF weights as explained earlier, the weights used in this
research were estimated in a different way. This is because the weights that can be
estimated by the MISS model may not reflect the reality of the relationships between
governments and various economic sectors and groups. In addition, there is an accepted
view that because of political instability o f developing countries, PPF weights estimated
with the MISS program may also be wrong because the MISS model assumes political
stability (Johnson, 1993).
For this reason, a procedure following the reasoning for collective action (Olson,
196S) is developed to estimate such weights. Initially, a subjective set of criteria were
chosen to measure the possible importance o f each commodity group in the view of the
government The criteria were chosen based on various factors of political relevance in
Central America. Commodity groups were ranked based on four criteria. First, it is
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reasonable to expect that government will devote more attention to commodity groups with
the highest generation of tax revenue. Secondly, the level of organization within a
commodity group is a determinant factor to achieve a group goal (Olson, 1965). So,
commodity groups are also ranked by level of organization.
Third, hard currency earnings are important for developing countries. Hard currency
is important because developing countries rely greatly on imports to satisfy country needs
in many goods. Developing countries, such as the Central American countries, have to
purchase their imports not in local currency but in foreign currency, usually in United States
dollars (De Alonso, 1994). Thus, for Central American countries hard currency earnings
are crucial. It is reasonable to expect that governments will place more importance on
commodity groups from which a higher percentage of the revenue generated is in hard
currency than to commodity groups generating revenue mostly in local currency.
Since developing countries rely greatly on hard currency, it is reasonable to expect
that governments will likely be influenced by commodity groups which actually generate
hard currency earnings or have the potential for hard currency generation. So, from the
government stand point, a commodity group with a potential o f generating exchange rate
earnings will be more important than other commodity groups which generate revenue in
local currency. This can be the case even if the amount o f revenue generated in local
currency by the domestic market commodity group is higher than the amount generated by
the export oriented commodity group. The justification for this behavior is the instability
of the local currency and its tendency toward devaluations and inflation against a stable
hard currency.
After the basis for ranking commodity groups has been established, the numerical
rank o f the groups was designed. Since the ranking of the groups is based on observation,
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the ranking is subject to bias. However, a careful design is used in order to reduce or avoid
bias in the ranking procedure. First, in game one it was shown that if a commodity group
has a PPF weight of one, it means that the government gives the same importance to the
commodity group in question as to itself. On the contrary, a PPF greater than one means
that the government values a commodity group higher than itself. The opposite applies to
PPF weights lower than one. hi addition, the commodity group with the highest PPF weight
is considered more important relative to the government but also relative to other
commodity and consumer groups.
A consistent procedure was designed to increase or decrease a commodity group’s
importance relative to the government In order to reduce bias, a normalized PPF weight
of one is assigned to the government Table 5.8 shows the criteria for ranking, they are
revenue generation, organization level, and the share of exports in revenue generated by
each commodity. There is one more criterion, whether the sector is mainly oriented to
exports (0.10) or to domestic consumption (-0.05). As Table 5.8 shows, government
revenue generation is the most important criterion since it may add up to 0.4 to the
importance of a given commodity group. Next is the level o f organization. Organization
level is important because the more united a group is, the more effective in reaching its
goals it is. Third is the share of revenue generated in hard currency. This criterion is
important but it is less important than the total amount of revenue generated and the level
o f organization.
The sign of die values assigned to the criteria has an important meaning. First, all
the values for revenue generation are positive but they can be negative for the other criteria,
hi practice, this means that the government will not penalize any sector that generates
revenue. By contrast, if a sector has a low organizational level or has a small share o f hard
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currency in the revenue generated, then the government may decrease the sector importance
relative to the government by weighting the sector lower than itself.

Table 5.8.

Ranking Criteria for PPF Weight Estimation for Central American
Countries

Government Revenue
Generation by Commodity
Group
Rank

Value

Share of Government
Revenue Generated by
Exports

Commodity Group
Organization Level
Rank

Value

Rank

Value

Very High

0.33-0.40

Monopoly/sony

0.25

*75%

0.15

High

0.25-0.32

Strong Union

0.15

51-74%

0 .1 0

Moderate

0.17-0.24

Moderate

0 .0

25-50%

0 .0

Low

0.09-0.16

Weak

-0.05

15-24%

-0.05

Very Low

0.0-0.08

No Organization

-0 . 1 0

sl4%

-0 . 1 0

After a careful implementation of the ranking procedure explained earlier, Table 5.9
summarizes the resulting PPF weights by commodity and country. As it seems reasonable
to expect, export commodities obtained the highest PPF weights for most countries. This
is in agreement with the historical importance of export commodities in Central American
countries (De Alonso, 1994). The weight used for consumers is the average value o f the
PPF weights for all commodity groups. Although consumers are poorly organized in
Central American countries, a rough idea o f their importance to the government may be
drawn from the average value of the PPF for each country. This is so, because it is
important to remember that producers are also consumers and by the way producers are
treated an idea can be obtained about how important consumers are for the government
This is achieved by pooling all producers together and seeing them as consumers. In
addition, consumers are also taxpayers and vote to elect government officials. Therefore,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152
although consumers are not organized in interest groups, their voice is heard at in election
time and thus consumers become important for the government and their weight might be
higher than that of the government itself as Table 5.9. shows.

Commodity

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Rice

0.91

1.09

0.91

0.82

1.03

Beans

0.81

0.93

0.75

0.84

0.77

Com

0.89

1.40

1 .0 1

0.99

1.50

Sorghum

0.75

0.85

0.80

0.84

0.85

Bananas

1.63

0.95

1.33

1.85

1.36

Coffee

1.70

1.63

1.80

1.55

1.43

Sugar

1.43

1.48

1.54

1.38

1.52

Beef

1.19

1.06

1.06

1.25

1.24

Consumers

1.16

1.17

1.15

1.19

1 .2 1

After the estimation of the PPF weights, the MISS model was used to obtain the
payoffs for the set o f government actions specified earlier. The results included in Table
5.10-5.14 indicate that little changes occur from game one. The new equilibrium for
Honduras is the only considerable change in game two with respect to game one. With PPF
weights different from one, the new equilibrium for Honduras is status quo/50% (SQ/50)
instead o f free trade/50% (FT/50) of game one. hi general, the outcome of game two
indicates that, from each country perspective, the political influence o f commodity groups
does not appear to be an obstacle to trade liberalization in Central America. This is an
important result as it indicates the benefits for Central American countries to open trade
among them even if government is under the pressure from producers of various
commodity groups.
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Table 5.10.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One Costa Rica Versus Rest of
Central America
Rest of Central America
Actions

C

25

50

75

FT

-2 2 ; 118

-47; 188

-71; -167

-84; -223

SQ

0

s
t
a
R

i
c
a

SQ

0

;0

25

103; - 1 0

79; 107

32; 176

26;-178

12;-235

50

200

; -18

174; 98

145; 165

117 ;-187

102 ;-245

75

291; -26

264 ; 89

234; 155

205;-196

188;-254

287; -204

270;-263

| _

FT

Table 5.11.

349; 80

377; -33

_

0

.

BBiBII

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, El Salvador Versus Rest of
Central America

[

Rest of Central America
E
I

Actions

;0

FT

25

50

75

- 1 0 ; 182

-18; 303

-127; 2 0

-28; -9

SQ

SQ

0

a
a
I

25

17;-3

8

; 179

-2 ; 299

-10; 17

-12;-13

V

50

35;-6

2 4; 175

14; 296

5 ; 13

4 ;-1 8

75

5 1 ;-8

4 0 ; 172

30; 292

-1 ;43

18; - 2 2

FT

5;-11

55; 166

34; 5

33; -25

c

a
d
0

r
Table 5.12.

msBSSBBm

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, Guatemala Versus Rest of
Central America
_________
Rest of Central America

G
u
a
t
e
m
a
I
a

Actions

25

SQ

SQ

0 ;0

-5 ; 118

25

195; -10

188; 107

50

391; -18

381; 98

75

7 ;-2 6

-2 ; 89

FT

-182;-335

102

; 80

50

75

FT

- 1 0 ; 188

-12; 167

-19; -224

181; 176

170 ;-178

168 ;-235

B fflW W W 249 ;-187

355; -25

um km m
-9 ; 155

-15; -196

-76; -254

92; 146

88;-204

73;-263

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154
Table 5.13.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protectionwith Weights not Equal to One, Honduras Versus Rest ofCentral
America
Rest o f Central America

H

Actions

0

n
d
u
r
a
s

Table 5.14.

SQ

25

50

75

FT

IHfliMH
— Em -112; 195

-124; 391

-123; 495

-163; 192

-174; 389

-143; 268

-181; 492

-222; 190

-234;385

-51; -3

-85; 272

-123; 495

-164; 206

-176; 388

242;-12

-278; 261

-317; 483

-358; 183

-371; 378

SQ

0

;0

-34; 275

25

-51; -3

-85; 272

50

-108; - 2

75
FT

Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels o f Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One, Nicaragua Versus Rest of
Central America
Rest o f Central America

N
l
c
a
r
a
g
u
a

Actions

SQ

25

50

75

FT

SQ

0

;0

-3 ; 190

-1 ; 320

-9 ; 26

-1 0 ; 6

25

1; -0.5

-335; 189

-6 ; 319

-9 ; 26

-1 1 ; 6

50

-3 ; - l

-1 ; 360

-9 ; 320

-12; 25

-13; 9

75

-8 ; - l

-11; 189

-14; 682

-17; 25

-18; 5

FT

12

; -1

-7 ; 206

nUNi 3 ; 25

269; 5

Game Three: Simulation with PPF Weights Equal to One and a 5% Exchange Rate
Depreciation
hi game three, PPF weights are equal to one, as in game one, but the exchange rate
o f each country is depreciated by five percent As was mentioned earlier, exchange rate
variations can be used to promote exports when necessary. A depreciation of the exchange
rate lowers die international price o f export commodities. This price decrease may cause
export growth and greater exchange rate earnings than prior to the exchange rate
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depreciation and improve the overall social gain. It was decided to decrease the exchange
rate by five percent to examine the likelihood that countries will be more inclined to
liberalize trade than with a higher exchange rate. The exchange depreciation did not
adversely affect the outcome in game three relative to game one. The results included in
Tables 5.15-5.19 indicate that a five percent depreciation in the exchange rate will affect
the Nash equilibrium outcome o f Costa Rica and the rest of Central America and
Guatemala and the rest of Central America toward a greater trade liberalization than in
game one but not that of the remaining countries.
Table 5.15.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
___________ o f 5%, Costa Rica Versus Rest of Central America__________________
Rest o f Central America
C

Actions

50

75

3 ;157

-16; 262

-33; -56

-44;-40

SQ

25

FT

0

s
t
a
R

i
c
a
Table 5.16.

;0

SQ

0

25

4 6 ;-6

30; 150

11; 254

-7 ; -140

-17; -46

50

62;-11

46; 144

27; 247

9 ; -146

-2 ; -52

75

69; -16

52; 138

16;-151

5 ;-5 8

FT

67; - 2 0

51; 133

14;-155

4 ;-6 3

32; 235

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
o f 5%, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central America
Rest o f Central America

E

Actions

25

SQ

FT

50

75

- 1 0 ; 261

-16; -132

-17; - 6 8

1

;0

-4 ; 163

SQ

0

25

13; - 1

6

; 161

1; 259

-5 ; -135

-6 ; -70

V

50

2 2;-3

15; 159

9 ; 256

4;-138

3 ;-7 3

a
d

75

2 9 ;-4

22; 157

17; 254

-3 ; -140

10; -75

FT

-9 ;-7

28; 155

mnhnh

16;-142

15; -77

«

s
a
1

0

r
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Table 5.17.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
__________ of 5%, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central America________________
Rest o f Central America
Actions

G
u
a
t
e
m
a
1

a

SQ
;0

25

50

75

FT

; 61

17; 94

16; 82

11 ; 133

SQ

0

25

161; -27

156; 26

151; 59

141; 47

142; 99

50

280; -65

273; -13

245 ; 20

157; 9

256; 60

75

365;-106

358; -54

351;-22

348; -33

Q fllH

FT

-296;-115

207; -65

199; -32

197; -43

185; 9

2 1

Table 5.18.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels o f Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
___________ of 5%, Honduras Versus Rest o f Central America___________________
Rest of Central America
H
0

n
d
u
r
a
s

Actions

SQ

25

50

75

FT

SQ

0

;0

-20; 165

-42; 275

-64; -91

-69;-31

25

17;-5

-4 ; 162

-27; 272

-49; -93

-53 ; -33

50

2 8 ;-7

7 ; 159

-16; 269

-39; -95

-45; -35

75

35; -62

14; 162

-9 ; 270

-28; -105

-55;

FT

40;-13

19; 153

-28;

-34; -41

HUH

-1 0 0

8

Table 5.19.

Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels o f Reduction in
Protection with Weights Equal to One and an Exchange Rate Depreciation
__________ o f 5%, Nicaragua Vs. Rest of Central America_____________________
Rest of Central America
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a

Actions

;0

50

25

SQ

75

FT

-3 ; 166

-5 ; 262

-7;-144

-7 ; -81

; 162

-2 ; 261

-3;-144

-4 ; 82

; 261

-2 ; -145

-2 ; -83

I ; 261

-1 ; -145

-2;-83

0 ; -145

-1 ; -83

SQ

0

25

3 ;-l

1

50

5 ;- l

3 ; 161

1

75

6 ;-2

3 ; 160

FT

6 ;-2

-8 ; 170
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GameFour: Simulation with PPF Weights not Equal to One and a 5% Exchange Rate
Depreciation
Game four is similar to game two in that both assign PPF weights different from
one to commodity groups and to consumers but in game four an exchange rate depreciation
of five percent is also modeled. As the results of the game simulation included in Tables
5.20-5.24 indicate, small changes were obtained for Guatemala and Nicaragua relative to
game two. For Guatemala and the rest o f Central America, a five percent exchange
depreciation leads to a Nash equilibrium with more trade liberalization than in game two
(75/75). However, a five percent exchange rate depreciation adversely affect the results for
Nicaragua relative to game two. hi game four, the Nash equilibrium for Nicaragua is
reached at 25/50 versus FT/50 of game two. So, it seems that exchange rate depreciation
reduces the likelihood o f Nicaragua liberalizing its agricultural protection. For all other
countries, the results are the same as in game two.

Table 5.20.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
Depreciation of 5%, Costa Rica Versus Rest o f Central America_______
w u

w *

Rest of Central America
c
0
s
t
a
R
i
c
a

Actions

SQ

25

50

75

FT

SQ

0 ;0

19; 118

-7 ; 187

-32; -165

-46; -222

25

148;-11

123; 107

96; 175

69;-176

54; 234

50

248; -19

222; 97

192; 164

164;-186

148;-243

75

343;-27

316; 88

285; 154

255;-195

238; -253

FT

433; -35

405; 79

340; 135

323;-261

B B
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Table 5.21.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
Depreciation of 5%, El Salvador Versus Rest of Central America_____
Rest of Central America

E

Actions

50

25

SQ

75

FT

1

SQ

0 ;0

3 ; 184

25

3 0 ;-I

2 1

V

50

4 9 ; -3

38; 178

a
d

75

6 6 ;-6

55; 175

FT

17;-8

71; 172

cS
a

-6 ; 306

; 18

-14; 24

-15; - 6

3 ; 20

2 ;-1 0

2 9; 299

19; 16

18;-14

4 5; 295

13; 12

33;-18

50; 9

49;-2 2

12

; 10

1

0

r
Table 5.22.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels o f Reduction in
Protection with Weights no Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
___________Depreciation of 5%, Guatemala Versus Rest of Central America_______
Rest of Central America
Actions

G
u
a
t
e
m
a
1

a

75

50

25

SQ

FT

35; 70

31; 112

28; 247

2 2

252;-43

255; 15

209; 56

198; 189

197; 123

50

303; -103

395; -47

353;-9

275; 125

371; 55

75

572;-169

561;-115

552;-78

FT

-143;-185

451;-133

439;-96

SQ

0

25

;0

; 182

476;-18
435;35

418; -34

Table 5.23.

Political Payoff Function Values for Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
____________Depreciation of 5%, Honduras Versus Rest o f Central America________
Rest o f Central America
H
0

n
d
u
r
a
s

Actions

SQ

50

25

75

FT

SQ

0

;0

18; 272

—

-65; 193

-78; 389

25

-4 ;-5

-40; 100

-81; 338

-123; 224

-134;386

50

-6 8 ; - 8

-104; 265

-145; 487

-188; 187

-201; 382

75

-137;5

-175; 268

-216; 492

-288; 170

-137; 386

FT

-213;-15

-251; 257

-292; 478

-336; 180

-349; 374
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Table 5.24.

Political Payoff Function Values For Alternative Levels of Reduction in
Protection with Weights not Equal to One and an Exchange Rate
Depreciation of 5%, Nicaragua Vs. Rest of Central America_________
Rest of Central America

N
l
c
a
r
a
g
u
a

Actions

SQ

25

75

FT

-7 ; 25

-1 0 ; 6

-6 ; 25

-7 ; 5

50
-4 ; 320

SQ

0

;0

-1 ; 190

25

3 ;- l

-1 ; 360

50

i ; -1

-2 ; 190

-5; 319

-8 ; 25

-9 ;5

75

-2 ;- l

-5 ; 189

-9 ; 319

-11; 25

-13; 5

FT

- 7 ; -I

-27; 2 0 2

-13; 319

-15; 25

-17; 5

Summary and Discussion of the Results
This chapter dealt with the central issue of this research, which was agricultural
trade liberalization. Initially, the MISS model was introduced as the technique to analyze
trade liberalization in Central America. Secondly, the NPC, the criterion used to measure
trade liberalization, was defined and described. Third, data and data sources were
discussed. Fourth, trade liberalization scenarios and actions were defined and the results
presented. Since this research focuses on the influence of various economic groups on the
governmental decisions relative to trade liberalization, the importance of these groups was
identified and used to model four simulated games. Four games were modeled. In game
one, PPF weights were assumed to be one, i.e., there was not a difference in importance
among economic groups in the view o f government interests, hi game two, PPF weights
were assumed to be different from one, i.e., government assigned different degrees of
importance to some groups relative to other groups and to itself. In addition, game three
included a 5% exchange rate depreciation when PPF weights were equal to one. Finally,
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game four included a 5% depreciation exchange rate when PPF weights were different from
one. The variations in exchange rate were included to analyze possible advantages or
disadvantages of exchange rate variations in Central American countries when entering
agreements to liberalize agricultural trade.
The results of the games simulated in this study, summarized in Table 5.25, indicate
that, in general, Central American countries will benefit from agricultural trade
liberalization. Game one indicated that from each country’s perspective, a 50% reduction
in protection in the rest of countries will be enough incentive it to choose free trade. This
outcome indicates that there is enough incentive for Central American countries to
liberalize agricultural trade among themselves. The results for game two indicated again
that Central American countries will choose a considerable degree of trade liberalization
(FT), as in game one, even if governments assign various level o f importance to commodity
groups. This outcome indicates that commodity group influence may be irrelevant in
governmental decisions concerning trade liberalization. This is because assigning different
values to the PPF weights led to very minor changes in the outcome of the simulated
games. Some degree of agricultural trade liberalization appears to be the most reasonable
choice for Central American countries despite the influence various commodity groups may
exert on their governments. The results of game three indicated, as economic theory would
suggest (Houck, 1994), that exchange rate depreciation may lead to a greater degree of
agricultural trade liberalization, as the cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala show. However,
as the results of game four indicated, exchange rate depreciation seems to be harmful for
trade liberalization in Honduras and Nicaragua and beneficial for Costa Rica when PPF
weights are different from one. This outcome is likely to occur because o f adverse changes
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in welfare o f the latter countries when PPF and exchange rate depreciations. Exchange rate
depreciations appear to lead to the worsening o f trade balance.
Table S.2S.

Nash Equilibrium Results o f Four Trade Liberalization Games Simulation
For Five Central American Countries.

Countries

Game One

Game Two

Game Three

Game Four

C/R

FT/50

FT/50

75/50

FT/50

S/R

FT/50

FT/50

FT/50

FT/50

G/R

50/50

50/50

75/FT

75/75

H/R

FT/50

SQ/50

FT/50

SQ/50

N/R

FT/50

FT/50

FT/50

25/50

Note: OCosta Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Central
American countries.

Changes in terms of trade may give some explanation for the case of Nicaragua.
Terms of trade worsen when the exchange rate depreciates. Thus, for a country relying on
imports, as is the case of Nicaragua, the reduction in terms of trade may lead to social
losses greater than the exchange revenue gains generated by the increase of exports due to
exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, although exchange rate depreciation is generally
beneficial because it boosts exports and may generate large hard currency earnings, that
may not be the case for Nicaragua.
Until this point, the analysis o f country actions have been done from each country
perspective and not from the regional standpoint However, it seems reasonable to expect
countries to jointly decide the level o f trade liberalization. Therefore, it is important to
analyze what action countries will more likely choose when all countries face the same
choices. For this purpose, the payoffs forjoint actions, i.e., the outcome when all countries
face SQ, 25,50,75, and 100% reductions in protection together served as the criterion for
each country decision. The resulting selected action for each game for each country are
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included in Table 5.26. The results in Table 5.26 show that El Salvador andHonduras have
a dominant strategy. However, in all games, El Salvador gain the most (loses the least) by
choosing free trade whereas Honduras is better off if it chooses status quo (SQ).
The results are mixed for the rest o f countries. For example, changes in PPF weights
seem to be more important in Costa Rica than variation in the exchange rate, hi both games
one and three, the outcome is the same as for game two relative to game four, hi the case
o f Costa Rica, it seems interesting to observe that when government assigns various levels
o f importance to commodity groups, the outcome get closer to free trade, hi the case of
Nicaragua, the results are not adversely affected by differences in the PPF weights assigned
to commodity groups. However, exchange rate variations seem to adversely afreet trade
liberalization. This is probably in connection with a worsening in terms of trade in games
three and four with respect to the first two games. Finally, changes in PPF weights seem
to be less important than variations in exchange rate in the case o f Guatemala. According
to the results in Table 5.26, Guatemala moves closer to free trade under an exchange rate
depreciation than without it.
Table 5.26.
Country

Best Choices Given All Five Countries Simultaneous Protection
Reductions.
Game One

Game Three

Game Two

Game Four

Costa Rica

25

FT

25

FT

El Salvador

FT

FT

FT

FT

Guatemala

50

50

75

75

Honduras

SQ

SQ

SQ

SQ

Nicaragua

FT

FT

25

SQ

An important question is by how much countries want and should liberalize trade.
Results o f Table 5.26 indicate that none of the five actions under analysis satisfies all
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countries simultaneously. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect countries to negotiate the
terms of trade liberalization. For example, Honduras, the country that loses the most when
trade is liberalized, will probably require compensation from the remaining countries in
order to participate in an agreement Nicaragua maybe another candidate for compensation.
If all countries are to participate in any trade agreement, some kind of differentiated
treatment should be given to countries not initially benefitting from the agreement. This
outcome is in agreement with the results from the first integration agreement from 1960.
Honduras was the loser then and it withdrew in 1969 from the agreement. Nicaragua
followed to weaken the agreement in the mid-seventies. This happened because none of
these countries was compensated for losses from trade liberalization by the rest of Central
American countries.
Sensitivity Analysis of the Results
Since the estimates to the elasticities used to model trade liberalization in Central
America presented limitations, it seems reasonable to develop a sensitivity analysis to test
the stability of the results. For this purpose, the following procedure was implemented.
First, the supply and demand elasticities were increased and reduced by 10,25 and 50%.
Since own price elasticities of demand are expected to be negative and those of supply be
positive, a movement in the same direction, as figure 5.2 shows, makes elasticities either
more negative (less positive) or more positive (less negative). For example, a 10% increase
in elasticities means that negative elasticities were made

10%

less negative and positive

elasticities 10% more positive. The logic of this decision is, as in any given interval, to
move all variables in the direction of the lower or upper bound simultaneously. Secondly,
to make a comparisons with elasticities from other sources, a set of elasticities were
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Demand Elasticities

>+10%

Supply Elasticities

-00

Figure 5.2.

A Ten Percent Positive Change in Elasticities

obtained from Gardiner et al, (1989). The same set of supply and demand elasticities were
used for all Central American countries because Gardiner et al (1989) estimated elasticities
for the entire region and not for each country individually (Table A12-A13). Third, the
sensitivity analysis was done for games one and two because they seem to be the most
relevant scenarios in the present study. The results of the sensitivity analysis are included
in tables 5.27-5.28. The results show that, in general, considerable changes in elasticity
values do not affect adversely trade liberalization. Thus, when elasticities were shocked by
10%

in either direction, results changed in the direction of more trade liberalization in the

region. Additional percentage changes in elasticities did not provide different results. The
results from the inclusion o f elasticities elicited from Gardiner et al, (1989) indicated that,
using another set of elasticities, considerably different from those estimated in the present
research, did not affect adversely the results obtained with the base set of elasticities.
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Moreover, the results indicated that using the same set o f elasticities for all countries does
not affect the main outcome o f the results obtained earlier. Finally, the results of the
sensitivity analysis indicate that, although elasticities may be important in the estimation
procedure o f the games analyzed, the outcome of the games will not vary considerably
when elasticities are changed.
Table 5.27
_______

Sensitivity analysis Results: Percentage change in Supply and Demand
Elasticities for Central American Countries, PPF Weight Equal One.
Percentage Changes in Elasticities from Base

Games

BASE

TUB
-50

-25

-1 0

+10

+25

+50

C/R

FT/50

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

S/R

FT/50

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

G/R

50/50

FT/FT

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

FT/75

50/FT

H/R

SQ/50

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

SQ/FT

N7R

FT/50

75/FT

SQ/FT

50/75

50/75

50/75

50/75

50/75

Note: C=Costa Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H=Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Central
American countries; TLEB=Elasticities from the Trade liberalization Database by Gardiner et al, 1989.

Table 5.28
_______

Sensitivity analysis Results: Percentage change in Supply and Demand
Elasticities for Central American Countries, PPF Weight Not Equal One.
Percentage Changes in Elasticities from Base

Games

BASE

TUB
-50

-25

-1 0

+10

+25

+50

C/R

FT/50

75/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

S/R

FT/50

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

G/R

50/50

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

50/FT

H/R

FT/50

FT/75

50/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

N/R

FT/50

FT/FT

FT/75

FT/FT

75/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

FT/FT

Note: OCosta Rica, S=E1 Salvador, G=Guatemala, H-Honduras, N=Nicaragua, and R=Rest of Centra
American countries; TLIB=Elasticities fromthe Trade liberalization Database by Gardiner et al, 1989.
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CHAPTER SIX - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section summarizes what was done
in the research. The second section emphasizes the implications o f the present study. The
third section analyzes the limitations of the present study. The last section summarizes the
most important conclusions to be drawn from this empirical research.
Summary

Will a second attempt of Central American countries to liberalize trade in the area
and create a trading bloc with respect to the rest of the world, i.e., the formation of a
customs union, be successful? An answer for this question is the main objective of this
study. A first integration attempt, started in 1960, failed and this experience may help to
secure a successful second integration attempt if the lessons from the past are taken into
account There is a general agreement that the first attempt failed because of social-political
problems within each country (Alonso, 1994; Institute of Latin American Studies, 1988;
McClelland, 1972; Schmitter, 1972). These problems spilled over the whole regional
integration process in such a way that the integration process was gradually weakened and,
ultimately, virtually over. So, it seems relevant for Central American countries to assess the
chances of a successful integration if the mistakes made in the past are taken into account
This research was developed with these ideas in mind. Initially, a thorough literature
review was presented. Chapter two showed that Central American countries are prone to
problems of various natures. Moreover, the literature revealed that the CACM, created in
1960, faced many problems. These problems caused the CACM to disintegrate by the mid
eighties. The analysis in chapter two also revealed that little of the first integration
experience of 1960 has been taken into account when the second integration wave started
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in 1990. The export promotion policies strategy, as the strategy o f the second integration
attempt, can be thought of as the main change in the integration process of the nineties
relative to I960. No information is available to support the idea that other lessons were
learned from the past Thus, Central American countries continue to face the same obstacles
toward integration they faced in the sixties and seventies. In this research, an attempt is
made to show the influence o f the most relevant factors for a successful trade liberalization
in Central America. The assumption made here is that the political influence of various
producer groups is the crucial factor in shaping national decisions regarding trade
liberalization.
One of the objectives of the present research was to analyze, from a partial
equilibrium perspective, how national decisions may be shaped by the interest of various
economic groups and by the implementation of agricultural policies. To do so, the present
research focused on national decisions when entering an international trade liberalization
agreement Five Central American countries, eight important commodity groups, a
consumer group, and the government perspective were included in the analysis. Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were the countries under analysis. Beans,
rice, com, sorghum, bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef were the commodity groups included
in this research.
Initially, it was hypothesized that government decisions are considerably affected
by the influence o f various important economic sectors. Various studies have shown this
to be a realistic hypothesis (Rausser and Freebaim, 1974; Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Mahe
etal, 1988; Abler and Sukhatme, 1998; Johnson etal, 1993; Kennedy, 1995). These studies
have also shown that a game theoretic framework can represent, in an adequate manner, the
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relationships under analysis. In addition, most of these studies have used the political
preference function to empirically analyze the influence of commodity groups on
government decisions. Thus, chapter three presented the theoretical model under which
trade liberalization in Central America was analyzed.
The model chosen is a game theoretic framework. As the various studies mentioned
above have shown, a game theoretic framework was appropriate for the topic under
analysis. The political preference function (PPF) was chosen to estimate the payoffs for the
actions to be analyzed. The actions included five levels of reduction in level of protection:
no reduction or status quo (SQ), 25% reduction in protection or dis-protection (25),50%
reduction in protection or dis-protection (50), 75% reduction in protection or dis-protection
(75), and 100% reduction in protection or dis-protection, which implies a free trade
situation (FT). The empirical estimation of the payoff using the PPF was done using

Modele International Simplifie de Simulation (MISS), a partial equilibrium trade model
(Mahe et al, 1988).
In order to use MISS to estimate the payoffs of the government actions specified
above, some preliminary data were needed. Data on quantity demanded and supplied,
domestic and international prices, and quantities of imports and exports were obtained from
the most reliable sources. These sources included the Food and Agricultural Organization
o f the United Nations (FAO), the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United
Nations (ECLAC-Mexico), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.
The literature review revealed that there were no estimates of elasticities of supply and
demand. Therefore, these elasticities were estimated as described in Chapter four. Finally,
protection levels were defined and estimated in chapter five.
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The results o f the empirical model were presented and discussed in chapter five. In
general, the results showed that there are good possibilities for trade liberalization in
Central America but in doing so, several factors should be considered. First, the results
showed that the political influence of the producer groups included in the analysis does not
deter countries from trade liberalization. Second, exchange rate depreciations serve as even
a greater stimulus for trade liberalization, with the exception o f Nicaragua, hi the case of
Nicaragua, exchange rate depreciation appears to worsen greatly the terms of trade and,
therefore, at the present stage, it is not a desirable measure to boost exports. Third, if all
countries are to choose the same level of reduction in protection, i.e., the same action, then
Honduras and possibly Nicaragua should be compensated. This is because the analysis
showed that Nicaragua and Honduras gain the least or lose the most when entering a trade
liberalization agreement So, for the agreement to be successful, some compensatory
measures should be implemented.
Implications
Several implications can be drawn from the present research. The main implication
of the present research is that the political influences of various producer, and consumer
groups on the government sector are not harmful to the process o f agricultural trade
liberalization. The results of the present research imply that there is a potential for Central
American agricultural trade liberalization. However, agricultural trade liberalization should
be accompanied by corrective measures to secure a successful process. The results also
imply that several agricultural policies at the domestic level should be implemented in order
to ease the way toward trade liberalization. For example, the analysis showed that many
commodities are considerably protected or dis-protected, as shown by the nominal
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protection coefficients. Better infrastructure, cheaper and wider access to credit and
financial institutions, technological improvement, and education are needed in order to
reduce the gap between world and domestic prices. These policies, however, may prove to
be very costly and only achievable in the long run. The main implication is that countries
should undertake long-term plans in order to secure a successful agricultural trade
liberalization. In addition, if the costs of implementation of agricultural policies are higher
than the benefits from trade liberalization, then countries may find themselves choosing a
status quo (SQ) situation. There are many factors to be taken into account when
governments decide to enter an international agreement. If some of those factors appear to
be an obstacle to trade liberalization, governments should take into account long-run rather
than short run gains when considering an agreement, hi addition, agreements among
countries under the GATT and WTO negotiations indicate an overall movement toward
free trade around the world. Central America may be ready to join the rest of the world in
this effort
Limitations
As any other study, this research has several limitations that should be taken into
account when used to address real world issues. A first limitation of the present study is
that many strong assumptions had to be made in order to estimate the empirical model. Any
time a researcher uses a partial equilibrium framework, the strong assumption of “other
factors constant” has to be made. Economic processes are dynamic and interrelated in
nature, so the “ceteris paribus” assumption is a strong one.
Secondly, data limitations are always a problem in research involving developing
countries (Fischer et al, 1980), and the present study is not an exception. Data limitations
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were present mostly in the estimation of elasticities of supply and demand of the products
analyzed. This situation may lead to undesirable consequences. On the other hand, the
sensitivity analysis showed that large variations in the value of elasticities (-50%, +50%)
did not change considerably the results obtained with the base set of elasticities. Moreover,
the use o f elasticities from other sources (Gardiner et al, 1989) did not result in large
changes from the outcome obtained earlier. Thus, the sensitivity analysis showed that
results are robust and insensitive to large variations in elasticities estimates. However, it
is recommended to interpret the elasticities o f supply and demand, estimated in this
research, as an approximation to the true values of these elasticities. If the true values of
the elasticities are very different from those used, results may vary substantially. Therefore,
readers are advised to use the results of the present research with caution. In addition, it
seems better to analyze the results under a “what-if' situation, i.e., this research indicates
what the results would be if the elasticities presented here were the true ones. It is important
to mention that in the preliminary stages o f estimation, supply and demand elasticities were
shocked by ten percent up and down and the results did not change significantly. So, if the
true elasticities are in the range o f ten percent interval, then the results are still very
valuable.
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the present research. First, this study
showed that agricultural trade liberalization is a feasible and beneficial alternative for
Central American countries. The results showed that Central America gains from trade
liberalization. Secondly, the political influences o f producers o f rice, beans, com, sorghum,
bananas, coffee, sugar cane, and beef, are not a real obstacle toward agricultural trade
liberalization in Central American countries. Third, the theoretical and empirical models
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used in the present research were appropriate to estimate the relationships under analysis.
Four, the results o f the present research should be used with caution when addressing real
life issues and questions regarding agricultural trade liberalization in Central American
countries.
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APPENDIX A:

EXPLANATION OF INCLUDED APPENDICES

Appendix A includes all tables which were cited in the main contents but not
presented there. Appendix B deals with estimations of costs o f production and net returns
for all five Central American countries included in this study. Appendix C is a
supplemental program of Appendix B. Appendices D, E, F, G, H, and I, include programs
codes used to estimate supply and demand elasticities for each country. Only the codes and
programs for Guatemala are included because similar programs were used for the rest of
countries.
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Table A. 1.

Costs o f Production and Expected Net Returns Estimates in Central American Countries for the Years 1984-1998
for Rice,
Beans,>Com, Sorghum, Bananas, Coffee, Sugar Cane, and Beef.
— »——
Country
Product T* Labor
Machinery Animal F e r t i
T o ta l
Net
Force l i z e r
Cost
Return
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Guatemala
Rice 0 217.08
10.86
227.94
-4 0 .7 4
Rice 1 112.56
0 .0 0
60 .00
10.86
183.42
78.66
Guatemala
60 .00
Rice 2 138.69
0 .0 0
21.72
107.19
220.41
Guatemala
Rice 3
76.38 240.00
0 .0 0
Guatemala
359.82
295.38
4 3 .44
0 .0 0
Rice 4
72 .36 180.00
219.00.
Guatemala
43.44
295.80
Beans 0 201.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
201.00
92.76
Guatemala
0 .0 0
60 .00
Beans 1 156.78
10.86
261,96
Guatemala
227.64
Beans 2 180.90 120.00
0 .0 0
311.76
Guatemala
10.86
300.24
0 .0 0
48 .00
0 .0 0
Corn 0 188.94
236.94
-7 4 .9 4
Guatemala
0 .0 0 144.00
32.58
393.66
Guatemala
Corn 1 217.08
173.34
273.60
20.10 300.00
0 .0 0
54.30
374.40
Guatemala
Corn 2
0 .0 0
60.00
21.72
73.56
Guatemala
Sorghum 0 245.22
326.94
80 .40 198.00
0 .0 0
Guatemala
Sorghum 1
43.44
321.84
198.81
9 .0 0
0 .0 0
86.88
312.96
Guatemala
Bananas 0 217.08
277.54
c o ffe e 0 703.50
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
796.03 2298.71
Guatemala
92.53
c o ffe e 1 458.28
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
65.16
Guatemala
523.44 1586.61
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
156.78
Guatemala
c o ffe e 2 156.78
0 .0 0
546.57

♦Note: T=technology

Continue___
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Table A.I. (Continued)
Country
Product T
c o ffe e
Guatemala
Guatemala sugarcane
Guatemala sugarcane
El_Salvador
Rice
Rice
EIJSalvador
Rice
El_Salvador
Rice
El_Salvador
El__Salvador
Rice
Beans
El_Salvador
Beans
El_Salvador
Beans
El_Salvador
El_Salvador
Corn
Corn
El_Salvador
El_Salvador
Corn
Sorghum
El_Salvador
El_Salvador
Sorghum
El_Salvador
Bananas
c o ffe e
El_Salvador

*Note: T=technology

3
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
0
0

Labor
534.66
120.60
76.38
160.38
83 .16
102.47
56.43
53 .46
148.50
115.83
133.65
139.59
160.38
14.85
181.17
59.40
160.38
519.75

Machinery Animal F e r t i Force l i z e r
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
88 .62
300.00
2 1 .72
0 .0 0
240.00
0 .0 0
21 .72
13.98
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
7 5 .00
13.98
0 .0 0
7 5 .00
2 7 .9 6
320.00
0 .0 0
55 .92
240.00
0 .0 0
55 .92
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
75 .00
13.98
160.00
0 .0 0
13.98
0 .0 0
6 0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 180.00
4 1 .9 4
400.00
69 .9 0
0 .0 0
2 7 .9 6
0 .0 0
75 .00
264.00
0 .0 0
55.92
12.00
0 .0 0 111.84
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 119.11

T o ta l
Cost
623.28
442.32
338.10
174.36
172.14
205.43
432.35
349.38
148.50
204.81
307.63
199.59
382.32
484.75
284.13
379.32
284.22
638.86

Net
Return
2190.12
300.18
269.40
0 .2 4
72 .3 0
100.12
178.75
130.77
244.62
450.39
511.37
-2 4 .9 9
228.78
213.65
39 .87
4 1 .8 8
-2 8 4 .2 2
2453.90

Continue.
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Table A.I. (Continued)________________________________________________________________________
Country
Product T Labor
Machinery Animal F e r t i - T o ta l
Net
Force l i z e r
Cost
Return
c o ffe e 1 338.58
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
83.88
422.46 1686.24
El_Salvador
c o ffe e 2 115.83
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
115.83
El_Salvador
587.07
c o ffe e 3 395.01
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 114.08
509.09 2302.51
El_Salvador
8 9 .10 400.00
0 .0 0
27.96
517.06
El_Salvador sugarcane 0
423.44
5 6 .4 3 320.00
0 .0 0
27.96
404.39
365.11
El_Salvador sugarcane 1
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Honduras
Rice 0 102.06
9 .2 6
57 .88
111.32
Rice 1
52 .92
0 .0 0
7 0 .00
9 .2 6
132.18
Honduras
104.70
Rice 2
65 .2 0
0 .0 0
7 0 .00
Honduras
18.52
153.72
142.38
Rice 3
35.91 320.00
Honduras
0 .0 0
392.95
199.25
37.04
Rice 4
34 .0 2 240.00
0 .0 0
37 .04
311.06
Honduras
154.24
Beans 0
94 .5 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
94 .5 0
Honduras
346.14
Beans 1
7 0 .00
9 .2 6
581.43
Honduras
73.71
0 .0 0
152.97
Beans 2
85 .0 5 160.00
0 .0 0
9 .2 6
Honduras
254.31
663.69
88 .8 3
56 .0 0
0 .0 0
Honduras
Corn 0
0 .0 0
144.83
44 .17
Honduras
0 .0 0 168.00
27 .78
297.84
Corn 1 102.06
363.66
Corn 2
9 .4 5 400.00
0 .0 0
46 .30
455.75
Honduras
300.25
70 .0 0
Honduras
Sorghum 0 115.29
0 .0 0
18.52
203.81
228.19
Honduras
Sorghum 1
3 7 .80 264.00
0 .0 0
37.04
338.84
222.76

*Note: T=technology

Continue...
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Table A .I. (Continued)
Product T
Country

Labor

Honduras
Bananas
c o ffe e
Honduras
c o ffe e
Honduras
c o ffe e
Honduras
c o ffe e
Honduras
Honduras sugarcane
Honduras sugarcane
Rice
Nicaragua
Rice
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Rice
Rice
Nicaragua
Rice
Nicaragua
Beans
Nicaragua
Beans
Nicaragua
Beans
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Corn
Corn
Nicaragua
Corn
Nicaragua

102.06
330.75
215.46
73.71
251.37
5 6 .70
35.91
6 8 .58
3 5 .56
43.81
24.13
2 2 .86
63 .5 0
49 .5 3
57 .15
59 .6 9
68 .58
6 .3 5

*Note: T=technology

0
0
1
2
3
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
0
1
2

Machinery Animal
Force
0 .0 0
12.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
400.00
320.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
3 0 .00
0 .0 0
3 0 .00
200.00
0 .0 0
150.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
30 .0 0
100.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
2 4 .00
0 .0 0
7 2 .00
250.00
0 .0 0

F e r t iliz e r
74.08
78.90
55.56
0 .0 0
75.56
18.52
18.52
11.18
11.18
22.36
44.72
44.72
0 .0 0
11.18
11.18
0 .0 0
33.54
55 .90

T o ta l
Net
CostReturn
188.14 1304.33
409.65 2051.49
271.02 1407.03
73.71
485.64
326.93 1910.47
475.22
173.23
374.4 3
156.12
7 9 .7 6
111.04
7 6 .74
190.38
9 6 .1 7
237.72
268.85
398.95
217.58
307.12
345.82
6 3 .5 0
90.71
591.49
168.33
684.42
8 3 .6 9
69.31
174.12
361.38
312.25
299.75

C ontinue...
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Table A .I. (Continued)
Country
Product T
Nicaragua
Sorghum
Nicaragua
Sorghum
Nicaragua
Bananas
Nicaragua
c o ffe e
Nicaragua
c o ffe e
Nicaragua
c o ffe e
c o ffe e
Nicaragua
Nicaragua sugarcane
Nicaragua sugarcane
Costa_Rica
Rice
Costa_Rica
Rice
Costa_Rica
Rice
Costa_Rica
Rice
Costa_Rica
Rice
Costa_Rica
Beans
Costa_Rica
Beans
Costa_Rica
Beans
*Note: T=technology

0
1
0
0
1
2
3
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2

Labor
77 .47
25 .40
68 .58
222.25
144.78
49 .5 3
168.91
38 .1 0
24 .13
386.10
200.20
246.68
135.85
128.70
357.50
278.85
321.75

Machinery Animal
Force
0 .0 0
3 0 .00
165.00
0 .0 0
7 .5 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
250.00
0 .0 0
200.00
0 .0 0
* 0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
60.00
0 .0 0
6 0 .00
280.00
0 .0 0
210.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
60 .00
140.00
0 .0 0

F e r tiliz e r
2 2 .3 6
4 4 .7 2
89 .44
95 .25
67 .0 8
0 .0 0
9 1 .2 3
2 2 .3 6
2 2 .36
12.92
12.92
25 .84
5 1 .6 8
51 .68
0 .0 0
12.92
12.92

T o ta l
Net
CostReturn
129.83
235.12
165.52
317.50
211.86
49 .53
260.14
310.46
246.49
399.02
273.12
332.51
467.53
390.38
357.50
351.77
474.67

198.67
191.93
139.46
2587.16
1768.59
610.62
2380.46
620.14
514.91
-15 7.8 2
64 .56
89 .59
376.67
272.92
-8 .6 6
229.63
252.08
C o n tin u e ...

00
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Table A.I. (Continued)
Country
Product T
Costa_Rica
Corn
Costa_Rica
Corn
C o s ta jttc a
Corn
Costa_Rica
Sorghum
Costa_Rica
Sorghum
Costa_Rica
Bananas
Costa_Rica
c o ffe e
Costa_Rica
c o ffe e
Costa_Rica
c o ffe e
Costa_Rica
c o ffe e
Costa_Rica sugarcane
Costa_Rica sugarcane
*Note: T=technology

Labor

0 336.05
1 386.10
2
35 .75
0 436.15
1 143.00
0 386.10
0 1251.25
1 815.10
2 278.85
3 950.95
0 214.50
1 135.85

Machinery Animal F e r t i T o ta l
Net
Force l i z e r
CostReturn
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
4 8 .00
384.05 -20 4.0 5
0 .0 0 144.00
568.86
3 8 .7 6
61.14
350.00
0 .0 0
64 .60
450.35
269.65
0 .0 0
60.00
521.99 -52 1.9 9
2 5 .84
231.00
0 .0 0
51 .68
425.68 -42 5.6 8
10.50
0 .0 0 103.36
49 9.9 6
122.98
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 110.08 1361.33 1539.37
0 .0 0
892.62 1085.13
0 .0 0
77.52
380.40
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
278.85
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 105.43 1056.38 1580.62
350.00
0 .0 0
2 5 .84
590.34
444.21
404.76
280.00
0 .0 0
25 .84
44 1.6 9
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Table A2.
Product/
Input

Production functions Parameter Estimates, Costa Rica, 1984- .998
Estimate

Std. Error

P-Vahie

Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Beans

Rice
Capital

0.009

0.128

0.946

-0.049

0.054

0.383

Labor

0.471

0.108

0 .0 0 1

0.698

0.123

0 .0 0 0

Fertilizer

0.173

0.106

0.131

0.306

0.108

0.016

Constant

-4.849

1.250

0.003

-9.043

1.493

0 .0 0 0

R-Square

0.891

0.832
Sorghum

Com
Capital

-0.150

0.099

0.159

0.169

0.152

0.316

Labor

0.617

0.173

0.004

0.219

0.116

0.119

Fertilizer

0.378

0.153

0.031

0.543

0.127

0.008

Constant

-7.964

1.158

0 .0 0 0

-7.704

0.542

0 .0 0 0

R-Square

0.998

0.961
Coffee

Bananas
Capital

0.453

0.106

0 .0 0 1

0.118'

0.072

0.132

Labor

0.068

0.089

0.460

0.135

0.084

0.134

Fertilizer

0 .2 1 0

0.095

0.049

0.143

0.084

0.114

Constant

-6.288

1.098

0 .0 0 0

-0.996

2.219

0.662
0.376

0.915

R-Square
Sugar Cane

Beef

Capital

0.340

0.073

0 .0 0 1

1.163

0.098

0 .0 0 0

Labor

-0.098

0.091

0.305

0.213

0.188

0.280

Fertilizer

0.173

0.108

0.136

*-0.167

0.236

0.493

Constant

-0.124

1.613

0.940

-12.907

3.586

0.004

R-Square
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)

0.697
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Table A3.
Product/
Input

Production Functions Parameter Estimates, El SalLvador, 1984-1998
Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Estimate

Rice

Std. Error

P-Value

Beans

Capital

0.183

0.056

0.008

0.083

0.057

0.171

Labor

0.789

0.109

0 .0 0 0

0231

0.163

0.184

Fertilizer

-0.034

0.152

0.826

0.171

0.147

0267

Constant

-8.988

1.333

0 .0 0 0

-2.025

2.258

0.389

R-Square

0.911

0.521

Com

Sorghum

Capital

0.444

0.075

0.565

-0.005

0.045

0.918

Labor

0.083

0 .1 0 2

0.436

0.038

0.119

0.753

Fertilizer

0.166

0.141

0.265

0 .1 2 1

0.085

0.183

Constant

1.508

2.737

0.593

2.721

2 .0 2 2

0.206

R-Square

0.167

0.183
Bananas

Coffee

Capital

—

--

—

-0.024

0.018

0.215

Labor

—

—

—

0.116

0.039

0.014

Fertilizer

—

—

—

0.035

0.044

0.447

Constant

—

—

—

3.010

1.028

0.014

—

R-Square

0.479

Sugar Cane

Beef

Capital

0.192

0.105

0.095

0.788

0.091

0 .0 0 0

Labor

0.374

0.077

0 .0 0 1

-0.331

0.106

0 .0 1 0

Fertilizer

0.273

0.106

0.026

*-0.805

0.188

0 .0 0 1

Constant

-6.310

0.854

0 .0 0 0

3.433

2.319

0.167

R-Square
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)

0.940

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

0.911

191
Table A4.
Product/
Input

Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Guatemala, 1984-1998
Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Estimate

Rice

Std. Error

P-Value

Beans

Capital

0.070

0.032

0.049

0.070

0.123

0.581

Labor

0.400

0.109

0.004

0.589

0.082

0 .0 0 0

Fertilizer

0.373

0.138

0 .0 2 1

0 .0 2 2

0.097

0.825

Constant

-7.176

1.144

0 .0 0 0

-5.410

1.738

0 .0 1 0

R-Square

0.907

0.878
Sorghum

Com
Capital

-0.195

0.146

0.205

-0.105

0.151

0.500

Labor

0.193

0.129

0.162

0 .2 0 2

0.153

0 .2 1 2

Fertilizer

0.017

0 .1 1 0

0.872

0.647

0.180

0.004

Constant

5.541

3.729

0.165

-5.658

2 .2 1 0

0.027
0.712

0.263

R-Square

Coffee

Bananas
Capital

0.357

0.107

0.006

0 .0 0 1

0.036

0.979

Labor

0.098

0.131

0.470

0.087

0.082

0.309

Fertilizer

0 .1 1 0

0 .1 0 2

0.305

0.131

0.089

0.170

Constant

-4.634

1.146

0 .0 0 2

2.180

1.923

0.281
0.269

0.850

R-Square

Beef

Sugar Cane
Capital

0.341

0.091

0.003

0.939

0.034

0 .0 0 0

Labor

0.176

0.097

0.097

0.036

0.081

0.660

Fertilizer

0.213

0.143

0.165

*0240

0.162

0.167

Constant

-4.003

1.622

0.031

-9.223

1282

0 .0 0 0

R-Square
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)

0.931
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Table AS.
Product/
Input

Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Hone uras, 1984-1998
Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Beans

Rice
Capital

0.023

0.080

0.782

-0 . 0 1 1

0.131

0.934

Labor

0.726

0 .2 0 2

0.004

0.162

0.157

0.323

Fertilizer

0.064

0.191

0.743

0.127

0.140

0.384

Constant

-7.57

0.904

0 .0 0 0

0.699

2.876

0.812

R-Square

0.194

0.9243
Sorghum

Com
Capital

0.168

0.047

0.005

0.186

0.073

0.027

Labor

-0.026

0.096

0.788

0.213

0 .0 1 0

0.55

Fertilizer

0.253

0.072

0.005

0.243

0.105

0.041

Constant

0.964

1.388

0.502

-3.793

1.466

0.025

R-Square

0.789

0.830
Coffee

Bananas
Capital

-0 . 0 1 2

0.030

0.706

0.092

0.071

0.219

Labor

0.053

0.029

0.099

0.669

0.155

0 .0 0 1

Fertilizer

-0.026

0.036

0.489

0.172

0.130

0.213

Constant

2.809

0.679

0 .0 0 2

-9.756

2.570

0.003
0.779

0.273

R-Square

Beef

SugarCane
Capital

0.058

0.031

0.088

0.006

0.003

0 .0 0 0

Labor

0.124

0.040

0 .0 1 1

0 .0 0 1

0.004

0 .0 2 2

Fertilizer

-0.018

0.083

0.835

*0.032

0 .0 2 1

0.147

Constant

1.716

1.025

0 .1 2 2

0.741

1.563

0.645

R-Square
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)

0.523
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Table A6.
Product/
Input

Production Functions Parameter Estimates, Nicaragua, 1984-1998
Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Estimate

Std. Error

P-Value

Beans

Rice
-0.031

0.050

0.554

-0.016

0.044

0.721

LaboiO.699

0.185

0.185

0.003

0.241

0.176

0.197

Fertilizer

0.213

0 .1 1 1

0.080

0.407

0.177

0.042

Constant

-8.165

1.641

0 .0 0 0

-3.498

1.859

0.087

Capital

R-Square

0.694

0.864
Sorghum

Com
Capital

-0.069

0.051

0 .2 0 0

-0.025

0.065

0.711

Labor

0.187

0.231

0.435

0.601

0.165

0.004

Fertilizer

0.247

0.172

0.179

0.377

0.161

0.040

Constant

-0.128

3.854

0.974

-9.063

1.139

0 .0 0 0

0.925

0.291

R-Square
Bananas

Coffee

Capital

0 .1 0 1

0.089

0.280

0.107

0.047

0.042

Labor

0.103

0.060

0 .1 1 2

0 .1 2 2

0.091

0.206

Fertilizer

0.344

0.089

0.003

0.088

0.114

0.455

Constant

-4.908

1.132

0 .0 0 1

-0.041

1.820

0.982

R-Square

0.557

0.818
Beef

Sugar Cane
Capital

0.086

0.044

0.076

0.946

0.133

0 .0 0 1

Labor

0.356

0.090

0 .0 0 2

0.209

0.275

0.482

Fertilizer

0.078

0.056

0.193

*0.335

0.399

0.440

Constant

-2.873

1.141

0.029

-12.163

5.684

0.085

R-Square
*: Parameter estimate for cattle stock (H)

0.766
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Table A.7.

AIDS ParameterEstimates for Costa Rica, 1984-1998.

Estimate! Std. Error |P-value
Estimate | Std. Error iP-value Product
Beans
Rice
-0.054
0310 0.805
Rice
0.645
0.371 0.125 Rice
0.092
0.055 0.139
Beans
-0.105
0.097 0315 Beans
-0.014
0.133 0.920
-0.115
0.234 0.638 Com
Com
-0.025
0.060 0.683
Sorghum
-0.150
0.105
0.197 Sorghum
0.067 0.965
-0.003
0.119 0.257 Beef
Beef
-0.147
0.007 0.911
0 .0 1 2
0.860 Expenditure -0 . 0 0 1
Expenditure
0 .0 0 2
0.158 0.856
0.030
Constant
0.470
0.279 0.136 Constant
R-Square
0.496
0.562
R-Square
Sorghum
Com
-0.008
0.009 0.397
Rice
-0.209
0.085
0.043 Rice
0 .0 0 2
0.874
-0.000
0.274
Beans
0 .0 2 2
Beans
0.026
0.005 0.900
-0 . 0 0 1
0.054 0.127 Com
Com
0.093
0 .0 0 2
0.084
0.005
Sorghum
0 .0 1 2
0.024 0.622 Sorghum
0.003 0.272
0.003
Beef
0.053
0.027 0.094 Beef
0.000 0.093
0.643 Expenditure 0 . 0 0 1
0.003
Expenditure -0 . 0 0 1
0.006 0.992
-0.000
0.064 0.662 Constant
Constant
-0.029
0.696
R-Square
R-Square
0.562
Bananas
Beef
0.079 0.298
0.087
Rice
-0.535
3.115 0 . 8 6 8 Bananas
-0.017
0.019 0.378
0.968
Coffee
Beans
-0.034
0.815
0.090 0.307
-0.097
1.969 0.275 Sugar
Com
-2.332
0.007 0.772
1.115
0.885 0348 Expenditure -0 . 0 0 2
Sorghum
0.178
0.031 0.000
0.153 Constant
0.999
Beef
1.599
0.470
0.476 R-square
0 .1 0 0
Constant
-0.075
2.345
0.399 >
Expenditure
-2.107
<
>
<
> <
S x r
R-Square
0.540
Sugar
Coffee
0.173 0.621
0.089
0.000 Bananas
0.025
Coffee
0.138
-0.082
0.041 0.076
Coffee
0.117
0.093
Sugar
-0.160
0.197 0.903
-0.025
-0.028
0.069 0.691 Sugar
Beef
0.015 0.974
0
.
0
0
1
0.330 Expenditure
Expenditure -0.009
0.009
0.069 0.000
0.449
0.471 Constant
0.159
Constant
0.119
0.453
R-square
0.772
R-square

Product
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Table A.8.

AIDS ParameterEstimates for El Salvador, 1984-1998.

Estimate jStd. Error |P-value
Estimate | Std. Error |P-value Product
Beans
Rice
0.082 0.556
Rice
0.028 0.075 Rice
-0.051
0.058
0.046 0.008
0.170
Beans
0.005
0.016 0.781 Beans
-0.148
0 .1 2 1
0.258
Com
-0.078
0.041
0.095 Com
Sorghum
0.136
0.835
0.046 0.573 Sorghum
-0.029
-0.027
-0.007
0.043 0.883
Beef
0.014
0.015 0.356 Beef
0.042 0.613
Expenditure
-0 . 0 2 1
0.014 0.177 Expenditure -0 . 0 2 2
0 .2 2 1
0.643
Constant
0.104
0.074 0.205 Constant
0.107
R-Square
0.730
R-Square
0.620
Sorghum
Com
0.040 0.360
0.085 0.606 Rice
0.039
Rice
0.046
-0.038
0.023 0.141
-0.140
0.048
0 . 0 2 2 Beans
Beans
0.059 0.400
-0.053
Com
0.185
0.125 0.183 Com
0.067 0.911
0.008
Sorghum
0.040
0.142 0.788 Sorghum
0 .0 2 1
0.313
0.045
0.845 Beef
0.023
Beef
-0.009
0 .0 2 1
0.715
0.091
0.044 0.076 Expenditure -0.008
Expenditure
0.109 0.307
0 .1 2 0
Constant
0.197
0.229 0.417 Constant
R-Square
R-Square
0.515
0.630
Bananas
Beef
0.089 0 . 2 1 2
0 .1 2 0
0.018
0.128 0.890 Bananas
Rice
0.050 0.711
0.019
0.072 0.426 Coffee
Beans
-0.061
0.136 0.272
-0.159
-0 . 1 11
0.189 0.577 Sugar
Com
0.031 0.440
0.214 0.687 Expenditure -0.025
Sorghum
0.090
0.204 0.640
0.099
0.188
0.068 0.028 Constant
Beef
0.413
Constant
0.093
0.066 0 . 2 0 2 R-square
0.346 0.193 >
Expenditure
-0.498
<
> <
>
<
> <
R-Square
0.775
s <
> <
Sugar
Coffee
0.082 0.497
-0.058
0.069
0 .0 2 2
0.013 Bananas
Coffee
-0.074
0.046 0.142
-0.041
0.057 0.497 Coffee
Sugar
0.125 0.242
0.156
-0.026
0.026 0.340 Sugar
Beef
0.028 0.687
0
.
0
1
2
0.394
Expenditure
-0.017
0.019
Expenditure
0.326
0.187 0.114
0.063
0.125 0.624 Constant
Constant
R-square
0.488
R-square
0.810

Product
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Table A.9.

AIDS Parameter Estimates for Guatemala, 1984-1998.

Estimate! Std. Error P-value
Estimate | Std. Error |P-value Product
Beans
Rice
0 .0 2 2
0.228
-0.029
0.041
0.013
0.018 Rice
Rice
0.008
0.089 0.935
0.054 0.902 Beans
Beans
-0.007
-0.055
0.060 0.387
-0.044
Com
0.036 0.258 Com
0 .1 0 2
0.742
0.035
0.894 Sorghum
0.061
Sorghum
0.008
0.029 0.328
0.031
-0 . 0 0 2
0.018 0.918 Beef
Beef
0.039 0.745
Expenditure
-0.013
0.024
0.900
Expenditure
-0.003
0.239 0.557
0.148
0.144 0.727 Constant
Constant
0.052
R-Square
0.470
R-Square
0.650
Sorghum
Com
0.684
0 .0 0 1
0 .0 0 1
0.062
0.048 0.232 Rice
Rice
0.005 0.611
-0.003
0.054
0.195 0.788 Beans
Beans
-0.004
0.003 0.308
0.864 Com
0.131
Com
-0.023
0.006 0.257
0.007
0 .2 2 2
0.689 Sorghum
Sorghum
-0.092
0.390
0 .0 0 2
-0 . 0 0 1
0.064 0.691 Beef
0.026
Beef
0
.
0
0
2
0.328
Expenditure
0
.
0
0
2
0294
0.097
0.086
Expenditure
0.013 0.119
0.974 Constant
0.023
Constant
-0.018
0.521
R-Square
0.340
0.430
R-Square
Bananas
Beef
0.007 0.063
0.015
0.084
0.039 0.066 Bananas
Rice
0.006 0.586
0.003
-0.372
0.158 0.051 Coffee
Beans
-0.027
0.013 0.065
0.106 0.064 Sugar
-0.233
Com
0.008 0.856
0.180 0.144 Expenditure -0 . 0 0 1
Sorghum
0.296
0.045 0.732
0.016
0.052 0.018 Constant
0.159
Beef
0.520
0.069 0.588 R-square
Constant
-0.039
0.501
0.422 0274
Expenditure
>
<
R-Square
0.820
s<
Sugar
Coffee
0.045 0.007
-0.155
0.060
0.015 0.003 Bananas
Coffee
0.036 0292
-0.040
0.031
0.325 Coffee
-0.032
Sugar
0.081 0.050
0.184
0 . 0 1 1 Sugar
-0.034
0 .0 1 1
Beef
0.050 -0.694
0 .0 2 2
0.290 Expenditure -0 . 0 2 0
Expenditure -0.025
0.288 0.166
0.434
0.134 0.489 Constant
Constant
0.097
0.620
R-square
0.850
R-square

Product
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Table A.10.

AIDS Parameter Estimates for Honduras, 1984-1998.

Estimatel Std. Error |P-value
Estim ate!Std. Error | P-value Product
Beans
Rice
0.009 0.075
-0.018
0.012
0.063 Rice
Rice
0.026
0.025 0.109
-0.047
0.034
0.136 Beans
Beans
-0.058
0.004 0 . 0 0 0
-0.030
0.006
0.001 Com
Com
-0.031
0.084
0.023 0.009
0.102 Sorghum
Sorghum
0.059
0.032
0.008 0.879
0.001
0.512 Beef
Beef
-0.007
0.011
0.006 0.009
0.009
0.045 Expenditure -0.023
Expenditure
-0.021
0.036 0.002
0.169
0.049
0.009 Constant
Constant
0.177
R-Square
0.910
R-Square
0.944
Sorghum
Com
0.001 0.014
-0.005
0.041 Rice
Rice
0.166
0.066
0.004 0.037
-0.011
0.196
0.045 Beans
Beans
0.477
0.001 0 . 0 0 0
-0.006
0.032
0.001 Com
Com
0.176
0.004 0.002
0.019
0.005 Sorghum
Sorghum
-0.736
0.180
0.001 0.226
0.002
0.060
0.187 Beef
Beef
-0.088
0.001 0.004
0.036 Expenditure -0.005
Expenditure
0.129
0.050
0.006 0.001
0.634 Constant
0.031
0279
Constant
0.139
R-Square
0.953
R-Square
0.917
Bananas
Beef
0.125 0.017
0.364
0.958 Bananas
0.100
Rice
0.005
0.109 0.934
-0.009
02 97
0.572 Coffee
Beans
-0.176
0.107 0.091
-0 2 0 2
0.044 Sugar
Com
-0.120
0.049
0.161 0.374
Sorghum
0.104
0 27 2
0.713 Expenditure 0.151
0.639 0.284
-0.728
Beef
0.073 Constant
0.191
0.091
0.594
0.872 R-square
Constant
0.013
0.076
-0.224
0.422
0.612 >
Expenditure
<
>
<
> <
R-Square
0.757
s < *
>
<
Sugar
Coffee
Bananas
0.023 0.051
-0.051
0.037
0.448
Coffee
0.029
0.020 0.175
-0.029
0.806 Coffee
Sugar
0.014
0.053
0.096
0.019 0.001
0.625 Sugar
Beef
-0.028
0.055
0.029 0.352
0.866 Expenditure -0.029
0.047
Expenditure
0.008
0.117 0.017
0.340
0.855 Constant
Constant
0.057
0.302
0.878
R-square
R-square
0 28 8

Product
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Table A.ll.

AIDS ParameterEstimates for Nicaragua, 1984-1998.

Estimate Std. Error | P-value Product
Estimatel Std. Error | P-value
Rice
Beans
Rice
0.042
0.004 Rice
-0.023
0.029 0.450
0.179
0.034
0.030 Beans
0.193
0.024 0 . 0 0 0
Beans
-0.093
-0.111
0.034 0.015
Com
-0.001
0.049
0.981 Com
0.014
0.365 Sorghum
0.016
0.010 0.144
Sorghum
-0.013
0.116 Beef
-0.008
0.136 0.954
Beef
0.349
0.195
0.010
0.396
Expenditure
-0.018
0.007
0.043
Expenditure
0.009
-0.263
Constant
1.534
0.114 Constant
1.076 0.814
-2.772
R-Square
R-Square
0.922
0.816
Com
Sorghum
0.164 Rice
0.006
0.006 0.326
Rice
-0.059
0.038
Beans
0.426 Beans
-0.002
0.005 0.608
-0.026
0.031
-0.001
0.007 0.843
Com
0.137
0.044
0.018 Com
0.004
0.002 0.054
Sorghum
0.016
0.012
0.237 Sorghum
0.632 Beef
0.009
0.026 0.753
Beef
-0.088
0.176
0.974 Expenditure -0.001
0.001 0.668
Expenditure
0 .0 0 0
0.009
-0.075
0.209 0.731
0.612
1.387
0.672 Constant
Constant
R-Square
0.675
R-Square
0.868
Bananas
Beef
0.093
0.036 0.031
0.106 Bananas
Rice
-0.168
0.091
0.168 Coffee
-0.028
0.020 0.196
Beans
-0.114
0.074
0.351 Sugar
0.045
0.034 0.224
Com
-0.107
0.107
0.460 Expenditure -0.004
0.004 0.296
Sorghum
0.030
0.023
-0.467
0.248 0.093
Beef
-0.457
0.424
0.316 Constant
0.551
0.020
0.022
0.391 R-square
Constant
0.122 >
5.878
3.340
Expenditure
<
>
<
> <
R-Square
0.862
>
<
> <
Sugar
Coffee
0.025 Bananas
0.283
0.146 0.084
Coffee
0200
0.075
-0.142
0.080 0 . 1 1 1
Sugar
0.324
0.191
0.124 Coffee
0.294
0.142 Sugar
0255
0.138 0.098
Beef
0.473
0.016 0.444
Expenditure -0.041
0.017
0.041 Expenditure -0.013
-1.552
1 .0 0 0
0.155
0.088 Constant
Constant
-6.493
3398
0.400
R-square
0.534
R-square

Product
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Table A. 12.

Demand Elasticities, Central American and Caribbean Countries

o
©
o

Product Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice
-0.65
0.0G
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
O.OC
Beans
-0.30
0.00
0 .0 0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.0(
0 .0 0
Com
0.05
0 .0 0
-0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.0(
Sorghum
0.00
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
-0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
o.oc
Bananas
0.00
0 .0 0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.40
0.0(
Coffee
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.40
0.00
0.0(
0.00
Sugar
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.30
0.0(
0.00
Beef
0.00
0 .0 0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 -0.8(
0.00
Source: E aborated from Gardiner et al (1989)

Table A.13. Sup ply Elasticities, Central American and Caribbean Countries
Product Rice
Beans Com Sorghum Bananas Coffee Sugar Beef
Rice
0.58
0 .0 0
-0.03
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
O.OC
Beans
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.28
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
O.OC
-0.04
Com
0 .0 0
0 .2 2
-0 .0 1
O.OC
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
Sorghum
-0.04
028
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
O.OC
-0.05
0 .0 0
Bananas
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.40
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
O.OC
Coffee
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.40
0 .0 0
O.OC
Sugar
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.30
O.OC
Beef
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0.4C
Source: E aborated from Gardiner et al (1989)
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APPENDIX B: C CODE TO ESTIMATE COSTS OF PRODUCTION AND
EXPECTED NET RETURNS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR
THE YEARS 1984-1998 FOR RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS,
COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF.
ffinclude <stdio.h>
#include <math.h>
ffdefine INPUTS 4
in t main()

{
FILE *outp;
outp=fopen(*a:costs.out*, "w*);
double w l[51[71[ 5 ] ,w o[5][7][51 |Wm[5][7 1 [5 J ,w f[ 5 ] [ 7 } [5J;
double wage[ 4 ] [5 ] °
{{4 .0 2 ,2 .9 7 ,1 .8 9 ,1 .2 7 ,7 .1 5 },
{1 2 ,1 5 ,1 4 ,6 ,1 2 },
{3 0 ,4 0 ,4 0 ,2 5 ,3 5 },
{1 0 .8 6 ,1 3 .9 8 ,9 .2 6 ,1 1 .1 8 ,1 2 .9 2 }};
double p ric e (5 ][7 }=
{{1 0 .4 ,2 7 .2 ,9 .0 ,8 .9 ,9 .1 ,1 5 6 .3 ,1 5 },
{9 .7 ,3 6 .4 ,9 .7 ,7 .2 ,0 ,1 5 6 .2 ,1 9 .0 } ,
{9 .4 ,4 0 .8 ,1 0 .5 ,9 .6 ,2 3 .0 ,1 2 4 .3 ,1 3 .1 },
{ 1 0 .6 ,3 7 .9 ,8 .5 ,7 .3 ,4 .7 ,1 4 6 .7 ,1 8 .8 },
{1 3 .4 ,3 2 .3 ,1 0 .0 ,0 ,9 .6 ,1 4 6 .5 ,2 0 .9 }} ;
double ric e _ te c h [5 ][ 5 ]“ {{2 0 ,2 8 ,3 5 ,7 0 ,5 5 },{5 4 ,2 8 ,3 4 .5 ,1 9 ,1 8 },
{ 0 ,5 ^ 5 ,0 ,0 } ,{ 0 ,0 ,0 ,8 ,6 } ,{ 1 ,1 ,2 ,4 ,4 } } ;
double b e a n _ te c h [5 ][3 ]» {{1 2 ,2 0 ,2 5 },{5 0 ,3 9 ,4 5 },{0 ,5 ,0 },{ 0 ,0 ,4 } ,{ 0 ,1 ,1 } } ;
double corn_tech[5][31*{{20,7 0 ,8 0 } ,{ 4 7 ,5 4 ,5 } ,{ 4 ,1 2 ,0 } ,{ 0 ,0 ,1 0 } ,{ 0 ,3 ,5 } } ;
double sorghum_tech[ 5 ] [ 2 ] * { { 5 0 ,6 5 ,} ,{ 6 1 ,2 0 } ,{ 5 ,0 } ,{ 0 ,6 .6 } ,{ 2 ,4 } } ;
double banana_tech[5 ]= {7 2 .1 ,5 4 ,0 ,0 .3 ,8 };
double c o ffe e ~ te c h [5 l[4 l» {{2 2 ,1 5 ,5 ,2 0 },{1 7 5 ,1 1 4 ,3 9 ,1 3 3 },{0 ,0 ,0 ,0 },{0 ,0 ,0 ,0 },
{8 .5 2 ,6 ,0 ,8 .1 6 }};
double 8ugar_tech[5J[2J={{55,45},{30,1 9 } ,{ 0 ,0 } ,{ 1 0 ,8 } ,{ 2 ,2 } } ;
double a re a [7 ][5 ]= {{1 8 .8 9 ,1 2 .5 ,1 5 .4 8 ,8 2 .2 2 ,9 1 .8 7 },{1 7 6 .9 3 ,8 9 .6 ,1 1 2 .0 4 ,2 0 6 .9 ,
5 4 .0 },{8 3 6 .3 8 ,3 5 5 ,6 3 4 .7 4 ,3 2 5 .1 8 ,2 4 .1 4 },{6 0 .1 ,1 4 4 .7 ,1 1 6 .9 ,3 1 .0 ,0 }, {24.14,
0 ,3 1 .8 1 ,2 .5 6 ,7 2 .8 5 },{3 8 7 .7 ,2 3 2 .7 ,2 8 4 ,1 2 6 .3 8 ,1 5 0 .2 },
{1 1 6 .4 ,1 1 5 ,6 3 .9 ,6 5 .3 ,6 9 .6 }};
char co u n trie s[5][15 l={'G u ate aa la*, ’ El_Salvador’ , ’ Honduras', ’ Nicaragua’ ,
*Costa_Rica’ };
char
p ro d u c ts [7 I[l0 l= { ’ R ice’ ,
’ Beans’ , ’ C o rn *,’ Sorghum’ ,
’ Bananas’ ,
•co ffee • , • sugarcane’ };
in t technology;
/•S ta rtin g the loop fo r the set of countries * /
in t i* 0 ;
fo r (i* 0 ; i< 5 ;+ + i)

{
/•S ta rtin g the loop fo r the set of products • /
in t J*0;
fo r (j* 0 ; j< 7 ;+ + j)

{
/•S ta rtin g the loop f o r the set o f technologies * /
if(j» 0 )
technology=5;
else
i f ( i “ i)
technology=3;
else
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if(j= * 2 )
technology^;
else
i f f j “ 3)
technology^;
else
if ( j = * 4 )
technology^;
else
if (j~ 5 )
technology^;
else
technology*2;
in t k=0;
fo r ( k=0; k<technology; ++k)

{
double cost=0, total_cost=0, oxen1=0, nach=0, fe rt= 0 ,
labor1«0, net_return=0;
if(i-O )

{
in t «=0;
fo r(« »0 ; «<INPUTS; ++■)

{
cost«w age[o][i]*rice_tech[«+1] [ k ] ;
total_cost=total_co8t+cost;
i f ( b==0)

{
lab o r!-co st;
wX[±][ j ] [k ]= la b o r1 *a re a [j] [ i ] ;

}
else
if ( a * = l )

{
oxen1»cost;
wo[ i 1131[ kJ*oxen1*area[j] [ i ] ;

>
else
i f (H“ 2)

{
nach«co8t;
w « [ il[ j ) [k]« a a c h *a re a [j] [ i ] ;

>
else

{
fert»c o st;
« r f [ i] t 31[ k ] » f e r t* a r e a [ j] t i l ;

>
> /‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
n et_retu rn *rice_tech [01[kl».9‘ p r ic e [ i] [jl-t o t a l_ c o s t;
f pr i n t f (outp, ’%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2 f %9. 2f%9. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2f%11. 2 f \ n' , count
r i e s [ i ] , products! j ] , k, labor! ,aach,
oxenl ,fe rt,to ta l_ c o s t,n e t_ re tu rn ,w l[i] [ j ] [k j ,w o [i] [11t*0 i*"»[i] [ j 1[k j , w f [ il [ j 1[ k ] );
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>

else

{
in t r»o ;
for(ii=0; n<INPUTS; ++■)

{
cost=wage[m][i]*bean_tech[n+11[ k ] ;
printf(*% 8.2f% 8. 2f%e72f\n *,
w age(n][ij,bean_tech[*+1] [ k ] ,c o s t);
total_cost=total_cost+cost;
i f ( b= 0 )

{
labor1=cost;
w l [ i ] [ j ] [ k ]= la b o rl*a re a [j J[ i ) ;
>

else
if(« = = 1)

{
oxen1=cost;
w o[l] [ j ] [4-]«oxen1 *area[ j 1[ i ] ;
>

else
if(m==2)

{
nach»cost;
wn>I i ] [ j ) [k]=nach*area[ j ] [ i ] ;
>

else

{
fert= c o st;
w f[il[jl[k ]« fe r t* a r e a [j]ti];
>

} / ‘ closing the loop f o r the set of inputs * /
net_return=bean_tech( 0 ] [ k ] * .9 * p r ic e [ i] [ j ) -to tal_co st;
f p r in tf ( outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%9. 2f %11. 2f %11. 2f %11. 2 f %11 .2 f\n * , count
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j ] , k , la b o r1 ,nach,
oxenl ,fe rt,to ta l_ c o s t,n e t_ re tu rn Iw l [ i l I j J[k] ,w o[i] [ j ] [k] ,wm[i) [ j J[k] ,wf ( i l [ j ] [ k ] );
>

else
if(j= = 2 )

{
in t r=0;
for(B=0; n<INPUTS; ♦+*)

{
cost=wage[a][i]*corn_tech[B+1] [ k ] ;
total_cost=total_cost+cost;
i f (« = 0 )

{
labor1»cost;
w l( i] ( j 1(k l* la b o r1 * a r e a [j] [ i ] ;

}
else
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if(« = * 1 )

{
oxen1=cost;
w o [iI lil[k ]= o x e n 1 * a r e a ( jI[ ilI
>

else
if ( « * * 2 )

{
aach=cost;
w » [ i][ j] [lc ] -a a c h * a r e a [j][ ii;

>
else

{
fe rt= c o st;
w f [i] [ jj[k ]» fe r t* a r e a [j][i];

>
} / 'c lo s in g the loop fo r the set of inputs * /

net_return=corn_tech[ 0 ] [ k ] * .9 * p r ic e [ i] [j] - to t a l_ c o s t ;
fp r in tf(o u tp , *%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%9. 2f%11 .2f%11 .2f%11 .2f%11 .2 f \n • , count
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j ] , k, labor4,aach,
o x e n l,f e r t ,t o t a l_ c o s t , n e t _ r e t u r n ,w l[ i] [ j] t k ] ,w o [ iJ I j] [ k ] ,« n [ i ] [ j] [ k ] , w f [ i) [ j] [ k ] ) ;

>
else
i f (J“ 3)

{
in t b*0 ;
fo r(a » 0 j «<INPUTS; ++b )

{

cost=wage[n] (il»sorghUB_tech[B+l ] [ k ] ;
total_cost*total_cost+cost;
if(a = = 0 )

{
laborl=cost;
w l [ i l t j ] [ k ] 3labor1 *area[ j ] [ i j ;
>

else
if (B “ 1)

{
oxen1»cost;
* o [ i ] t j 1[kl» o x e n 1 *a re a [j1 1 i);

>
else
if (B “ 2)

{
nach>cost;
* » [ i ] t j 1tkl»«ach*areat j ] [ i ] ;

>
else

{
fe rt*c o s t;
w ftijtjJ [k l= fe r t* a r e a [j]til;
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>
> /‘ closing the loop f o r the set o f inputs * /
net_return=>sorghu«_tech[0] [ kl • .9 *p ric e [ i ] [ j 1-to tal_ c o s t j
f p r in tf (outp, ■%12s%10s%3<!%8.2f%8.2f%8.2f%8.2f%9.2f%9.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11,2f%11.2f\n*, count
r ie s [ i ] , products[ j 1 ,k , la b o r l, each,
o x e n 1 ,fe rt,to ta l_ c o s tl net_return)w l [ i l [ J ] [ k ] , w o [ i ] [ j l [ k J >w » [ i l [ j l [ k l >w f [ i ] l j l [ k ] ) ;
>

else
if (j* » 4 )

{
in t a=0;
for(ra=0; ■<1NPUTS; ++m)

{
cost=wage[e] [ i ] *banana_tech[B+1 ];
total_co st*to tal_co st+co st;
i f (B“ 0)

{
laborl»cost;
w l ( i ] ( j ] [ k ]* la b o r l‘ area[ j l [ i ];

}
else
if(B “ 1)

{
oxen1>cost;
w o [ i l I j ] (kl« o xe n 1*a re a(j] [ i ) ;
>

else
if { « " 2 )

{
aach*cost;
« « (iltjl(k J * B a c h * a r e a (jJ (iJ ;
>

else

{
fe rt*c o s t;
w f [ i ] [ j ] [ k ] * f e r t * a r e a [ j] £ ± ];
>

} / ‘ closing the loop f o r the set of inputs * /

net_return»banana_tech[0]* .9 » p r ic e [i] [ j ] -to ta ljc o s t;
f p r in t f (outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8.2f<W.2f%8.2fW.2f%9.2f%9.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11.2f%11.2f\n‘ .count
r ie s [i ] , products[j] , k , la b o r l, each,
o x e n l,f e r t,t o ta l_ c o s t,n e t _ r e tu r n ,w l[ i][ ] ][ k ] ,w o [ i] [j][ k ] ,« « [ ! ) [ j ] [ k ] , w f [ i ] [ j ] [ k ] ) ;

}/*c lo s in g i f s ta te a e n t*/
else
i t ( i “ 5)

{
in t a*0;
for(a=>0; «<INPUTS; ++a)
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{
cost*w ag e[a][il*co ffee_tech [m + 1j[k];
to tal_co st«to tal_co st+co st;
i f (**= 0 )

{
lab orl ~cost;
w l [ i ] [ j 1[k ]= la b o r1 *a re a [j] [ i l j
>

else
i f ( b®»1)

{
oxen1=cost;
wo[ i ] [ j 1[k]*o x en 1 *are a [j] [ i ] ;
>

else
if(m==2)

{
nach=cost;
w n [ i l t j 1[k]=n ac h *a rea [j] [ i ] ;
>

else

{
fe rt*c o s t;
w f[i][j][k l« fe r t* a r e a [j)[il;
>

} / ‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
n e t_ re tu rn « c o ffe e _ te c h [0 1 [k j*.9 *p ric e [i][ j 1-to tal_ c o s t;
f p r in tf (outp, *%12s%10s%3d%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%
9 . 2 f%1 1 . 2 f%1 1 . 2 f%1 1 . 2 f%1 1 . 2 f \ n , ,c o u n trie s [i].p ro d u c ts !jJ ,k ,la b o rl,« a c h ,o x e n 1 ,fe rt,to ta l_
c o s t,n e t_ re tu rn ,w l[il [ j H k l ,w o [il[ j l [ k l ,wm[il [ j l [k] ,w f [ iH j l [ k l ) ;
} / ‘ closing i f statement * /
else

{
in t m=0;
for(a»0; m<INPUTSj ++m)

{
cost«wage[m][i]*sugar_tech[n+l ] [ k ] ;
to ta l_c o st*to ta l_c o st+ c o st;
if(m »*0)

{
la b o rl*c o s t;
w l[ i] [ j] [ k ] = l a b o r l* a r e a [ j] [ i ] ;

}
else
if(B « *1 )

{
oxem=cost;
w o [iJ [il[k ]= o x e n l*a re a [jJ [iJ ;

}
else
i f (m »2)

{
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uch«cost;

w*[ilt JI[kl«rach*area[j][i ] ;
>

else

{
fert= c o st;
w f(illjl(k j» fe r t* a r e a [j][i];

}
} / ‘ closing the loop fo r the set of inputs * /
n et_ re tu rn » s u g a r_ te c h [0 ][k ]*.9 *p ric e [il[ j ] -to tal_ c o s t;
f p r in tf ( OUtp t * %12S%10S%3<«8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%8. 2f%9. 2f%
9.2f% 11.2f% t1.2f% 11.2f% 11.2fVn*(Countries[i],produets[j] , k ,la b o r1,n a c h ,o x e n 1 ,fe rt,to ta l_
c o s t ,n e t _ r e t u r n , w l[ i] [ j] [ k ] ,w o [ ilt j] [ k l,w a ( i] [ jl [ k ] , w f [ i] [ jl( k ] ) ;
> / ‘ closing i f stateaent * /
>/ ‘ closing loop of technologies*/
} / ‘ closing loop o f products*/
> /‘ closing loop of countries*/
fclo se(o u tp );
in t q u it;
p r in t f ( ‘ press any nunber and enter to f in is h \n ‘ );
scanf(*%d*l q u it);
return 0;
) / ‘ closing r a in * /
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APPENDIX C: C CODE TO ESTIMATE CHANGES IN EXPECTED NET
REVENUE IN THE BASE PERIOD AND WHEN PRICES ARE SHOCKED BY
10% FOR RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR
CANE, AND BEEF.
#include <stdio.h>
iin clu d e <aath.h>
in t nain()

{
FILE »outp;
outp«*f open( "ajw nr.out", *w*);
double net_base{20]{51=
{{-1 9 .9 4 , ~
19.64,
{107.78,
99.46,
{143.59,
134.07, 175.28 ,
{368.18 ,
246.65 , 265.05 ,
{276.20,
184.12, 205.94,
{125.40,
288.30, 395.10,
{316.36 ,
523.19 , 663.03 ,
{368.24 ,
602.37, 765.69,
{-5 6 .9 4 ,
-5 .5 9 ,
{236.34 ,
296.68, 437.16,
{345.60 ,
291.25, 384.25 ,
{118.06,
75.87,
{256.66 ,
88.68 ,
{343.15,
-284.22,
{2642.57,
2797.54,
{1821.06,
1920.54,
{624.72 ,
665.17, 547.79,
{2502.72,
2614.91,
{382.68,
527.94, 245.28,
{336.90 ,
450.61, 215.07,

76.68,
132.24, -13 1.0 2 ),
1 3 1 .0 2 ,2 2 0 .0 6 ,1 0 2 .0 8 ),
274.82, 136.49),
473.15 , 470.47),
365.42, 346.62),
391.30, 30.1 0),
667.29 , 294.23),
779.17, 332.83),
65.17,
86.31,
-18 4.0 5 ),
420.88, 131.14),
367.75 , 349.65),
2 7 6 .1 9 ,2 3 5 .1 7 ,-5 2 1 .9 9 ),
285.16, 239.38, -42 5.6 8 ),
1470.16,
1 7 3 .3 5 ,1 9 2 .2 0 ),
2324.95,
2909.90,
1861.67),
1593.48,
1988.64,
1304.88),
683.97, 453.65),
2159.07,
2673.86,
1873.62),
723.54, 559.16),
599.51, 4 98 .81 ));

double n e t_ 1 0 [2 0][5]*
{{-4 0 .7 4 , ~
0 .24 ,
57.88,
111.04, -15 7.8 2 ),
{78.66, 72.30,
104.70, 190.38, 6 4.5 6),
{107.19,
100.12, 142.38, 237.72, 8 9.5 9),
{295.38,
178.75, 199.25, 398.95, 376.67),
{219.00,
130.77, 154.24, 307.12 , 272.92),
{92.76, 244.62, 346.14, 345.82, -8 .6 6 ),
{261.96 ,
450.39 , 581.43 , 591.49 , 229.63),
{300.24 ,
511.37, 663.69 , 684.42 , 252.08),
{-7 4 .9 4 ,
-2 4 .9 9 ,4 4 .1 7 ,
69.31,
-20 4.0 5 ),
{173.34 ,
228.78, 363.66, 361.38, 61.1 4),
{273.60 ,
213.65 , 300.25 , 299.75 , 269.65),
{73.56, 39.87 ,
228.19, 198.67, -521.99),
{198.81,
41.88 ,
222.76, 191.93, -425.68),
{277.54,
-284.22,
1304.33,
139.46, 122.98),
{2298.71,
2453.90,
2051.49,
2587.16,
1539.37),
{1586.61,
1686.24,
1407.03,
1768.59,
1085.13),
{546.57,
587.07, 485.64, 610.62, 380.40),
{2190.12,
2302.51,
1910.47,
2380.46,
1580.62),
{300.18 ,
423.44, 173.23, 620.14, 444.21),
{269.40,
365.11, 156.12, 514.91, 404.76}};
double a re a [7 ][5 ]> {

{1 8 .8 9 ,1 2 .5 ,1 5 .4 8 ,8 2 .2 2 ,9 1 .8 7 },
{1 7 6 .9 3 ,8 9 .6 ,1 1 2 .0 4 ,2 0 6 .9 ,5 4 .0 },
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{8 36 .3 8,3 55 ,6 34 .7 4,3 2 5.1 8,24 .14 },
{6 0 .1 ,1 4 4 .7 ,1 1 6 .9 ,3 1 .0 ,0 },
{2 4 .1 4 ,0 ,3 1 .8 1 ,2 .5 6 ,7 2 .8 5 },
{3 87 .7 ,23 2 .7 ,2 8 4 ,1 2 6 .3 8 ,1 5 0 .2 },
{1 1 6 .4 ,1 1 5 ,6 3 .9 ,6 5 .3 ,6 9 .6 }};
double w_ave_b[5)[ 7 ] ,w_ave_10[5l[7J;
in t i= 0;
fo r (i= 0 ;i< 5 ;+ + i)

{
in t j=0;
fo r (j= 0 ;j< 7 ;+ + j)

{
i f ( j* * 0 )/* r ic e * /

{
double total_8umb=0, total_sun10=0, revenueb=0,
revenue10=0;
in t k=0;
for(k=0;k<5;++k)

{
if(k = = 0 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ] ;
revenue10«net_10 [ k] [ i ] * 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ];

}
else
if(k = = 1 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ];
re ve n u e 1 0=n e t_ 10 [k][i]*0 .0 5*a re a[j] [ i ] ;

}
else
if(k » = 2 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k ] [ i ] * 0 .3*area[ j ] [ i ];
revenue10 *n e t_ l0 [ k] [ i ] * 0 .3*area( j ] [ i J;
>

else
i f (k » 3 )

{
re v e n u e b = n e t_ b a s e [k l{il*0 .3 *a re a {jI{i);
re v e n u e 1 0= n e t_ 10 [k][i]*0 .3 *area [j) [ i ] ;
>

else

{
re v e n u e b = n e t_ b a s e [k ][i]*0 .3 *a re a [j][i];
re v e n u e 1 0 » n e t_ l0 [k ][i]*0 .3 *a re a [j] [ i ] ;

}
total_suBb=total_suab+revenueb;
total_sua10=total_suBlO+revenue10;

}
w_ave_b[i][j]=total_suab/area[j1[ i ] ;
w_ave_10[i]{j]=total_suBlO/area[j J [i];
fprintf(outp,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n* ,w_ave_b[i] [ j ] ,w_ave_10[il [J 1);

}
else
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if ( j= » 1 ) / * beans*/

{
double total_sunb»0, total_su«10 * 0 ,revenueb=0,
revenue10=0;
in t k=5;
for(k=5;k<8;++k)

{
if(k « = 5 )

{
revenueb=net_base[k][i]*o.3*area[j] [ i ] ;
re ve n u e 1 0« n et_1 0[k][i]*o .3*a re a[j1[ i l ;

}
else
if(k *= 6 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 . 2*area[ j ] [ i ];
revenue10 » n e t_ 1 0 [k ][i]* 0 .2 * a r e a [j][i];
>

else

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i 1 *0 .5*area[ j ] [ i ];
re v e n u e 1 0 » n e t_ l0 [k ]til*0 .5 *a re a [j1[ i ] ;

}
total_su*b»total_sunb+revenueb;
total_sum10=total_su«10+revenue10;

>
w_ave_b£i][ j]« to ta l_ s u e b /a re a [j] t i l ;
w_ave_10[i][ j]> to ta l_ s u n 1 0 /a re a [jl [ i l »
fp rin tf(o u tp ,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n *,w _ a v e _ b (i)[j] ,w _ave_10[il[ j ] ) ;
>

else
i f ( j “ 2) / ‘ corn*/

{
double total_sunb=0, total_suRlO>0,revenueb»o,
revenue10=0;
in t k*8;
for(k*8;k<11;++k)

{
i f (k“ 8)

{
reven ueb =n et_b ase[k][i]*0.3*area(j] [ i ] ;
revenuel0=net_10 [ k ] [ i ] * 0 .3*area[ ] ] [ i ];
>

else
if ( k * * 9 )

{
reven ueb =n et_b ase[k][i]*0.2*area[j] [ i l ;
re ve n u e 1 0= n e t_ 10 [kl[i]*0 .2*are a[j] [ i ] ;
}

else

{
re v e n u e b = n e t_ b a s e [k ][i]*0 .5 *a re a [jl[i];
re ven ue10=n et_10[k][i]*0.5*area{j1[ i l ;
>
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}
total_suab*total_suab+revenueb;
total_sua10*total_8u*10+revenue10;
w_ave_b[i][ j]*to ta l_ s u a b /a re a [j] [ i ] ;
w _ av e_ l0 [il[ j]=to ta l_ s u m 1 0 /a re a [j1[ i l ;
fp rin tf(o u tp ,
■%10.2f%10.2f \n ’ fw _ave_b[il[ j ] ,w _ a ve _l0 [ij[ j 1);

>
else
i f ( j» = 3 )/ *8orflhuB*/

{
double total_sumb=0, total_sum10 =0,revenueb=0,
revenue10=0;
in t k * l l ;
for(k»11;k<13;++k)

{
i f (k = 1 1 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i 1 *0 .5*area[ j ] [ i ] ;
revenue10=net_10 [ k ] [ i ] * 0 .5*area( j ] [ i ];

>

else

{
revenueb*net_base[k][ i ] ‘ 0 .5 ‘ a r e a [j] [ i ] ;
revenuel0*net_10 [ k ] [ i ] * 0 .5*area[ j ] [ i 1;

}

total_3unb«total_suflb+revenueb;
total_suBl0*total_8UBl0+revenue10;
w_ave_b[i][ j]*total_suab/area[jJ[ij;
w_ave_10[i][j]>total_sun10/area[j] [ i l ;
fprintf(outp,
■%10.2f%10.2f\n ',w _ a v e _ b [i]tj1,w _ave_lO [il[ j ) ) ;

~>
else
i f ( j “ 4) / ‘ banana*/

{

w_ave_b[i][ jl*n e t_ b a s e [1 3 ] [ i ] ;
w _ a v e _ l0 [il[j]- n e t _ l0 [ l3 ][ i] ;
fp rin tf(o u tp ,
•%10.2f%10.2f \n‘ , w_ave_b ( i 1( j 1, w_ave_10 [i ] [ j ) ) ;

>
else
i f ( j “ 5) / ‘ c o ffe e */

{
double total_suBb>0, total_sum l0*0, revenueb=0,
revenue10*0;
in t k *l4 ;
for(k*14;k<l8;++k)

{
if (k * * 1 4 )

{
re v e n u e b « n e t_ b a s e [k ][i]*0 .0 5 *a re a [jI[i];
reve n u e l0 =n et_ 10 (k )[il* 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ] ;

>
else
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i f (k » 1 5 )

{
revenueb=net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .05*area[ j ] [ i ];
revenue10»net_10[kj[i]‘ 0 .0 5 * a r e a [ j ] [ i] ;

>
else
i f ( k — 16)

{
revenueb «n et_b ase[k][il*0.3*area[j] [ i ] ;
revenuel0»net_10[k]t i l * 0 .3 *a re a [j1[i ] ;

}
else

{
revenueb*net_base[ k] [ i ] * 0 .3*area[ j ] [ i ];
revenuel0»net_10 [ k] [ i ] * 0 .3 *a re a [j 1[ i l ;

>
}
total_suab=total_suab+revenueb;
total_sun10»total_sua10+revenuel0;
w _ave_b[ij[ jl*to ta l_ s u a b /a re a [ j ] [ i ] ;
w _ave_10[ij[ jl*to ta l_ s u a l0 /a r e a [ j I [ i l ;
fp rin tf(o u tp ,
•%10.2f%10.2f\n *,w _ave_b [i][ j J,w_ave_10[il[ j l );

>
else /*sugarcane*/

{
double total_sunb»0, total_sua10“0 , revenueb=0,
revenuel0*0;
in t k«18;
for(k»18 ; k<20; ++k)

{
i f (k“ 18)

{
re v e n u e b *n e t_ b a s e [k j[il*0 .5 *a re a [jl[il;
re v e n u e l0 « n e t_ 1 0 [k l[il*0 .5 *a re a [j1[ i l ;

>
else

{
reven ueb «n et_b ase[k][i]*0.5*area[j] [ i ] ;
re venue 10=>net_l 0 [ k 1[ i 1*0 . 5*area [ j 1[ i l :

>
}
total_suBb*total_suab+revenueb;
total_sual0*total_sua10+revenue10;
a _a ve _b [il[ jl« to ta l_ s u a b /a re a [j1[i l ;
w_ave_10[il[ jl« to ta l_ s u a io /a re a [H [ i l ;
fp rin tf(o irtp ,
•%10.2f%10.2f\n *,w _ a v e _ b [il[J I,w _ a v e _ l0 [il[jI);
) / ‘ closing la s t i f (k )s ta te a e n t*/
} /•
closing product loop ( j ) * /
} / ‘ closing country loop ( i ) • /
fclo s e(o u tp );
return 0;
> / ‘ closing a a in */
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APPENDIX D: SAS PROGRAM FOR THE ESTIMATION OF LABOR,
FERTILIZER, AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND
BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
data Quatema;
array guate{15,60} guate1-guate900;
array seed{60> seed1-seed60;
do i=1to 60;
s eed{i}*10+ i;
end;
do i*1 to 15;
do 1*1 to 60;
i f }*1
then g u a te {i,j}*5 4 *.7 5 + 5 4 *.2 *n o r« a l(s e e d {1 });
else i f J*2
then g u a te {i,1 }* 1 *.75+1 * . 2*nornal( seed{2});
else i f j* 3
then g u a te {i,j}*2 .2 5 + 0 .3 4 *n o rn a l(s e e d {3 });
else i f j=4
then g u a te { i,J }*2 8 *.75+28*.2*normal(seed{4>);
else i f j=5
then g u a te fi,j}= 1 *.7 5 + 1 *0.2*norinal(seed{5});
else i f j* 6
then g u a te {i,j}*2 .2 5 + 0 .3 4 *n o rn a l(s e e d {6 });
else i f j* 7
then g u a te {i, j }*3 4 .5 *.7 5 + 3 4 .5 *.2*nor«al(seed{7});
else i f 1-8
then g u a te {i,j> -2 *.7 5 + 2 *.2 *n o ra a l(s e e d {8 > );
else i f j* 9
then guate{i,l> *2.25+0.34*n orm al(seed {9});
else i f j*1 0
then g u a t e { i,j} * l9 * .75+19*.2*nor«al(seed{10>);
else i f 1*11
then g u a te {i,l}*4 *.7 5 + 4 *.2 *n o ra a l(s e e d {1 1 });
else i f 1*12
then g u a te {i,l> *2 .2 5 + 0 .3 4 *n o ra a l(s e e d {l2 });
else i f 1*13
then g u a te fi, 1>*18*.75+18*.2 *n o raal(seed {13»;
else i f 1*14
then g u a t e { i,i} * 4 * .75+4*.2*nor«al(seed{14});
else i f j*1 5
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then g u a te {i, j } * 2 .25+0.34*nonaal(seed{15 } );
else i f j»16
then g u a te { i,j}s 5 0 *.75+50*.2*norm l(seed{16>);
else i f j “17
then g u a te {i,j> = 0 ;
else i f j»18
then g u ate{i,j}*2.25+ 0.34*n o p n al(seed {18});
else i f j “19
then g u a te {i,j}*> 3 9 *.75+39*.2*n op aal(seed {l9});
else i f j«20
then g u a te {i, j> = 1*. 75+1 * . 2*nom al( seed{20>);
else i f j*21
then g u a te {i, j}=2.25+0.34*nor«al(seed{21>);
else i f j*2 2
then g u ate{i, j} * 4 5 * .75+45*.2*nom al(seed{22>);
else i f j=23
then g u ate{i,j> *1*.75 + 1 *.2*n o r» a l(s ee d {2 3> );
else i f j*2 4
then g u ate{i,j}*2.2 5+ 0.3 4 *n oraa l(se ed {2 4> );
else i f j»25
then g u a te { i,j}« 4 7 *.75+47*.2*noraal(seed{25>);
else i f j=26
then g u a te {i,j> *0 ;
else i f j*2 7
then g u ate{i, j> « 2 .25+0.34*nornal(seed{2 7 });
else i f ]«28
then g u a te {i, j} * 5 4 * .75+54*.2*nor«al( seed{2 8 });
else i f j-2 9
then g u a te {i,j}» 3*.75 + 3 *.2 *n o raa l(se ed {2 9> );
else i f j*3 0
then g u ate{i,j}*2.2 5+ 0.3 4 *n oraa l(se ed {3 0> );
else i f j*31
then guate{i,j>»5*.75+5*.2*nopaal(seed{31>);
else i f j*3 2
then g u ate {i,j}*5 *.7 5 + 5 *.2 *n o rw a l(s e e d {2 3 });
else i f j=33
then guate{i,j}»2.2S +0.34*nopaal(seed{33>);
else i f j=*34
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then g u a te { i,j}= 6 1 *.75+61*.2*noraal(seed{34>);
else i f j*3 5
then g u a te {i,j}= 2 *.7 5 + 2 *.2 *n o r« a l(s e e d {3 5 });
e lse i f j*3 6
then guate{i,j}= 2.25+0.34*n o raal(seed {36> );
else i f J=37
then g u a te {i, j >>20*.75+20*.2*nornal( seed{3 7 });
else i f j»38
then g u a t e { i,j>=4*.75+4*.2*noraal( seed{38>);
else i f j«39
then g u a te { i,j}= 2 .25+0.34*noraal( seed{39});
else i f j=40
then g u a te { i,j}» 5 4 *.75+54*.2*noraal(seed{40>);
else i f j=41
then g u a te {i, j > *8 *.7 5+ 8*.2*n oraal( seed{41>);
else i f j*4 2
then g u ate{i,j}-2.25+0.34*n o rn al(seed {42 }

) ;

else i f j*4 3
then g u a te { i,j >*175*.75+175*.2*noraal(seed{43});
else i f j*4 4
then g u a te {i, j } * 8 .5 2 *.7 5 + 8 .5 2 *.2*n oraal( seed{44});
else i f j»45
then g u ate{i,j}*2.2 5+ 0.3 4 *n o raa l(se ed {4 5> );
else i f j«46
then g u a te {i, j } * 1 14*.75+114*.2*nornal(seed{46});
else i f j*4 7
then g u ate{i,j}» 6 *.7 5 + 6 *.2 *n o ra a l(s e e d {4 7 > );
else i f j*4 8
then g u ate{i,j}*2.2 5+ 0.3 4 *n o raa l(se ed {4 8> );
else i f j»49
then g u a te {i,]> > 3 9 *.75+39*.2*noraal(seed{49>);
else i f j»50
then g u a te {i,}> *0 ;
else i f J-51
then g u ate{i,j}*2.25+ 0.34*n o r«al(seed {51} ) ;
else i f j-5 2
then g u ate{i,j> *133*.75+133*.2*n o n sal(seed {52»;
else i f j»53
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then g u a te {i, j}= 8.1 6 *.75 +8 .1 6*.2*n o r« al(s ee d {53 });
else i f j*5 4
then g u ate{i,j}*2 .2 5 + 0 .3 4 *n o rn a l(s e e d {5 4 });
else i f j “55
then g u a te {i, j} * 3 0 * .75+30*.2*noreal( seed{55>);
else i f j=56
then g u a te {i,j}= 2 *.7 5 + 2 *.2 *n o ra a l(s e e d {5 6 });
else i f j=57
then g u a te { i,j} = 2 .25+0.34*noraal(seed{5 7 });
else i f j*5 8
then g u a te {i, j >*19 *.75 + 1 9*.2*n oraal( seed{4 0 });
else i f j«59
then g u a te {i, j} = 2 * .75+ 2*.2*nornal(seed{59>);
else g uate{i,j}> 2.2 5 + 0.34 *n o rn al(se e d {60 });
end;
end;
run;
proc p rin t;
var guatel-guate900;
run;
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APPENDIX E: SHAZAM! PROGRAM FOR OUTPUT MAXIMA AND
MINIMA IN THE PRODUCTION OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM,
BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES USING DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
set nocolor
sample 1 9
file screen a:\guatema\gminmax.out
read(a:\guatema\gminmax.txt) 1 h
genr min=l* 1,42*.75
genr max=h* 1.42* 125
format(2 f8 .2 )
print min max / format
sample 1 7
genr tmin=sum(min)
genr tmax=sum(max)
print tmin tmax / format
stop
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APPENDIX F: SHAZAM! PROGRAM FOR PARAMETER ESTIMATION OF
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM,
BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES USING DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
set nocolor
file screen a:\guatema\guatema.out
sample

1

IS

read(a:\guatema\guatlkf.txt) rll r lf rlk i21 r2f r2k r31 r3f &
r3k r4l r4f r4k r51 r5f r5k &
b ll b lfb lk b21 b2f b2k b31 b3f b3k e ll e lf elk c21 c2f c2k &
c31 c3f c3k sll s lf slk s21 s2f s2k g ll g if glk k ll k lf klk &
k21 k2fk2k k31 k3f k3k k41 k4f k4k z ll z lf zlk z21 z2f z2k m il m lk
read(a:\guatema\guataqp.txt) ar ab ac as ag ak az qr qb qc qs &
qg qk qz pr pb pc ps pg pk pz qm tm sm pm
***************************************************************

♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR RICE#
genr rtfl=ar^l.42^05M f*1000
genr 1*0 = 3 ^ 1.42^.05^r2f*1000
genr rtf3=ar* 1,42*.3*r3f* 1000
genr rtf4=ai* 1,42*.3*r4f* 1000
genr rtf5=ai*l.42#.3+r5f* 1000
genr rtfi=rtfl+rt£2+rtf3+rtf4+rtf5
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR BEANS^
genr btfl=abn.42+.3^blf*1000
genr bt£2=ab# 1.42^.2#b2f* 1000
genr btf3=ab<1.42^.5#b3f* 1000
genr btf=btfl +btf2+btf3
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR CORN^
genr ctfl=acn.42+.3^clf*1000
genr ctf2=ac# 1.42+.2#c2f* 1000
genr ctf3=ac#1.42#.5#c3f*1000
genr ct£=ctfl+ct£2+ctf3
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR SORGHUM^
genr stfl=as^l.42^.5^slP1000
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genr stf2=as* 1.42*.5*s2f* 1000
genr stf=stfl+stf2
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR BANANAS*
genr gtf=ag* 1.42*g 1f* 1000
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR COFFEE*
genr ktfl=ak*l .42*.4*kl f*1000
genr kt£2=ak*1.42*.2*k2t*1000
genr ktf3=ak*1.42*.3*k3f* 1000
genr ktf4=ak* 1.42*.! *k4f*1000
genr ktf=ktfl+lct£2+ktf3+ktf4
♦ESTIMATING FERTILIZER USE FOR SUGARCANE*
genr ztfl =az* 1.42*.5*z If* 1000
genr ztf2=az* 1.42* 5*z2f* 1000
genr ztf=ztfl+ztf2

♦♦♦TOTAL FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION******
*************************************

genr tf=rtf+btf+ctf+stf+gtf+-ktf+ztf
format(3x, 8fl3.2)
print tf / format
print rtf btf ctf stf gtf ktf ztf / format
*******************************************************

♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR RICE*
genr rtl l=ar*1.42*.05*rll* 1000
genr rtl2=ar*1.42*.05*r2I* 1000
genr rtl3=ar*1.42*.3*r31*1000
genr rtl4=ar*l ,42*.3*r4l*1000
genr rtI5=ar*1.42* 3*rSl*1000
genr rtl=rtll+rtl2+rtl3+rtl4+rtl5
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR BEANS*
genr btl 1=ab* 1.42* .3*b 11*1000
genr btl2=ab* 1.42* 2*b21* 1000
genrbtl3=ab*l.42*.5*b31*l000
genr btl=btl l+bt!2+btl3
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR CORN*
genr ctll=ac*l.42*.3*cll*1000
genr ctl2=ac* 1.42*.2*c21* 1000
genr ctl3=ac*1.42*.5*c31* 1000
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genr ctl=ctl 1+ctl2+ctl3
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR SORGHUM^
genr stll=as>1.42#.5%slP1000
genr stl2=as* 1,42^.5^s21*1000
genr stl=stll+stl2
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR BANANAS^
genr gtl=ag# 1.42#g I !♦ 1000
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR CATTLE-BEEF#
genr mtl=sm^mll# 1 0 0 0
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR COFFEE^
genr ktll=akn.42*.4*klP1000
genr ktl2=akM.42#.2*k21#1000
genr ktl3=ak+1.42^.3^k3P 1000
genr ktl4=ak*l.42M♦k41*1000
genr ktl=ktl L+ktl2+ktl3+ktl4
♦ESTIMATING LABOR USE FOR SUGARCANE^
genrztll=azM .42#.5#zll*1000
genr ztl2=az^ 1.42*.5*221* 1000
genr ztl=ztll+zt! 2

♦♦♦TOTAL LABOR C O N S U M P T IO N " " ^ " "
genr tl=rtl+btl+ctl+stl+gtl+ktl+ztl+mtl
print tl / format
print rtl btl ctl stl gtl ktl ztl mtl / format
*********************************************************

♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR RICE^
genr rtkl=qr#.05#pr#rlk
genr rtk2=qr#.05#pi*r2k
genr rtk3=qr#.3,>prl*r3k
genr rtk4=qr#.3’*pr’*r4k
genr rtk5=qr#.3#pr#r5k
genr rtk=rtkl+rtk2+rtk3+rtk4+rtk5
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR BEANS^
genr btkl=qb#.3^pb^blk
genr btk2 =qb#.2 ,tpb%b2 k
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genr btk3=qb*.5*pb*b3k
genr btk=btkl +btk2+btk3
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR CORN*
genr ctkl=qc*.3*pc*clk
genr ctk2 =qc*.2 *pc*c2 k
genr ctk3=qc*.5*pc*c3k
genr ctt=ctkl+ctk2+ctk3
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR SORGHUM^
genr stkl=qs#.5#ps#slk
genr stk2=qs#.5*‘ps+s2k
genr stk=stkl+stk2
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR BANANAS^
genr gtk=qg#pg#g lk
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR CATTLE-BEEF*
genr mtk=qm*pm*m 1 K
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR COFFEE^
genr ktkl=qk*.4*pk*klk
genr ktk2 =qk*.2 *pk*k2 k
genr ktk3=qk*.3’*pkl,k3k
genr ktk4=qk*. 1♦pk#k3k
genr ktk=ktkl+ktk2+ktk3+ktk4
♦ESTIMATING CAPITAL USE FOR SUGARCANE^
genr ztkl=qz*.5*pz^zlk
genr ztk2=qz* .5 *pz#z2k
genr ztk=ztkl+ztk2

♦♦♦TOTAL CAPITAL C O N S U M P T IO N ""^"
*************************************

genr tk=rtk+btk+ctk+stk+gtk+ktk+ztk+mtk
print tk / format
print rtk btk ctk stk gtk ktk ztk ratk / format

*************************************************

♦ ESTIMATING LEAST SQUARES *********************
**********************************************
*******************************************
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genr lnqr=log(qr)
genr Inpr=log(pr)
genr lnar=log(ar)
genr lnrtk=log(rtk)
genr Inrtl-log(rtl)
genr Inrtf=Iog(rtf)
genr lnqb=log(qb)
genr lnab^IogCab)
genr lnpb=log(pb)
genr lnbtk=log(btk)
genr lnbtl=log(btl)
genr lnbtf=log(btf)

genr lnqc=log(qc)
genr lnac=log(ac)
genr lnpc=log(pc)
genr lnctk=log(ctk)
genr lnctl=Iog(ctl)
genr lnctf=log(ctf)
genr Inqs=log(qs)
genr Inas=log(as)
genr Inps=Iog(ps)
genr lnstk=log(stk)
genr Instl=Iog(stl)
genr lnstfHog(stf)
genr lnqg=log(qg)
genr lnag=Iog(ag)
genr lnpg=log(pg)
genr lngtk=log(gtk)
genrIngtl=log(gtl)
genr lngtf=log(gtf)
genr lnqk=log(qk)
genr lnak=log(ak)
genr lnpk=log(pk)
genr lnktk=log(ktk)
genr lnktI=log(ktl)
genr lnktf=Iog(ktf)
genr lnqz=log(qz)
genr lnaz=log(az)
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genr lnpz=Iog(pz)
genr lnztk=log(ztk)
genr lnzti=log(ztI)
genr Inztf=log(ztf)
genr lnqm=log(qm)
genr lntm=log(tm)
genr lnsm=log(sm)
genr lnpm=Iog(pm)
genr lnmtk=log(mtk)
genr lnmtl=log(mtl)
format(2 x, 2 f 8 .2 )
ols ar rtk rtl rtf
ols lnar lnrtk Inrtl lnrtf / predict=lnarhat
print lnar lnarhat / format
olsab b tkb tlb tf
ols Inab lnbtk Inbtl Inbtf / predict2 lnabhat
print lnab lnabhat / format
ols ac ctk ctl ctf
ols lnac Inctk lnctl lnctf / predict2 Inachat
print lnac lnachat / format
ols as stk stl stf
ols Inas lnstk Instl lnstf / predict= Inashat
print lnas Inashat / format
ols ag gtk gtl gtf
ols lnag lngtk lngtl Ingtf / predict2 lnaghat
print lnag lnaghat / format
ols ak ktk ktl ktf
ols lnak lnktk lnktl Inktf / predict2 Inakhat
print lnak Inakhat / format
ols az ztk ztl ztf
ols lnaz lnztk lnztl lnztf / predict2 Inazhat
print lnaz Inazhat / format
************************************************

**beef estimation*******************************
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ols qm mtk mtl tm
ols Inqm lnmtk lnmtl lntm / predict^ lnqmhat
print lnqm lnqmhat / format
ols qm mtk mtl sm
ols lnqm lnmtk lnmtl lnsm / predicts lnqmhat 1
print lnqm lnqmhatl / format
stop
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APPENDIX G: SAS PROGRAM FOR NON-LINEAR ESTIMATION
PROCEDURE OF SUPPLY ELASTICITIES OF RICE, BEANS, CORN,
SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
data Guatema;
proc nip tech=QUANEW MAXITER=1000 MAXFUNC=1000;
parms
ar ab ac as ag ak az av
nr nb nc ns ng nk nz nv
kr kb kc ks kg kk kz kv
lr lb lc Is Ig lk Iz lv
fr fb fc fe fg fk fe
pop=l2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ;
bounds
11700 <=ar<= 46150,
68000 <=ab<= 3070000,
582560 <=ac<= 1356100,
36210 <= as <=124250,
7880 <=ag<= 30180,
259860 <=ak<= 484570,
74550 <=az<= 323050,
39410 <=av<= 120700,
0 <= pop <= 573320,
0 < = k r< = 21805.02,
0<= kb <=129380.74,
0< = kc< = 437394.71,
0 <= ks <= 23044.03,
0<= kg <=414321.92,
0< = kk< = 1259388.34,
0< = kz< = 68814.94,
0< = kv< = 61625.84,
0 < = lr< = 388657.0,
0<= lb <=6359631.42,
0 < = lc< = 17537624.48
0 <= Is <= 1991181.89,
0 < = lg < = 1215453.83,
0 < = lk < = 431291133,
0 < = lz< = 4378645.54,
0 <= lv <= 13894713,
0 < = fr<= 43050.64,
0 <= fb <= 94764.78,
0 < = fc< = 2735649.27,
0 < = fs< = 127115.57,
0 < = fg < = 239756.79,
0 < = fk< = 1264781.07,
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0 <= fz <= 313980.05,
0 <= nr nb nc ns ng nk nz nv;
nlincon
nlcl-nlcl9 >= 0.,
0 <= nlc9 <=240.78,
0< = nlcl0 < = 285.01,
0 < = n lc ll< = 172.80,
0< = nlcl2< = 12833,
0< = nlcl3< = 343.15,
0< = n lcl4< = 750.82,
0< = nlcl5< = 168.45,
0 < = nlcl6< = 150.1;
maxf;
f=nr*arfnb*ab+nc*ac+ns*as+nk*ak+nz*az+nv*av;
nlcl=ar-(exp(-7.176)*(lr**0.400)*(kr**0.070)*(fr**0.373));
nlc2=ab-(exp(-5.4l0)*(lb**0.589)*(kb**(0.070))*(fb**0.022));
nlc3=ac-(exp(5.540)*(lc**(0.193))*(kc**(-0.196))*(fc**0.017));
nlc4=as-(exp(-5.658)*(ls**0.202)*(ks**(-0.105))*(fs**0.646»;
nlc5=ag-(exp(-4.634)*0g**0.098)*(kg**(0.357))*(fg**(0.109)));
nlc6=ak-(exp(2.180)*(lk**0.087)*(kk**0.00l)*(fk**0.131));
nlc7=az-(exp(-4.003)*(lz**0.176)*(kz**0.341)*(fe**(0.213)));
nlc8=av-(exp(-9.223)*(lv**0.036)*(kv**0.931)*(pop**(0.239)));
nlc9 = ar-((240.78-nr)/0.001);
nlclO = ab-((285.01-nb)/0.0001);
n lcll =ac-((172.80-nc)/0.000l2);
nlcl2 = as-((12833-ns)/0.001);
nlcl3 = ag-((343.15-ng)/0.001);
nlcl4 = ak-((750.82-nk)/0.0001);
nlcl5 = az-((168.45-nz)/0.0001);
nlcl6 = av-(( 150. l-nv)/0 .0 0 1);
nlcl7 = 75000304.73-(lr**0.400)-(lb**0.589)-(Ic**(0.193))-(ls**0.202)0g**0.098>(lk**0.087)-(Iz**0.i76)-(lv**0.036);
nlcl8 = 2332334.68-(kr**0.007)-(kb**(0.007))-(kc**(-0.196))-(ks**(-0.105))(kg**(0.357)Hkk**0.001Hkz**0.341Hkv**0.931);
nlcl9 = 4819098.16-(fr**0.373Kfi>**0.022Hfc**0.017Hfe**0.646)(fg**(0.109)Kflc**0.131Hfe**(0339));
run;
quit;
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APPENDIX H: SAS CODE TO ESTIMATE DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF
RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE, SUGAR CANE, AND
BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICA COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
data Guatema;
array guate{15,8} guatel-guatel20;
array seed{8 } seedl-seed8 ;
do i=lto 8 ;
seed{i}=1 0 +i;
end;
do i=l to 15;
do j= l to 8 ;
ifj= l
then guate{ij }=4.6+4.6 *.2*normal(seed{1});
else if j = 2
then guate {ij }=8 .4+8.4*.2*normal(seed {2});
else if j=3
then guate{ij}=l 10.15+110.15*.2*normal(seed {3});
else if j=4
then guate{ij}=l .25+1.25*.2*normal(seed{4});
else if j=5
then guate {ij }=3.4+3.4*0.2*normal(seed {5});
else if j = 6
then guate{ij}=l. 1+ 1 .1 *.2 *normal(seed{6 });
else if j=7
thenguate{ij}=42.2+42.2*.2*normaI(seed{7});
else guate {ij }=4.45+4.45*.2*normal(seed {8 });
end;
end;
run;
proc print;
var guatel-guatel2 0 ;
run;
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APPENDIX I: SHAZAM! PROGRAM TO ESTIMATE DEMAND
ELASTICITIES OF RICE, BEANS, CORN, SORGHUM, BANANAS, COFFEE,
SUGAR CANE, AND BEEF IN CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES USING
DATA FOR THE YEARS 1984-1998.
set nocolor
file screen a:\honduras\hdemandout
sample I IS
read(a:MiondurasMidernancLtxt) npr npb npc nps npg npk npz npm dr db dc ds &
dg dk dz dm gdpcu gdpco pop cpi
format(3x,8fl0.2)
genr cr=dr*pop
genrcb=db*pop
genr cc=dc*pop
genr cs=ds*pop
genr cg=dg*pop
genr ck=dk*pop
genr cz=dz*pop
genr cm=dm*pop
write(a:\honduras\hconsumo.txt)cr cb cc cs eg ck cz cm / format
genr t=time(0)
genrpr=npr/cpi
genr pb=npb/cpi
genr pc=npc/cpi
genr ps=nps/cpi
genr pg=npg/cpi
genr pk=npk/cpi
genr pz=npz*l 1/cpi
genr pm=npm/cpi
genr expr=dr*pr
genr expb=db*pb
genr expc=dc*pc
genr exps=ds*ps
genr expg=dg*pg
genr expk=dk*pk
genr expz=dz*pz
genr expm=dm*pm
genr expt=expiH-expb+expc+exps+expk+expz
genr wr=expr/expt
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genr wb=expb/expt
genr wc=expc/expt
genr ws=exps/expt
genr wg=expg/expt
genr wk=expk/expt
genr wz=expz/expt
genr wm=expm/expt
stat wr wb wc ws wg wk wz wm / means=mexp
matrix wbar=mexp
matrix wrbar=mexp(l)
matrix wbbar=mexp(2)
matrix wcbar=mexp(3)
matrix wsbar=mexp(4)
matrix wgbar=mexp(5)
matrix wkbar=mexp(6)
matrix wzbar=mexp(7)
matrix wmbar=mexp(8)
genr Inpr=log(pr)
genr lnpb=log(pb)
genr lnpc=log(pc)
genr lnps=log(ps)
genr Inpg=log(pg)
genr Inpk=log(pk)
genr lnpz=log(pz)
genr lnpm=log(pm)
genr lagwr=lag(wr)
genr lagwb=lag(wb)
genr lagwc=Iag(wc)
genr lagws=lag(ws)
genr Iagwg=Iag(wg)
genr lagwk=lag(wk)
genr lagwz=Iag(wz)
genr lagwm=lag(wm)
genr lnwr=log(wr)
genr lnwb=Iog(wb)
genr lnwc=log(wc)
genr lnws=log(ws)
genr lnwg=log(wg)
genr lnwk=log(wk)
genr lnwz=log(wz)
genr lnwm=log(wm)
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sample 2 IS
genr
tamdex=lagwr*tapt+lagwb*tapb+lagwc*tapc+lagws*taps+lagwg*topgHagwk*taplc+la
gwz*lnpz+lagwm*Inpm
genr index=exp(taindex)
genr lnexp=log(expt/index)
*********************************************************

*********ESTIMATING ELASTICITIES FOR r ic e *"**************
*********************************************************

ols wr lnpr lnpb Inpc taps lnpm taexp / coef=rice
matrix i=rice
genl brr=r(l)
genl brb=r(2)
genl brc=r(3)
genl brs=r(4)
genl brm=r(5)
genl bre=r(6)
genl rint=r(7)
genl err=-1+(brr/wrbar)-bre
genl erb=(brb/wrbar)-bre*(wbbar/wrbar)
genl erc=(brc/wrbar)-bre*(wcbar/wrbar)
genl ers=(brs/wrbar)-bre*(wsbar/wrbar)
genl erm=(brm/wrbar)-bre*(wmbar/wrbar)
print err erb ere ers erm
*********************************************************

*********ESm iATING ELASTICITIES f o r

b e a n s ***************

*********************************************************

ols wb lnpr lnpb tape taps lnpm taexp / coef=bean
matrix b=bean
genl bbr=b(l)
genl bbb=b(2)
genl bbc=b(3)
genl bbs=b(4)
genl bbm=b(5)
genl bbe=b(6)
genl bint=b(7)
genl ebb=-1+(bbb/wbbar)-bbe
genl ebr=(bbr/wbbar)-bbe*(wrbar/wbbar)
genl ebc=(bbc/wbbar)-bbe*(wcbar/wbbar)
genl ebs=(bbs/wbbar)-bbe*(wsbar/wbbar)
genl ebm=(bbm/wbbar)-bbe*(wmbar/wbbar)
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print ebr ebb ebc ebs ebm
*********************************************************

♦********ESTIMATING e l a s t ic it ie s FOR CORN***************
*********************************************************

ols wc lnpr lnpb Inpc taps lnpm taexp / coef=com
matrix c=com
genl bcr=c(l)
genl bcb=c(2)
genl bcc=c(3)
genl bcs=c(4)
genl bcm=c(5)
genl bce=c(6)
genl cint=c(7)
genl ecc=-1+(bcc/wcbar)-bce
genl ecr=(bcr/wcbar)-bce*(wrbar/wcbar)
genl ecb=(bcb/wcbar)-bce*(wbbar/wcbar)
genl ecs=(bcs/wcbar)-bce*(wsbar/wcbar)
genl ecm=(bcni/wcbar)-bce*(wmbar/wcbar)
print ecr ecb ecc ecs ecm

ESTIMATING ELASTICITIES FOR SORGHUM'
ols ws lnpr lnpb tape taps lnpm taexp / coef=sorg
matrix s=sorg
genl bsr=s(l)
genl bsb=s(2)
genl bsc=s(3)
genl bss=s(4)
genl bsm=s(5)
genl bse=s(6)
genl sint=s(7)
genl ess=-l+(bss/wsbar)-bse
genl esr=(bsr/wsbar)-bse*(wrbar/wsbar)
genl esb=(bsb/wsbar)-bse*(wbbar/wsbar)
genl esc={bsc/wsbar)-bse*(wcbar/wsbar)
genl esm=(bsm/wsbar)-bse*(wmbar/wsbar)
print esresb esc ess esm
*********************************************************

*********ESTIMATING e l a s t ic it ie s

fo r

BANANA************"

*********************************************************

ols wg tapg tapk tapz taexp / coef=guin
matrix g=guin
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genl bgg=g(l)
genl bgk=g(2)
genl bgz=g(3)
genl bge=g(4)
genl gint=g(5)
genl egg=-1+(bgg/wgbar)-bge
genl egk=(bgk/wgbar)-bge*(wkbar/wgbar)
genl egz=(bgz/wgbar)-bge*(wzbar/wgbar)
print egg egkegz
*********************************************************

*********ESTMATING ELASTICITIES f o r

c o f f e e **************

*********************************************************

ols wk Inpk lnpz lnpm lnexp / coef=cafe
matrix k=cafe
genl bkk=k(l)
genl bkz=k(2)
genl bkm=k(3)
genl bke=k(4)
genl kint=k(5)
genl ekk=-1+(bkk/wkbar)-bke
genl ekz=(bkz/wkbar)-bke*(wzbar/wkbar)
genl ekm=(bkm/wkbar)-bke*(wmbar/wkbar)
print ekk ekz ekm
*********************************************************

*********ESTIMATING e l a s t ic it ie s

f o r s u g a r ***************

ols wz Inpg Inpk lnpz lnexp / coef=sugar
matrix z=sugar
genl bzg=z(l)
genl bzk=z(2)
genl bzz=z(3)
genl bze=k(4)
genl zint=k(5)
genl ezz=-1+(bzz/wzbar)-bze
genl ezg=(bzg/wzbar)-bze*(wgbar/wzbar)
genl ezk=(bzk/wzbar)'bze*(wkbar/wzbar)
print ezz ezg ezk

*********************************************************

*********ESTTMATING ELASTICmES FOR BEEF****************
*********************************************************

ols wm lnpr lnpb lnpc Inps lnpm biexp / coef=meat
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matrix m=meat
genl bmr=m(l)
genl bmb=m(2)
genl bmc=m(3)
genl bms=m(4)
genl bmm=m(5)
genl bme=m(6)
genl mint=m(7)
genl emm=-1+(binm/wmbar)-bme
genl emr=(bmr/wmbar)-bme*(wrbar/wmbar)
genl emb=(bmb/wmbar)-bme*(wbbar/wmbar)
genl emc=(bmc/wmbar)-bme*(wcbar/wmbar)
genl ems=(bms/wmbar)-bme*(wsbar/wmbar)
print emm emr emb emc ems
**********************************************************
•♦♦CREATING MATRIX OF ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND**************
**********************************************************

format(3x,8f8.4)
matrix eta=iden(8)
matrix eta(l,l)=err
matrix eta(l,2)=erb
matrix eta(l,3)=erc
matrix eta(l,4)=ers
matrix eta(l,5)=0
matrix eta(l,6)=0
matrix eta(l,7)=0
matrix eta(l,8)=:enn
matrix eta(2,l)=ebr
matrix eta(2,2)=ebb
matrix eta(2,3)=ebc
matrix eta(2,4)=ebs
matrix eta(2,5)=0
matrix eta(2,6)=0
matrix eta(2,7)=0
matrix eta(2,8)=ebm
matrix eta(3,l)=ecr
matrix eta(3^)=ecb
matrix eta(3,3)=ecc
matrix eta(3,4)=ecs
matrix eta(3,5)=0
matrix eta(3,6)=0
matrix eta(3,7)=0
matrix eta(3,8)=ecm
matrix eta(4,l)=esr
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matrix eta(4,2)=esb
matrix eta(4,3)=esc
matrix eta(4,4)=ess
matrix eta(4,5)=0
matrix eta(4,6)=0
matrix eta(4,7)=0
matrix eta(4,8)=esm
matrix eta(5,l)=0
matrix eta(5,2)=0
matrix eta(5,3)=0
matrix eta(5,4)=0
matrix eta(5,5)=egg
matrix eta(5,6)=egk
matrix eta(5,7)=egz
matrix eta(5,8)=0
matrix eta(6,l)=0
matrix eta(6,2)=0
matrix eta(6,3)=0
matrix eta(6,4)=0
matrix eta(6,5)=0
matrix eta(6,6)=ekk
matrix eta(6,7)=ekz
matrix eta(6,8)=ekm
matrix eta(7,l)=0
matrix eta(7,2)=0
matrix eta(7,3)=0
matrix eta(7,4)=0
matrix eta(7,5)=ezg
matrix eta(7,6)=ezk
matrix eta(7,7)=ezz
matrix eta(7,8)=0
matrix eta(8,l)=emr
matrix eta(8,2)=emb
matrix eta(8,3)=emc
matrix eta(8,4)=ems
matrix eta(8,5)=0
matrix eta(8,6)=0
matrix eta(8,7)=0
matrix eta(8,8)=emm
print eta / format
stop
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